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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to describe how one
particular community, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, was transformed
from a religious commune into an industrial city between
1741 and 1920. The focus of this essay is on social change,
for industrialization i~~~olved more than just economic
development; it also affected the social institutions and
value systems ~y which people lived. Moreover, since none
of the events which comprise Bethlehem's history took place
in isolation, local developments are considered in the
light of the national experience. Thus, this examination
of Bethlehem's past should be viewed as more than just an
exercise in local history: it should be seen as a case
study in the industrialization of the United States.

vi
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Introduction

The theme of this dissertation is social change.

Its focus is the

experience of a particular American community, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,
during the period 1850 to 1920--a period which marked the emergence of
the United States as a modern industrial nation.

Although Bethlehem is

the subject of this essay, the intent is not to present a local history
~~·

Rather, Bethlehem is to be seen as a microcosm of the national

experience.

In other words, it should be viewed as a case study in the

impact of industrialization.
All discussion of social change,

~·1hether

it be of a national or a

community orientation, cannot escape the debt owed to the work of
Ferdinand Tennies.

Tennies' classic Gemeinschaft -- Gesellschaft

typology has been the theoretical starting point for all discussion of
social organization since he first presented his ideas in 1887.

In

fact, although a number of theorists have subsequently attempted to
supplant Tennies' theories with their own, none have succeeded.

For

the most part, they have merely modified his ideas in regard to
specific problems; Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft remain as a relevant

-=-

conceptual framework for the study of social change.

1

1John c. McKinney and Charles P. Loomis, "The Application of
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as Related to Other Typologies,"
in Ferdinand Tennies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft), Charles P. Loomis, Ed., (Harper Torchbooks
Edition), New York, 1963, PP• 12-29, Colin Bell and Howard
2.
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3.
Tonnies' theories grew out of his attempts to place those changes,
which he saw taking place in'Western society during a period of rapid
industrialization, in a coherent conceptual framework.

As he saw it,

alterations in societal organization occurred along a continuum whose
opposite poles he labelled Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, terms which
are usually translated as community and society.

Tennies stressed

that these were theoretical types and, in their pure forms, would not
be found in the real world.

As constructs, howeverD they could be

employed as models against which any existing society might be measured.

_

Thus, for Tonnies, Gemeinschaft
.........._....,._ was approximated by the small preindustrial village, and Gesellschaft by the modern industrial state.
Moreover, since Tonnies posited these two types as comprising opposite
ends of a spectrwn, all existing societies fall somewhere in between,
and incorporate, to greater or lesser degrees, elements of both
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.

It should be pointed out, however,

that Tonnies did not feel that the mere existence of a continuum, in
which any given society could be placed, meant that social change
developed in a linear fashion.

Social change, he was careful to point

out, did not proceed uniformly, but varied in its details according to
time and place. 2
Because of the importance of Tennies' concepts to this essay, a

Newby, Community Studies: An Intrfduction to the Sociology of
the Local Community, New York, 1972, p. 25. In this context see
also Samuel P. Hays, "A Systematic Social History," in George A.
Billias and Gerald N. Grob, Eds., American History: Retrospect and
Prospe~~ New York, c. 1971, pp. 338-340.
2This and the following pa~agraphs are based on Tennies, Community
and Society, passim.
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4.
b~ief

discussion of what the Gemeinschaft and Gesellachaft typology

involves is in order at this point.

In Gemeinschaft, then, the basic

social unit is seen to be the group itself, not the individual.

Indi-

vidual identity is· derived from membership in the group, not from
personal achievement.

The group is viewed by its members as an organic

whole, and they have internalized its values and goals.

There is

little or no room for individual striving or success at the expense of
the community, and social relationships are based on a clear understanding of each person's place in the social order.

Ties of kinship

and religion are usually quite strong, and, as such, reinforce the
group's moral codes.

The community tends to be homogeneous and rooted

in a specific locality.

The tribe, village, and town are, in degrees

of increasing social complexity, examples of Gemcinschaft.

The town is

its highest form of development, and as it increases in size and
complexity, it gradually loses the characteristics of Gemeinschaft, and
acquires those of Gesellschaft.
If the village typified Gemeingchaft, Gesellschaft is typified
b:· the capitalistic society.

It develops out of Gemeinschaft, and its

presence is marked by the widespread acceptance of a philosophy of
individualism.
individual.

The basic social unit is no longer the group, but the

In Gesellschaft, every man strives for his own advantage,

and membership in the larger society presupposes no preexisting condition
of unity.

Convention replaces mutual understanding as the means by

which Gesell.schaft maintains its continued existence.
In

~sellschaft,

economic activity is assumed to be the most

important aspect of human behavior.

Quoting Adam Smith, Tennies notes
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s.
.

that "Every man ••• becomes in some measure a merchant, .... "

3

As the

town develops the characteristics of Gesellschaft, it becomes a
commet·cial town, and as commerce dominates its productive labor 11 a
factory town.

Increasingly 11 human relationships becomra contractual

ones.
The development of Gesellschaft is neither a uniform nor a coherent
process.

Elements of Gemeinschaft often continue to exist within the

industrial city.

Neighborhoods and voluntary social organizations pro-

vide a sense of community which many feel to be otherwise lacking in
their social environment.

In fact, it is Tennies contention that only

the upper strata of society have the opportunity to take advantage of
the possibilities of freedom and individual development inherent in
Gesellschaft.

They set the standards to which the lower classes con-

form, and the lower classes conform out of a desire to achieve the
power and independence which the upper classes already possess.
Although Gesellschaft is based upon a philosophy of individualism,
it eventually develops a need for rational organization.

The con-

tractual nature of relationships in the capitalistic society leads to
the emergence of a number of associations whose goals, like those of
the single individuals, are to maximize profit.

Because Gesellschaft

is based on economic conflict, or at least competition, there exists a
large degree of uncertaintyo

By permitting individuals to pool their

resources, the corporation reduces risk and uncertainty, and replaces
them with order and predictability.

3

1~e qubtation from Adam Smith is to be found in~., p. 76.
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6.

Society's concern with order and stability, which Tennies saw as
giving rise to the modern corporation, led him to

~redict

that the state

would eventually emerge as the most powerful guardian of order in
society.

Only the authority of a powerful state could produce harmony

in a society of individuals whose main preoccupation was economic gain.
Eventually, all aspects of life, not just the economic, would be
regulated by the state, because it alone would have the capacity to
produce order out of disorder.

It was Tennies' belief that the

ultimate form of Gesellschaft would be socialism of a national, and
4
eventually, an international variety.
Tonnies' theories of social change have been dealt with here at
some length because they provide the basic conceptual framework for
our examination of Bethlehem as a case study in the industrialization
of the United States.

However, before examining Bethlehem's develop-

ment in detail, it becomes necessary to indicate how our conceptual
structure can be applied to changes in American society prior to 1920
in order to place local events in proper perspective.
Americans of the mid-nineteenth century were separated from their
colonial forebearers by a gulf of ideology as well as one of time.
value system based on individualism formed the basis of their

live~,

A
while

a belief in the importance of community had structured the thinking of

4rt is interesting to note that Alexis de Tocqueville, after
visiting the highly egalitaria~ and individualistic American
society of the 1830's, also predicted the rise of the state to
a position of great power. Tocqueville, however, was far less
sanguine about the meaning of this development than was Tennies.
See Tonnies, Community and Society, pp. 216-218, and Alexis de
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner
Eds., New York, c. 1966, pp. 665-669.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7.
most colonists.

For them, religion, politics, the relief of the poor,

and the punishment of the wicked took place within the context of the
local community.

Even expansion of the areas of settlement usually

occurred in terms of group

e~~erience.

Thus, while the family farm-

stead was not unknown in the colonial period, it usually existed within
5
a community framework.
In a word, the dominant form of social
organization for most of the colonial period came close to approximating
Gemeinschaft.
The eighteenth century saw the gradual replacement of the values
appropriate to Gemeinschaft by those of Gesellschaft.

The intellectual

current of the Enlightenment with its stress on progress, individual
dignity, and hostility to revealed religion certainly made inroads into
the established values of the time.

However, the Great Awakening, with

its emphasis on the importance of individual religious experience, and
the aggressive republicanism of the American Revolution were crucial
factors in making individualism a major part of the American value
6
system.
Indeed, the later social and political turmoil of the so-called

5see, Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kin doms: New En land Towns in
the Eighteenth Century, Vintage Books Edition , New Yor~, c. 1970,
pp. 46-84, David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social
Order and Disorder in the New Republic, Boston, c. 1971, pp. 11-20,
Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town; the First Hundred Years:
Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736, New York ,c. 1970, pp. 93-102.
James T. Lemon, The nest !oor Man's Count!Y: A Geographical Study
of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania, Baltimore, c. 1972, pp. 98-102,
109-117.
6Lockridge, A New England Town, pp. 167-180, Sam Bass Warner, Jr.,
The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth,
Philadelphia c. 1968, pp. 3-45, Dietmar Rothermund, The Layman's
Progress: Religious and Political Experience in Colonial Pennsylvania; 1740-1770, Philadelphia, c. 1961, p. 137, Gordon s. Wood,
TI1e Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787, Chapel Rill, c.
1969, pp. 60-61, 70-73.
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8.
Jacksonian period of American history can be seen as marking the point
at which individualism finally triumphed over a communal ethic.

The

egalitarian society so vividly described by Alexis de Tocqueville in
his classic work Democracy in America bears an unmistakable resemblance
to Tennies' Gesellschaft.

7

Even though most Americans of 1850 lived in small towns, much as
their colonial predecessors had, they nevertheless rejected the belief
that the community, rather than the individual, formed the basis of
society.

The colonial practice of denying strangers access to a town

if the residents disapproved would have seemed :i.nconceivable to most
Americana of 1850.

On

the contrary, individual mobility, whether social

or geographic, appeared worthy of praise.

Each individual was

to make every effort to attain economic success.
individual's efforts to do so.

expe~ted

Mobility indicated the

Indeed, the prevailing beliefs assumed

that acceptance of one's lot in life indicated weakness of character
and moral failure.

8

Individualism, and its accompanying belief in laissez faire
economics, encouraged the industrialization of the United States, but
industrialization itself eventually gave rise to an ethic hostile to

7Rothman, Discovery of the Asylum, pp. xviii, 125-127, Marvin Meyers,
The Jacksonian·Persuasion: Politics and·Belief, (Vintage Books
Edition), New York, c. 1960, pp. 11-12, Edward Pessen, Jacksonian
America: Society, Personality, and Politics, Homewood, Ill., 1969,
pp. 59-92, Tocqueville, ·nemocracy in·America, pp. 387-473.
8

~.,

pp. 522-527, 603-607, Robert H. Wiebe,~ Search for Order:
1877-1920, (American Century Series Edition), New York, 1968, pp.
135-138, Louis M. Hacker, The World of Artdrew Carnegie: 1865-190~,
Philadelphia, c. 1968, pp. 68-75, 84. Warner, Private City, p. x.
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individualism.

The value system of 1920 differed from that of 1850 in

that it stressed the necessity of order and regularity as crucial to
the smooth functioning of society.
In the course of seventy years, the nation had been once again •
transformed.

A nation-wide railroad network and the mass production

of both consumer and industrial goods proclaimed the United States an
industrial society.

Moreover, as the nation had industrialized, it

had become a truly national society, and 0 as such, tremendously complex.
Con~ributing

to the complexity had been enormous increases in the growth

rates of urbanization and immigration.

The social mechanisms which had

sufficed to regulate behavior when most Americane lived in small towns,
and shared similar cultural and ethnic backgrounds, no longer
apply.

to

see~ed

To those Americans concerned with the apparent instability of

their society, the prevalent belief in the value of an unrestricted
individualiam seemed to be leading the country toward destruction.
9
rational organization of society seemed to offer the only hope.

A

The factory and the new industrial corporation of the late nineteenth century offered disturbed Americans a model for the proper
organization of society.

The corporations had developed new methods

of management to regulate their increasingly complicated and far-flung
operations.

These new methods were, in a word, bureaucratic.

They

involved the centralization of decision-making, hierarchical chains of
command, specialization of tasks, and, above all, a rational and logical

9wiebe, Search for Order, pp. 62-66, 145-146, Samuel P. Hays,
The Response to Industrialism: 1885-1914, Chicago, 1957, PP• 48-70.
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10.
ordering of activity by means of impersonal rules and sanctions.
Scientific management, as the organizational techniques were known,
made for predictability and continuity in operations, and this, in
turn, made for profit.

Then as now, the majority of Americans

have looked with favor upon economic success.

Consequently, it was not

long before the techniques of scientific management were being advocated
as the solution to the ills of society.

A proper management of society

would, it seemed, resolve the tensions and uncertainties created by
10
complexity.
The first two decades of the twentieth century, the so-called
Progressive Era, witnessed an outpouring of
aspects of American life.

p~oposals

to reform various

Most, if not all, of the reforms involved

the application of some form of bureaucratic procedures to the problems
facing the country.

Thus, the regulation of economic activity by the

federal government, the rationalization and professionalization of
teaching and social work, efforts to Americanize immigrants, as well
as political reforms on the local, state, and national levels, all
proceeded out of a desire to introduce rationality and order in
11
American society.

10wieee, Search for Order, p. 156, James Weinstein, The Corporate
Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918, Boston, c. 1968, pp. x-xi,
Samuel Haber, Efficienci and Uplift: Scientific Management in
the Progressive Era; 18 0-1920, Chicago c. 1964, pp. 59, 102.
11Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of
American History, 1900-1916, London, c. 1963, pp .1-10, Roy
Lubove, The Professional Altruist: The Emersence of Social Work
as a Career, 1880-1930, (Atheneum Edition)p Boston, 1969, pp. 118156, Haber, Scientific Management, p. llO,Gerd Korman,
Industrialization, Immigrants and Americanizers: The View From
Milwaukee, 1866-1921, Madison, Wise., 1967, p. 136.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11.
Many of the leaders of the various reform movements came from the
ranks of the country's business elite.

As a group, the most admired

people in American society have been the economically successful.

In

the absence of an established church or an hereditary aristocracy,
Americans have often turned to the business community for their leaders.
Moreover, the familiarity of businessmen with the techniques of management encouraged them to take the lead in many of the reform movements.
To be sure, not all businessmen were reformers, nor were all reformers
businessmen.

However, many of the reform-minded members of society

shared similar approaches to their different areas of concern, and felt
that the methods of organization applicable to business activities could
be used to regulate social activities as well.

Even those reformers

hostile to business interests had no quat.rel with the ideas of order
and efficiency.
The involvement of businessmen in reform movements grew out of
an awareness that economics was not a sphere of life separate from
social or political activities.

Although some business-oriented re-

formers clearly sought reforms beneficial to their own interests,
there is no need to impute sinister motives to them.

Such reformers

often sincerely felt that the actions they advocated would benefit the
nation all l.YeJ.l as business.

To bring order out of chaos 11 and forestall

social collapse by creating a stable society would improve the quality
12
of life for all.

12Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the
Progressive Movement, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, pp. 206-224.
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12.
The First World War marked the triumph of the new bureaucratic
value system.

Businessmen devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the

war effort, and, in the process, familiarized the country with the
techniques of scientific management.
techniques worked.

Moreover, they showed that these

In a sense, the war ended the Progressive Era, not

because all the nation's problems had been solved, but because the
methods of problem-solving had become a permanent part of the
American scene.

All that seemed to remain was to put those methods
13
into wider practice.
Indeed, it can be argued that American history
since tlte end of the First World War has involved just that; the
application of bureaucratic methods of management to larger and larger
14
segments of American life.
By 1920, in any case, Tonnies' predictions as to the tendencies inherent in Gesellschaft seemed to have
borne fruit.
If Tennies' Gemeinschaft--Gesellschaft continuum can be applied
to the study of national societies, it can be used as a means to study
local communities as well.

Both sociologists and historians have

viewed the development of the local community as a process involving
its increasing integration into the national society.

Indeed, some

sociologists have claimed that as a result of the related processes
of urbanization, bureaucratization, and industrialization, there no
longer exists, at present, true local communities with unique
identities, but only local manifestations of a national, mass

13
Wiebe, Search for

Orde~

pp. 287-297, 300-301.

14John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Boston, 1967.
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13.
society.

15

Whether, this be the case or not is far beyond the scope

of this dissertation.

What is relevant here, however, is the use of

_

the Gemeinschaft--Gesellschaft
typology as a conceptual tool, because
.......
~

it is within this framework that our examination of Bethlehem is
placed.

The developments described as taking place in Bethlehem must

therefore be seen as occurring within the context

e~f

an emergi.ng national

society, and being related to it.
Although this dissertation covers nearly two centuries of
Bethlehem's history, the core of our discussion is devoted to an
examination of a movement to reform Bethlehem's municipal government
in 1917.

As such, it is an attempt to study the te;ndency to apply the

newly emergent bureaucratic value system to local problems, and can
therefore be approached as a case study in municipal reform during the
Progressive Era.

It should be noted, however, that this reform movement

must be examined as the culmination of a process of social change which
had taken place over a long period of time.

Consequently,the chapters

which precede the discussion of the reform movement are tc be considered
as an indication of the specific milieu in which the reform movement
originated.

At the same time, these chapters on Bethlehem's Moravian

origins, its economic growth, ethnic composition, social hierarchy,
and labor conflicts, are intended to show how developments relating to
industrialization on the national scene manifested themselves in the

15Maurice R. Stein, The Eclipse of Community: An Interpretation of
American Studies, (Harper Torchbooks Editions), New York, 1964,
pp. 94-113, Roland L. Warren, The Community in America, Chicago,
1963, pp. 5-6, Page Smith, As a City Upon a Hill: The Town in
American History, New York, 1966, p. 107, Arthur J. Vedich and
Joseph Bensman, Small Town in }mas SocieJY: Class, Power and
Religion in a Rural Community, (Anchor Books Edition), New York,
1966, PP• 88-107.
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14.
experience of one particular community.

Chronologically, the

dissertation ends at a point where locally, as nationally, the
business-oriented techniques of scientific

managemen~

had been applied

to political activity with the hope of producing a stable and orderly
society.

By 1920, then, in Bethlehem as elsP.where 1 the values of

Gesellschaft had achieved maturity.
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CHAPTER ONE:
MORAVIAN BETHLEHEM:

1741-1845

Bethlehem, Pennsylvania was founded in the 1740's by members of
the Moravian Church.

Only in the 1840's, after a century of exis-

tence, did the community permit non-Moravians to settle within the
town's limits.

The reversal of a century-long policy of exclusion

did not herald a radical change in behavior on the part of the
community's residents.

What it did mark was the culmination of a

series of changes which had already transformed Bethlehem from a
religious settlement into a secular town.

In the years between 1741

and 1845, the inhabitants of Bethlehem had exchanged an ethic of
religious communalism for a value syatem based on secular individualism.

A Gemeinschaft orientation

h~d

been exchanged for a value

orientati.on appropriate to a Gesellschaft.

It is the purpose of

this chapter to indicate how this alteration in values came about.
Bethlehem's early history car. only be understood in the light
of the background and beliefs of its Moravian founders.
to the Unitas Fratrum, as the Church is officially known.

They belonged
It is a

Church which traces its origins to Jan Hus, a pre-Reformation opponent
of the Roman papacy.

Hus' followers formally seceded from Rome in

1467, and acquired an episcopacy for themselves through the agency of
the Waldensians, another anti-papal group.

The Brethren then settled

15.
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near Prague to devote themselves to lives which stressed piety and
moral conduct, but not doctrinal orthodoxy.

Although the Church had

many adherents at the start of the seventeenth century, it was almost
totally destroyed during the Thirty Years War.

For the next century

or so, a period of dispersion known to Moravian historians as the
Time of the Hidden Seed, the Church barely managed to survive.

Only

in the eighteenth century did the Moravian Church once again experience
growth. 1
The revival of the Moravian Church can be laid to the efforts of
one man:

Count Nickolas Ludwig von Zinzindorf.

The Count, a devout

Lutheran of a pietist inclination, permitted members of the Moravian
Brethren to settle on his estates in Saxony where, in 1722, they
established the village of Hermhut, meaning "in the Lord's care."
Zinzindorf had originally hoped to convert the Moravians to his own
beliefs, but found himself converted to theirs instead.

He received

ordination as a bishop of the church, and, in fact, became its
unofficial, but very real, head.

2

Under Zinzindorf's leadership, the revived Moravian Church
developed a strong pietistic orientation.

Emotion, not reason, dominated

lGillian Lindt Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds: A Study of
Changing Communities, New York, 1967 pp. 1-7, Joseph Mortir.ter
Levering, A History of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: 1741-1892,
Bethlehem, Pa., 1903, pp. 10-11.
2Arthur J. Lewis, Zinzindorf, The Ecumenical Pioneer: A Stu2Y
in the Mor.avian Contribution to Christian Mission and Uuity,
Phila. c. 1962, PP• 111-114.
John Ro Weinlicke, Count Zinzindorf, New York c. 1956, pp.
114-127.
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the Morsvians' view of religion.

God, they felt, could not be under-

stood by use of rational thought processes alone.

Indeed, God had

only become comprehensible to mankind when He chose to reveal Himself
in the person of Jesus.

God thus became accessible to man through

Jesus, and Jesus, through his sufferings on the Cross, had atoned for
man's sins.

The Atonement made it ?OSsible for men now to love and

adore God without undergoing a painful process of guilt, pain and sin.
For Zinzindorf, the worship of God expressed itself in a profound
emotional experience in which man became joyously united with Christ.

3

In all this, however, Zinzindorf and his followers laid a strong
emphasis on interpreting man's comprehension of God as a communal
rather than an individual experience.

4

A world-wide missionary activity developed as an outgrowth
of the Moravians' stress on community as the basis of religious
enthusiasm.

The Moravians viewed their Church as an ecumenical

movement to promote religious experience, not merely a denomination.
To maintain both church discipline, and inter-denominational
cooperation, Zinzindor£ created a system of "tropes" as forms of
worship.

Under this system, members of other churches, which, in

Germany, meant primarily the Lutheran and Reformed, could associate
with the Moravian Church without abandoning their previous affiliations.

3

5

Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, pp. 10-11.
4nietmar Rotherruund, The Layman's Progress; Religious and Political
Experience in Colonial Pennsylvania: '1740•1770 1 Phila., c. 1961,
P• 20.
5

Lewis, Zinzindorf, PP• 139-161.
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Such missionary activity soon spread all over Germany, and, from
there, to the American colonies, where large numbers of German immigrants lived without ministerial leaders.
many heathens to be brought into the fold.

Attr~ctive,

too, were the

By 1741, there already

existed Moravian missionary communities in such widely separated
.
6
places as Greenland and the West Indies.
The establishment of Bethlehem in 1741 grew out of an attempt
by the Moravians to create a settlement in Georgia in 1735.
outbreak of war

b~tween

The

Spain and England subjected the Moravians

to harassment because of their pacifist stand. In 1740, the Moravians
7
abandoned their settlement.
The survivors traveled north to
Pennsylvania where they purchased a tract of land along the Lehigh
River in Northampton County from a friend of Zinzindorf's, George
On Christmas Day 1741,
8
with Zinzindorf in attendance, the site was named Bethlehem.

Whitefield, the famous Methodist preacher.

From the start 5 Moravian Bethlehem reflected its founders' concern with the communal experience of religion.
characterized the town's development.

Planning, not chance,

The Moravians laid out streets

and squares with an eye toward orderly growth.

They placed the dormi-

tory-like choir residences and other community structures in patterns
9
based on the buildings' functional relation to one another.
Such

6

Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, p. 155.
7
8

Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 35-37.

~., p. 79. M.S. Henry, History of the Lehigh Valley, Easton,
Pa., 1860, pp. 178-179.

9william J. MuTtagh, Moravian Architecture and Town Planning,
Chapel Hill, c. 1967, PP• 12-14.
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planning and regulated growth could only

o~cur

in a closed environment

where economic, social, and political goals could be subordinated to
religion.

To permit non-Moravians to settle permanently in Bethlehem

would threaten the whole reason for the town's existence.

Conse-

quentlyD Bethlehem remained an exclusive community for more than a
century after its founding.

It did not become incorporated as a

political unit, and thus open to residence by anyoner but remained
10
a private estate owned by the Moravian Church.
Living in a closed religious community, Bethlehem's Moravian
residents felt little need to separate religious and

s~cular

activities.

Within their communal framework, nothing existed to distj.nguish one
sphere of life from the other.

Indeed, because Jesus had been declared

the community's Chief Elder, theocratic authority

prevailed~

However,

Jesus' membership in the community did not mean that village authorities
had the opportunity to make their own decisions, and then to declare
them to be God's will.

On the contrary, in order to ascertain Jesus'

verdict on a given issue the Moravians resorted, not only to prayer,
but also to the device of the lot.

Use of the lot involved the

drawing of a slip of paper from a box which usually held three ballots:
one affirmative, one negative, and one blank.

Moravians resorted to

the lot to ascertain God's will in a wide variety of situations ranging
from questions of community policy to matters affecting only a few
individuals.

Thus, the admittance of a new member to the community,

the new member's decision to marry, as well as the name of his spouse,

10Levering, Bethlehem, p. 269.
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the selection of individuals to staff missionary or political posts,
erection of new buildings, economic policies, or establislting the
date of a synod were matters often submitted to the lot,

11

In the day to day administration of Bethlehem, when the lot did
not come into service, the Moravians practiced rule by committee.
Elders' Conference stood at the top,

The

This consisted of the Chief

Ordinarius, who was the main administrative officer, his deputy, the
supervisors of the choirs--the basic social unit--and the general
overseer of economic affairs,

Below this lay a general supervisory

council whose members represented the various branches of the
community's economy and dealt with its routine matters.

A community

council of all adult church members formed the bottom of the committee
structure.

However, this council had only advisory powers, and did
12
not participate in decision-making,
Religion, not democracy, gave
direction to the community's decisions,
Bethlehem's social organization reflected the Moravians' desire
to subordinate individual desires to the maintenance of religious
community,

Thus, the family did not constitute the basic social unit

in Bethlehem.

£h2r,

Instead, this role belonged to the choir (from the German

a group organized to sing the praises of God),

The choir served

as a family surrogate, and functioned so as to replace distracting

11 Gillian Lindt Gollin, "Bethlehem Transformed: The
Secularization of a Moravian Settlement," Pennsylvania History,
Vol. XXXI, Jan., 1970, pp, 58-59, Gollin, Moravians in Two
Worlds, pp. 67-89.
12 Ibid,, 39-40,
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familial loyalties with communal ones.

Indeed, the choir system

stratified the community in terms of age, sex,and marital status.
Ideally, an individual would spend his entire life, from birth to
death,

belonging_~o

one choir or another.. Separate choirs existed

for infants, boys, girls, single men, single women, married couples,
widows,and widowers.

The choirs provided their members with food,

clothing, and communal housing, as well as taking care of the raising
and education of children.

No one who lived in Bethlehem could
13
rcmsin outside the choir system.
Communal organization dominated Bethlehem'B economic life in much
the same fashion as it did social life.

In fact, the choirs, which

served as the basic social units, carried on economic functions as
well.

A communal sharing of property,labor, production,and consumption
14
characterized Bethlehem's economic life.
Moreover, the community

had the right to determine which occupation an individual should pursue.
This, of course,_reflected the Moravian belief that all labor belonged
to God, and that the community's spiritual welfare demanded the subordination of the individual's desires to the group's.

~1e

idea of

private property never received official condemnation by church
authorities, but conditions, as they existed in Bethlehem, prevented
individuals from effectively making use of whatever private possessions

13w. Ross Yates, Bethlehem of Pennsylvania: The First Hundred
Years, Bethlehem, Pa. c. 1968, p. 40-41, Gollin, Moravians
in Two Worlds, pp. 67-89.

14Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 178-181.
Worlds, pp. 138-147.

Gollin, Moravians in Two
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they may have had.

15

In any case, neither profits nor wages accrued

to the benefit of the individual.

The choirs provided their members

with all their material needs, and all profits from the community's
enterprises went to the Church.
Economic activity in Bethlehem revolved around manufacturing
rather than agriculture.

Nearly half of the community's labor force

in 1750 devoted itself to skilled crafts while only about a quarter
16
engaged in farming.
T.he .:ommunity had been designed as a manufacturing center from which surrounding mission posts, itinerant
missionaries, as well as the residents of Bethlehem, would receive
the necessities of life.

In fact, the third building erected in

Bethlehem was a tannery, built in 1743.

The same year saw the

completion of a grist mill, and a second mill followed ten years
later.

Textiles and clothing made up another significant part of

the town's economy:•
in the 1750's.

A fulling mill and a dye works came into being

Several of the trades practiced in Bethlehem- those

of stocking weaver, baker, chandler, locksmith, nailsmith, fuller and
dyer--had not been followed in Northampton County before the arrival
17
of the Moravians.
This, plus a '.IOt'k ethic similar to Calvinism, in

15

Edmund de Schweinitz, The Financial History of the American
Province of the Unitas Fratrum and of Its Sustentation Fund,
Bethlehem, Pa., 1877, p. 15.

16 Gollin, "Secularization," p. 57.
17

Murtagh, Moravian Architecture, pp. 13, 30-34, Henry, Lehigh
Valley, p. 205, Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 144-153.
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that devotion to work was essential to one's state of grace, helped
18
Bethlehem to prosper.
By the 1750's, ~ethlehem had become a regional manufacturing
19
center.
Its location on the frontier gave it a near-monopoly on
the sale of manufactured goods in.that part of eastern Pennsylvania.
Settlers from the nearby agricultural regions came to Bethlehem to
have their grain milled as well as to purchase needed articles.

To

accommodate them, as well as to enhance the community's treasury,
the Moravians in Bethlehem opened up the first general store in
Northampton county where goods of local manufacture could be purchased as well as items imported from Philadelphia.

The Moravian.s

had, by this time, established a thriving trade with certain
Philadelphia merchants who supplied them with such things as glass,
salt, and gun powder in exchange for textiles, pottery, and hardware.

20

Indeed, by 1760, after twenty years of existence, Bethlehem appeared
to have accomplished its founder's every dream.

lt throve spiritually

and economically, providing for its own needs as well aa those of the
missionaries it supported.

Unfortunately, appearances are often

deceptive, and in Bethlehem's case, success and failure came hand in
hand.
The Bethlehem of the 1740's and 1750's clearly comes quite close

18
Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, p. 222.
19 James T. Lemon, The Best Poor Man's Country: A Geosraphical
Histora of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania, Baltimore, c. 1972,
PP• 13 , 147.
20
Murtagh, Moravian Architecture, pp. 69-73, Gollin, Moravians
in Two Worlds, pp. 178-179, Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 286-289.
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to the classic description of Gemeinschaft.

The community of goods

and labor, and the social and religious bonds which united the
inhabitants of Bethlehem clearly belong in the same category of
mechanism which Tennies found to be the operative factors producing
a Gemeinschaft. 21 Unfortunately for the Moravians, eighteenth century
Pennsylvania proved to be the wrong time and the wrong place to establish such a community.

Pennsylvania, not to mention the rest of the

Western World, was a society whose value system reflected a growing
shift away from the attitt1des of Gemeinschaft in the direction of
', •.ls change in values would soon make itself felt in

Gesellschaft.

Bethlehem and gradually

trans~orm

it.

In a social sense, the values of community, as expressed by
Bethlehem's Moravian residents, appeared to most Pennsylvanians as
22
belonging to a system of beliefs rapidly becoming obsolete.
The word
which can best be used to describe Moravian Bethlehem's relation to
contemporary Pennsylvania society is anachronism.

The Moravian Church

placed great stress on the importance of community in the lives of its
members, but among other residents of Pennsylvania, the concept of
community received a great deal less veneration.

Pennsylvania was a

liberal society in the classic sense of placing greater emphasis on
individual freedom and material gain than on the public interest.

By

mid-century, this philosophy of individualism had come to dominate the

21 Ferdinand Tonnies, Communit and Societ (Gemeinschaft und
Gesellschaft) Charles P. Lonnies Ed., Harper Torchbooks
Editions) New York, 1963, p. 47.
22 Lemon Best Poor Man's Country, p. 98ff.
1
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value system of Pennsylvanians, whether they lived in the commercial
metropolis of Philadelphia, the few county seats and commercial
centers like Reading, Carlisle or York, or in the province's rural
24
This reflected a trend taking place, since the seventeenth
area.
century, all over rural western Europe.

As feudalism declined in

Europe, the idea of the peasant village as the social basj.s for the
organization of agriculture began to disappear as well.

The agri-

cultural village had had meaning only in the feudal open-field system
which accompanied a social ethic that encouraged an equitable distribution of all qualities of land.

With the disappearance of the

medieval ethic of social justice, a rise in individualism encouraged
the creation of family farms operated by the heads of nuclear families.

25

This, in turn, encouraged the further individualization of opinion
and decision-making which would eventually turn Western society into
a Gesellschaft.
Given the conditions of its

settleme~t, Pe~.nsylvania

can easily

be described as the most liberal society in the world of the mideighteenth century.

The agricultural villages, linked together in a

series of townships, which William Penn envisioned when he established
his colony, failed to materialize.

Instead, family farmsteads became

24 tbid., pp. 118-119, 134, Sam Bass Warner Jr., The Private City:
Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth, Phila. c. 1968,

P•

4.

25 Lemon, Best Poor Man's Country, pp. 108-109. For a description
of a similar process in New England see, Kenneth A.Lockridge, A
New England Town: The First Hundred Years; Dedham, Massachusetts,
1636-1736, New York, c. 1970, pp. 93-118.
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dispersed over the countrysidee and indiscriminate settlement led to
irregular holdings.

Townships existed, but only as political units
26
which had few claims on their residents in terms of community.
Moreover, the system which Penn had desired had been an idealized
version of feudal England, but few peasants could afford to migrate
and few aristocrats wanted to,
p~ovince

The bulk of the migrants to Penn's

came mostly from the ranks of the skilled and the middle

classes whu had been the very elements in European society bene27
fitting from the rise of individualism.
They were not about to
abandon a philosophy which they found encouraging.
Besides being an individualistic society, Pennsylvania also had
the distinction of being a pluralistic one as well.

The social map

of the province described a mosaic of different ethnic and religious
28
groups most of whom felt somewhat suspicious of their neighbors.
The
necessity of mutual tolerance as well as the lack of the necessary
ministerial leadership, prevented the rise of strong parishes which
could serve as the basis for community.

The township likewise failed

to serve as the nucleus for community even though many had been settled
almost exclusively by members of one or another ethnic or religious
group.

This resulted from the location of political authority on the
29
county level, not on that of the township.
As a result, only a very

Z6 Lemon, Best Poor Man's Country, pp. 98-106,
27
Ibid., p. 6. Philip S, Klein and Ari Hoogenboom, A History
~ennsylvania, New York, c. 1973, pp. 39-40.
28
Rothermund, Layman's Progress, pp. 14, 30,
29

~., p. 69, Lemon, Best Poor Man's Country, pp. 110-111.
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few groups, such as the Moravians, who possessed strong social
organization to begin with, managed to create a real sense of
community.
The Moravians established Bethlehem with the purpose of using it
as a center of missionary activity among the inhabitants of Pennsylvania,

Lacking Lutheran and Reformed ministers, the German church

people of the province appeared to offer an open field for eager
missionaries, and Zinzindorf hoped to create a sense of ecumenical
30
unity among themo
For several years Moravian missionaries pursued
a course of almost feverish activity among the Germans,

Moravian

ministers established Lutheran and Reformed "tropes" to provide for
their charges.

All this was in vain, however, for this missionary

activity took place during the religious revival of the Great
Awake~ing,

the immediate effect of which was an increase in denominational

consciousness.

By 1748, in fact, the Moravians found that they could no

longer compete with the ministerial efforts of the various revived
churches.

They retreated to their headquarters in Bethlehem, and

abandoned the interdenominational congregations they had established.
From the 1750's on, the Moravians concentrated their missionary efforts
31
solely on the Indians--efforts which had a great deal of success.
If the Great Awakening increased denominational consciousness in
Pennsylvania, it also had the paradoxical effect of iucreasing the
secularization of provincial society.

The Moravians had failed in their

30Rothermund, Layman's Progress, P• 30.
31~·• pp. 30-34, Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 119-123, 141.
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missionary efforts because of their emphasis on ecumenical unity,
and on the communal nature of religious experience.

For most

Pennsylvanians, however, the significance of the Great Awakening
lay 1n the fact that it emphasized the importance of an individual
religious experience.

This, in turn, meant an emancipation of the

individual from the judgment of authority and dogma.

Denominations

became voluntary societies for personal identification and salvation
rather than institutions which gave direction and focus to the
totality of life.

The religious enthusiasm soon vanished but the
32
emphasis on individualism remained.
The encouragement given to
individualism in time gave rise to a spirit of secularization and
participation in politics.

The squabbles and controversies accompanying

the Great Awakening had heightened disrespect for figures of religious
authority and their political supporters.

Individual judgment and

enthusiasm gradually shifted from religion to

politics.

A secular,

rather than a religious, commonwealth of individuals became the goal.
Party politics developed an intensity in Pennsylvania, during the
1750's and 1760's, which had not been seen before.
noted, "The new piety was patriotism."

As one historian has

In the course of the thirty years

between 1740 and 1770, the consciousness of Pennsylvanians had been
transformed.

32

The American Revolution would emerge as the secular heir

Rothermund, Layman's Progress, ~P~ 60, 116-117, 137, Lemon,
Best Poor Man 1 s Country, PPo 112-113Q Michael Kammen, Peop~
of Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Origins of American
Civilization, New York, 1972, pp. 46, 83.
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of the Great Awakening.

33

The increasing secularization of Pennsylvania society in general
made itself felt in Bethlehem.

The long range effect of the Gree.t

Awakening would be the transformation of Bethlehem from a religious
community to a secular town.

The change, however, would be gradual,

for social change is neither continuous development nor mere
mechanical response to the impact of events on people or institutions.
Rather, it results from the reaction of individuals to changes in
their environment, and the way they attempt to cope with them in terms
of the conceptual, institutional, and social frameworks they
familiar with.

a~e

already

In Bethlehem change would come, but it would come

slowly; its pace would be gradual, but its effect would be total.

34

The 1760's marked the start of Bethlehem's decline as a religious
community.

Despite their exclusiveness, the Moravians found themselves

unable to resist the effects of being located in the midst of an
individualistic society.

With the decline of missionary activity

came a decline in religious enthusiasm, and a corresponding rise in
the spirit of secular individualism.

This new spirit first made itself

33william G. McLoughlin,'"The Role of Religion in the Revolution:
Liberty of Conscience and Cultural Cohesion in the New Nation,"
in Stephen G. Kuntz and James H. Hutson, Eds., Essays on The
American Revolution,(Norton Paperback Edition,)New York, c. 1973,
p. 198, Rothermund, J•ayman' s Progres!, pp. 62, 137.
34
seymour Mart1.n Lipset, "A Changing American Character?", in
Seymour Martin Lipset and L. Lowentha, Eds., Culture and Social
Character: The Work of David Riesman Reviewed, New York, c. 1961,
p. 158, Robert A. Nisbet, Community and Power (Formerly The Quest
for Community)(Galaxy Books Edition) New York, 1962, pp. 87-88.
Lawrence A. Cremin, American ~ducation: The Colonial Experience;
1607-1783, New York, c. 1970, p. 265.
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felt in the economic area.

The choir system of social and economic

organization had made Bethlehem prosper.

By the

1760's~

a growing

number of the town's residents began to demand a share in that
prosperity, not as members of a religious community, but as
individuals.

To permit the individnAls in a given enterprise to

operate according to a profit system, they argued, would increase
productivity and thus benefit everyone.

By 1761, the clamor for a

profit system had become so great that the church authorities, fearful of the community's secession from the Unitas Fratrum, agreed to
the abolition of the General Economy in that year.

35

Abolition of the General Economy did not mean the overnight
transformation of Bethlehem into a aecular community.

That trans-

formation would indeed take place, but it would take place within
the framework of the institutions Bethlehem's residents were already
familiar with.

Thus, the end of the General Economy meant that

many who had worked for the Church-owned enterprises, in return for
their matezial needs, would now receive wages instead.
permitted to set themselves up as independent craftsmen.

Others were
36

In all

this, however, the ehurch still retained a say in the community's
economic affairs.

The businesses and industries given up by the Church

were not sold, but leased to private individuals, and all land within
the boundaries of the town continued to remain the property of the

35 Rothermund, Layman's Progress, p. 44, de Schweinitz, Financial
History, p. 18.
36

Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, p. 202.
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church.

Under a perpetual lease system, the purchaser of a house as

well as his heirs, had to respect the right of the owner of the land,
the Church, to approve of all transactions involving such property.
Moreover, no business could be started or expanded without official
37
permission.
In other words, the Church authorities attempted to
maintain Bethlehem's character as a religious community by permitting
private economic activity, but under strict communal supervision.

They

hoped that in this way the forces of secularism could be excluded from
Bethlehem.

In this they erred.

The end of Bethlehem's General Economy also spelled the end for
its choir system of social organization.

Without a communal economy,

it made little sense to maintain the social organization which
accompanied it.

In any case, married couples began to regard communal

living as an encumbrance, and demanded the right to raise their own
children.

The Church authorities yielded to their requests, and, by

the late 1760's, the construction of

individua~

family housing had

begun.

By the time of the American Revolution, the married couples'
38
choir no longer retained any viability.
The choirs for single men
and women had

degenera~ed

lodgers paid rent.

to the status of boarding houses whose

The Single Brethrens' Choir and the Single Sisters'

Choir went out of existence in 1817 and 1841 respectively.

The Widows'

and Widowers' Choirs remained in existence but as pension societies
not as communes; an indication of the decline in the religious zeal of

37 Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 379-80.
38 Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds, pp. 96-98.
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former years.

39

The American Revolution hastened the
into a secular community.

t~ansformation

of Bethlehem

In many respects, the Revolution had the

appearance of a secular crusade:

its adherents sought the creation
40
of an earthly commonwealth both republican and egalitarian.
Aware
of the Revolution's nature, and, aware too, of its possible deleterous
effects on Bethlehem, the Moravian authorities sought to remain neutral,
but this proved impossible.

Rumors, news, refugees, and, eventually,

armies arrived in Bethlehem, bringing with them ideas and attitudes
inimical to the continued existence of an exclusive community.

From

December of 1776 to June of 1778, Bethlehem served as the General
Hospital for the Continental Army.

Try as they might, the Church

authorities could not keep the world from Bethlehem's doors.

More-

over, cut off from contact with the Church's headquarters in Europe,
41
Bethlehem's residents grew more American and less Moravian.
The resumption of peace did not mark a return to the conditions
of Bethlehem's early days.

On t.he contrary, the post-war years saw

the decline already apparent before the Revolution continue at an
accelerated pace,

The authorities' policy of limiting the number of

39Ibid,, p. 98. Augustus H, Leibert, "Historical and Statistical
Matters Relating to the Widow's Society", Transactions of the
Moravian Historical Society 0 Vol, X, 1917, pp. 41-104.
4°Gordon s. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, Chapel
Hill, 1969, pp. 53-57, 70-75. Bernard Bailyn, Pamphlets vf
the American Revolution: 1750-1776, Vol. I, Cambridge, Mass.,
1965, PP• 190-202.
4 lyates, Bethlehem, pp. 97-121.
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individuals who might engage in a particular trade created antagonisms.
Many of Bethlehem's younger residents left the town in search of
greater economic opportunity, and the bustling metropolis of Philadelphia lured many with the freedom it presented for an individual to
choose his own destiny.

Population also declined.

In 1750 1 Bethlehem
42
had supported 1,000 inhabitants; in 1800 there were only 543.
Most
serious of all, from the point of view of the Church 1 was the abatement
of religious zeal.

In the early days all had felt themselves to be a

part of the missionary community.

Everyone could feel that whatever

activity he engaged in had a religious purpose; the craftsman or the
agriculturalist saw himself as part of a band of heroic Christians
laboring in the wilderness to spread the Word of God.

Now, however,

few inhabitants felt that the support of missionary activity was the
direct and immediate concern of all Moravians.

So much had religious

zeal abated, that, in 1787, the Church authorities

fo~nd

it necessary

to create a Society for Propagating the Gospel Among the Heathen to
encourage laymen to support such matters.

By the start of the

nineteenth century, Bethlehem had deteriorated to the point where
visitors would describe it as a "quaint church village".
43
had become stagnation.

E'l.lthusiasm

If Bethlehem appeared to observers as an economic and social backwater, American society at large did not, and the same forces which

42 Ibid.

1

p. 167 1 Gollin, "Secularization", P• 57.

43yates, Bethlehem, P• 173.
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operated on tbe larger national stage would eventually manifest themselves in Bethlehem.

The first half of the nineteenth century has been

labeled the "era of the common man" in American history.

Accounts of

this period have laid stress on its loudly proclaimed egalitarianism,
44
either to glorify it or to deny its reality.
To argue w'a.tether or
not American society had truly become egalitarian during the Jacksonian
period is not the issue at hand.

What is important to note here is

that the vehemently proclaimed social equality marked the triumph of
individualism.

Individualism and equality are

no~

identical, of

course, but they are related in the sense that individualism cannot
operate in a society in which inequality is considered a natural or a
desirable state of affairs.

The egalitarianism of the Jacksonian era

did not necessarily reflect a belief that all men were equal, but it
did reflect a belief that, given the absence of restrictions, the
45
superior individual would improve his lot in life.
Moreover, in a
secular society economic ach:l.evement became the most demonstrable
indication of superiority.

As a

res~lt,

the successful businessmen

emerged as the most respectable members of society and thus. as its
leaders.

They had proven themselves to be above the common run of

44 tee Benson, "Middle Period Historiography: What is to be done?"
in George A. Billias and Gerald N. Grob 0 Eds., American History:
Retrospect and Prospect. New York, c. 1971, pp. 174-190,
Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States
in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Anchor Books EditionJ
Garden City, N.Y., 1967, PP• 115-158.
45 Rowland BerChoff, An Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder
·in American History, New York, c. 1971, pp. 177-180. David J.
Rothman, ]he Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder
in the New Republic, Boston, 1971, pp. 58-71, 125-127.
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mankind.
Major economic change accompanied the egalitarianism, social
mobility, and political turmoil of the Jacksonian period.

Between

1800 and 1850, thE! outlines of a national economy began to emerge.
Production of goods for market became a major factor in the economy,
replacing the traditional household manufacture of goods for personal
consumption.

By mid-century 1 improvements in the technique,

organization, and scale of production had culminated in the emergence
of the factory system as the most efficient means of organizing labor
and capital for production.

Regional isolation decreased with the

growth of a national transportation network based on turnpikes,
canals, and later, railroads.

Improved transportation facilities

reduced the cost of moving goods over long distances, and this, in
turn, stimulated the growth of manufacturing.

The rise and spread of

banks and other financial institutions likewise indicated a burgeoning
economy.

Indeed, the financial panic of 1837, and the depression which

followed in its wake, which had resulted from speculation and unsound
fiscal policies can be seen as a sign of the emergence of a national
economy.

Had a national economy not been in existence, the depression's
46
effects would never have been so widespread.
The economic expansion of the first half of the

ninet~enth

tury drew Bethlehem out of its isolation and stagnation.

cen-

The con-

struction of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company's canal along the

46George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution: 1815-1860,
(Harper Torchbook Edition), New York, 1968, pp. 38-42, 74-84,
135-138, 215, 338-344.
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Lehigh River brought Bethlehem into extensive contact with the outside
47
world.
The canal reached Bethlehem in 1829, Local businessmen welcomed the canal, for they recognized the opportunities which it
presented,

Bethlehem, after all, was more in tune with the commercial

and industrial revolutions of the period than its official policy of
exclusion might indicate.

The town had never depended heavily on

agriculture for its existence, but, rather, on craft industries and
trade.

Indeed, from the start of its existence until the time the

canal reac:1ed

Bet~lehem,

manufacturing center.

By

the community functioned as a regional
no~,

of course, most of the old Moravian

industries were in the hands of local businessmen not those of the
church.

These businessmen recognized much more quickly than did the

church authorities that prosperity for the town would depend on the
operation of outside forces, now more than ever before.

48

Businessmen

would be the specific agents of change in removing from Bethlehem the
last vestiges of its exclusively Moravian character.
Pressure from businessmen led church authorities to remove the
restrictions which they had placed on economic activities.

Aware that

the Church did not have the resources to ensure the material wellbeing of the community, the Moravian authorities agreed to the demands
of the businessmen for a modification of the lease system.

As a result,

47w. Ross Yates, History of the Lehigh Valley Region, n.p. 1963,
pp. 60-67.

48

Yates, Bethlehem, p. 204, Levering, Bethlehem, p. 653.
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tbe church began selling off businesses and industries which had
previously been leased to individuals.

Among the sales made in 1829

and 1830, for example, were the tannery and the grist mill.

The

church authod.ties made such sales in the hope that the purchasers,
all Moravians, would continue to act in a spirit beneficial to the
community, for they were well aware of the destructive effects of an
49
unrestrained economic individualism.
The fears of some of the church authorities about the dangers
of economic individualism for Bethlehem soon appeared justified.
The presence of the canal and the modification of the lease system
encouraged most businessmen to expand their activities, and led some
50
to engage in speculations that soon proved unwise.
The panic of
1837, and the subsequent depression which lasted until 1844, found
local businessmen over-extended.
others went bankrupt.

Some were forced to sell out, while

To prevent several businesses from falling into

the hands of non-Moravians through sheriff's sales, the Church found
it necessary to purchase these enterprises from their owners.
result, the church's indebtedness increased dramatically.

As a

The year

1842 saw Bethlehem hit by a series of economic disasters which compounded the problem.

The tannery closed down, and the mercantile enter-

prises of Owen Rice, the town's most important businessman, failed.

49 Yates, Bethlehem, p. 205, the question of restraining businessmen arises in Kammen, People of Paradox, p. 261, see also
Rothman, Discovery of the Asylum, pp. 125-127.
50

Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 648-650.
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The Lehigh River's spring floods of that year destroyed Lewis Doster's
woolen mills as well as other local enterprises.
continue its policy of rescuing its members
would mean the Church's financial ruine

frL~t

For the Church to
business failures

The Church simply did not

have the wealth to subsidize local businesses during periods of
51
economic depression.
As a result, local church authorities began
to listen more favorably to the petitions of Bethlehem's residents
for a total abolition of the lease system, and the opening up of the
community to settlement by non-Moravians.
The demands for the abandonment of exclusiveness were not new;
they had been growing in intensity from the start of the nineteenth
century.

In all but name, Bethlehem had already developed into a

secular community.

By the 1840's, in fact, the Church authorities

no longer controlled the town's political affairs.

A democratic

system of elections similar to that in purely secular communities
had replaced Church Administrators in determining the course of nonreligious affairs.

Elections were held every January by voters

assembled in a congregation council.

After 1819 they chose a secular

administrator who, with the title of Burgomaster, combined the duties
of street supervisor, chief of police and health supervisor.

Along

with the members of the tax board, and the Overseers of the Poor, the
Burgomaster was elected annually, and like them, had to present the
council with annual reports and explanations of their policies.

These

positions, along with those of a public school board which came into

51 Ibid., P• 677,

de Schweinitz, Financial History, p. 25.
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existence in 1836, were staffed primarily by businessmen, not church
52
leaders.
Given this spirit of secularization, the abandonment of
exclusivism became merely a matter of time.
The fully developed spirit of secular individualism as well as
the Church's financial difficulties ended the policy of religious
exclusiveness for all time.

A Church committee, formed in 1843 to

study the Church's financial problems, unanimously recommended the
abolition of the lease system, and, by implication, exclusiveness.
When the leaders of the Moravian Church in Europe declared their
unwillingness to advance the Bethlehem congregation money to maintain
53
the old system, the end was at hand.
On January 11, 1844, the
congregation voted to abolish the lease system, and the old church
village was dissolved.

On March 6, 1845, the governor of Pennsyl-

vania approved an Act of Assembly incorporating the Borough of
Bethlehem.

From now on, the Moravian congregation would no longer be

identical with the town.

Bethlehem was no longer "a company of heroic

Christians and enthusiastic evangelists."

54

In the course of a century, Bethlehem had undergone a transformation in values.

The original settlers had possessed an ethic not

unlike that of the Puritans in 17th century New England.
tion was related to one's salvation.

One's occupa-

Hard work was a virtue, and to

52Yates, Bethlehem, pp. 208-209.
53
54

Levering, Bethlehem, p. 677.
Ibid., P• 678.
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follow diligently at a-calling was a religious duty.

In the early

communal days, this ethi.c had been the major factor in Bethlehem's
economic success.

To the degree that Bethlehem ceased to function

as an active missionary center, religious zeal declined, and a
secular spirit arose.

Gradually, the values of an individualistic

society replaced the communal ethic formerly held by Bethlehem's
inhabitants.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the achieve-

ment of economic success had ceased to function as a means to an end;
it had become an end in itself.

The Bethlehem of 1850 had ceased to

be a Moravian communal settlement, it had become a secular town some
of whose residents belonged to the Moravian Church.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE BOROUGH OF BETHLEHEM:

1850-1900

Change came slowly to Bethlehem in the years after 1845, but come
it did, and, by 1900, Bethlehem would no longer be a homogeneous,
tightly-knit

commun~ty,

but a town reflecting the growing social

complexities of a modern nation.

To be sure, Bethlehem would be

dominated for years by the Moravians, who were concerned lest
Bethlehem be destroyed by an unrestrained industrial growth.

They

succeeded in preserving Bethlehem's aesthetic charms, and maintaining
a peaceful residential character.

Even after the arrival of non-

Moravians with their diverse needs and wants, Bethlehem remained a
rather sedate community rather than developing into an industrial
center.
When Bethlehem became a borough in 1845, the influence of the
Moravian Church did not disappear.

Bethlehem's business and political

leadership remained almost entirely in Moravian hands for several
decades after the abolition of exclusivism.

Between 1845 and 1879,

for example, fifteen men filled the annually elected office of Chief
Burgess, and all but one, who served a one-year term, belonged to the
Moravian Congregation.

During the same thirty-five year period, eight

of these former Chief Burgesses were elected to seats on the borough
council.

Taken together, these eight served a

t~tal

of forty-seven

41.
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years as councilmen.
all were businessmen.

With the exception of one Moravian minister,
1

The citizens of Bethlehem who had voted for the abolition of
exclusivism in 1844, held great hopes for the future of the new
Bethlehem.

They felt sure that secularization would bring prosperity

to a community whose recent past had been marked by economic woes.
At the same time, they likewise believed that the businessmen who had
led the move for secularization would remember their responsibilities
to the community as they carried out their affairs.

This did not

appear to be merely an idle dream, for, although the end of exclusiveness had marked the triumph of a spirit of individualism, this
individualism had to find its expression within the context of a local
culture influenced by a century of Moravian experience.
were expected to act like Moravian businessmen.

Businessmen

In other words, the

awareness of their Moravian heritage should temper the entrepreneurial
2
spirit of the town's economic leaders.
Such expectations did not
go totally unrealized, and Bethlehem found 1tself spared the worst
ravages of industrialization.
Although Bethlehem experienced a measure of prosperity in the
second half of the nineteenth century, it never developed into a major

Lw.

Ross Yates, History of the Lehigh Valley Region, n.p., 1963,
pp. 122-123, w. Ross Yates, Bethlehem of Pennsylvania: The First
Hundred Years, Bethlehem, Pa., c. 1968, pp. 210-212, 215. For
a list of Burgesses and councilmen of Bethlehem, see, Ordinances
of Town Council of the Borough of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1896,
PP• 169-186.

2Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 123.
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industrial center.

For the rest of the century it continued pretty

much as a residential and commercial community.
this was due to choice.

For the most part,

Both Church and community leaders preferred

to retain the natural beauty of the town at the expense of attracting
new industry.

The Moravian Church, being the largest individual

property owner in the borough, used its economic powers to thwart
unrestricted expansion.

In 1849, for example, the Church prevented

the erection of several anthracite furnaces along the north shore of
the Lehigh River.

3

Even among business leaders, many of the older

traditions held strong sway.

"Although," as one writer has noted, "at

times, the influence of men who attach no value to any interests or
activities beyond those covered by the word business, bore down hard
on the town, there were always more people than in most Pennsylvania
communities of like size who welcomed what the men of literature and
4
science, the musicians and the artists had to despense."
Boosterism,
so common to many similarly-sized towns of the period, was remarkable in
Bethlehem mostly by its absence.
If the inhabitants of Bethlehem had no desire to see the town
subjected to unrestricted industrialization, they had no quarrel with
manufacturing per !!•

Indeed, Bethlehem had served the agricultural

areas of the Lehigh Valley as a regional manufacturing center since its
establishment in the 1740's.

5

The Bethlehem of the post-Moravian period

3Ibid.
4
Joseph Mortim£r Levering, A History of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,
1741-1892, Bethlehem, Pa., 1903, p. 708.

-

5James T. Lemon, The Best Poor Man's Country: A Geographical History
of Early ~outheastern Pennsylvania, Baltimore, c. 1972, p. 147.
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continued to provide for the material needs of the town as well as
the surrounding rural areas.

Three flour mills, a tannery" a brass

foundry, a distillery, a piano factory, a brewery, and three carriage
tactories were to be found within the borough's limits in 1860,
Technically outside the town's boundaries, but nevertheless part of
the community's economic life, were a woolen mill, a barrel factory,
a sawmill, an agricultural implements factory, and an iron foundry.
Bethlehem also possessed a number of mercantile establishments both
wholesale and retaii,
prosperity:

The town thus enjoyed a modest, but very real,

a prosperity indicated by the existence of three banks.

all established before 1877,
Bethlehem did

no~

6

suffer economically from its failure to en-

courage extensive industrialization; in fact, it benefitted,

The

charms which the Moravians sought to preserve encouraged Bethlehem's
7

development as a summer resort during the second half of the century.
To be sure, Bethlehem had attracted tourists ever since its foundation.
Travellers, both famous and forgotten had visited Bethlehem through
the years, and European travellers considered a visit to the Moravian
community a "must."

Moreover, a boarding school for girls, established

in 1788, resulted in members of the country's elite f m.. llies coming to

6M,S, Henry, History of the Lehigh Valley, Easton, Pa., 1860, pp.
234-235, F. Ellis, History of Northampton County, Pennsylvania,
Phila., 1877, pp. 203-204, H.T. Clauder, Clauder's Year-Book and
Home Almanac for 1879, Bethlehem, Pa,, 1879, pp. 87-88,
7

Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 123, E, Gordon Alderfer, North~mpton
Heritage: The Story of an American County, Easton, Pa,, 1953,
p. 219.
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Bethlehem,

This, in turn, had made Bethlehem a summering place for
8

some ante-bellum southern gentry.

.

However, in the post-Civil War

period, Bethlehem saw the annual summer arrival of "hundreds of the
9
best families of Philadelphia, Boston, and New York," They came
each year to sample the quiet charms of Bethlehem, and spent their
time in promenades along shady streets, visits to spots of local
histvric interest, boat and canoe rides on the Lehigh River, and
10
picnics in the local parks or on the river islands.
Such sedate
pleasures would have been inconceivable in a town which stressed the
importance of industry and economic expansion,

As late as 1890, a

Guide to the Industry and Wealth of the Principal Points in Northeastern Pennsylvania conaidered Bethlehem's most economically
significant interest to be the business offices of Weston Dodson and
Company, an anthracite mining firm whose nearest colleries were forty
11
miles away.

8For examples of traveller's accounts see, Johann David Schoepf,
Travels in the Confederation: 1783-1784, 2 vola. New York, 1968,
Vol, I, pp. 134-135, 136-183, Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in
North America in the Years, 1780 1 1781 1 and 1782, 2 Vola. Chapel
Hill, c. 1963, Vol, II, pp. 520-528, For an account of life at
the school for girls see, C,B. Mortimer, Bethlehem and Bethlehem
School, New York, 1858, passim, For Bethlehem as an ante-bellum
resort town see Charles B. Trego, A Geography of Pennsylvania,
Phila., 1843, p. 307, John Hill Martin, Historical Sketch of
Bethlehem in Pennsylvania, Phila., 1872, p. 73, and Anne Royall,
Mrs. Royall 1s Pentlsylvania, or Travels continued in the United
States; 2 Vola,, Washington, 1829, Vol, I, pp. 114-122.
9Ellis, Northampton County, p. 203,
lOibid., and also Clauder, Almanac, pp. 45-46, 54,
llNew York, 1890, p. 121.
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If Bethlehem's inhabitants looked askance at industrialization,
they did not oppose innovations of ob·11ious benefit to the communit)l·.
Thus, they welcomed the formation of a gas company whose lampr began
illuminating streets and homes in 1854.

Macadamized road surfaces

made their appearance in 1884 with the purchase of a steam stonecrusher by the borough.

The following year saw the introduction of

electric street lighting, and in 1890 Bethlehem acquired its own
12
telephone exchange.
Withot't becoming an industrial center,
Bethlehem was nevertheless quick to accept technological improvements.

In so doing it slowly but surely came under the influence

of an emerging industrial culture.
For several decades after becoming a secular borough, Bethlehem
retain(1d much of the semblance of
community.

b(~ing

a rather closely-knit

For one thing, population growth, although respectable,

was not excessive.

In 1845, the population numbered 1,050,

the federal census listed 6,762 inhabitants.
was relatively homogeneous.

In 1890

Moreover, the population

Only sixty-seven Negroes lived in the

borough in 1890, and only 478 members of the white population were
13
foreign-born.
In spite of this seeming homogeneity, Bethlehem had
nevertheless, developed a population of varied interests.
Ethnic diversity did not characterize Bethlehem in the years
after secularization.

On the contrary, people of German background

12

Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 123, Henry, ·Lehigh Valley, p. 234,
Ellis, Northampton County, P• 203.
13
Levering, Bethlehem, P• 680, Eleventh Census of the United
States, Vol. IV, Washington, 1895, p. 479.
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comprised the majority of the town's population for decades after
1845.

Bethlehem had been established by Germans, and Germans had also

been the original settlers in that part of Pennsylvania.
into the twentieth century, German served

a~

Until well

a primary language for

many people in the area, and large numbers of people spoke it as a
second.

Many of the Moravians spoke German fluently, and German

served as the language of ordinary discourse in Bethlehem for years
after secularization.

The use of Gerrean in Bethlehem was not limited

to Moravians, however.

Many of the people who settled in Bethlehem

after 1845 likewise spoke German, but this did not necessarily contribute to feelings of solidarity on the part of the old and new
residents of the community.

On the contrary, it led to an increaae

in stratification, for the newcomers could be distinguished from the
Moravians by their dialect.

Because of the close ties the Moravians

had maintained with their European co-religionists, they mostly
spoke the continental variety of high German.

On

the other hand, the

newcomers, and the local German dialect they spoke, have both been
given the label Pennsylvania Dutch.

Thus, rather than being united by

use of a common language, the two groups were made aware of their
differences.

Moreover, most of the newer inhabitants of the town had

just recently left the farm, and had brought with them the age-old
14
suspicion of rural peoples for town-dwellers.
Only as English
gradually replaced German as the most commonly heard language, did

14yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 101-102, 123-124.
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antagonisms between the two groups melt away.

By then, however, the

original sense of community had suffered a degree of strain.
The establishment of congregations by a variety of religious
denominations marked the growth of an increasingly stratified local
community.

In American society, the various denominations have not

drawn their membership from all social classes, but have generally
reflected the outlook and status of particular groups within the
15
social hierarchy.
In Bethlehem, the establishment of churches by
non-Moravians indicated a growing diversity of interests among the
town's inhabitants, and indicated the degree to which Bethlehem, in
spite of its conservative character, had moved toward a greater
acceptance of the values

commo~

to the national society.

The Pennsylvania Dutch were the first non-Moravians to settle
in Bethlehem, and they brought with them a desire to establish their
own Lutheran and Reformed congregations.

Lutheran services were held

in Bethlehem as early as 1849 in a rented hall known as the Armory.
The congregation remained fairly small for a number of years and could
not afford the construction of its own church building.

As

a result,

.

the Lutherans united with a Reformed congregation, which had likewise
begun to hold services in Bethlehem, to build jointly and share what
became known as Salem Church.

The two congregations used the church

on alternate Sundays until 1868,

By that year, both the Salem

Lutheran and Christ Reformed congregations had grown to the point
where the same building could not serve both.

They consequently

15Page Smith, As a City Upon & Hill: The Town in American History,
New York, 1966, pp. 3, 31-32, 33, 35, 74, 175, Seymour Martin
Lipset, ~he First New Nation: The United States in Historical
and Comparative Perspective, (Anchor Books Edition) Garden City,
N,Y, 1967, P• 190,
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separated, with the Lutheran congregation purchasing the Reformed
16
Church's interest in the building.
E~th

a growing

congregations held services in German, but by the 1870's,
proport~on

that English be used.

of the Lutheran congregation began to demand
Alternating the use of English and German

satisfied no one, and in 1872 1 the English-language, Graue
Evangelical Congregation, was formed out of Salem Lutheran.

According

to an 1877 account, only one other Lutheran church in Northampton
County used English in its services, and that was in Easton, the
county seat.
War.

Salem retained its use of German until the First World

Other Lutheran Churches, established in following years, re-

tained German while others used English.

Holy Trinity Lutheran,

founded in 1887, maintained the use of German until 1901, but St.
Stephen's Lutheran, which was established in 1895 1 held services
in English.

17

Christ Reformed Church also served as a parent organization for
other congregations.

Unlike the Lutherans, however, no split

occurred between English and German-speaking members.

Rath~r,

the

increase in the congregation's size required the creation of new
churches.
16

Christ Reformed held German services until 1894 when

Levering, Bethlehem, and Edwin Frey, "History of the Protestant
and Orthodox Churches of Bethlehem, Pa.", Bethlehem Globe-Times,
August 26, 1967, p. 22.

17 Ellis, Northampton County, pp. 207-208, Holy Trinity Lutheran
Church; Bethlehem; ·pennstlvaniaj ·Golden Anniversary: '1887~937,
Bethlehem, Pa., 1937 1 P• 5., Frey, "churches11 , p. 22.
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English came into use on alternate Sundays.
English sermon preceded one in German.

Three years later an

Its daughter organizations,
~1867),

First Reformed Church of South Bethlehem

St. Paul's (1888)

Bethany (1897) and Zion (1898) likewise used German as the language
18
of their religious services.
Another religious denomination which used German in its services was the Evangelical Association.

Its ministers held services

in private homes beginning in 1848, and later in the Odd Fellow's
Hall.

Members of this denomination organized themselves into a

congregation in 1854, and built a church sho·rtly thereafter.

Circuit

~ ........

min~.sters

served the congregation until 1866, when it had become of

sufficient size and stability to warrant its own pastor.

This church

too became a parent organization for other congregations:

St. Luke's
19
in South Bethlehem (1885), Olivet (1889) and Emmanuel (1894).
As in the case of the Protestant churches, the members of
Bethlehem's first Roman Catholic congregation spoke German as their
20
primary tongue.
The congregation's early history also resembled
that of other denominations, with services being first held in private
homes and then, after 1856, in the congregation's own small church

18 Christ Evangelical and Reformed Church, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,
1849-1949: One Hundredth Anniversary, Bethlehem, Pa., 1949,
PP• 7-10.
19 Henry, ~ehigh Valley, p. 231, Emmanuel Evangelical Congregational
Churcli.;. ·Bethlehem, Pa. , 1945, unpaginated.
20william J. Heller, Historz of Northampton County, 3 Vola., New
YOrk, 1920, Vol. I, P• 362.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51.

building.

The Church of the Nativity grew slowly, and did not have a

resident pastor until 1871.

The parish's growth did not continue,

however, for most of the German speaking Catholics who came to the area
tended to settle across the Lehigh River in the newly incorporated
borough of South Bethlehem.

In 1886, the church lost most of its

membership with the creation of the Church of St. Bernard in that
community.

After this, Nativity became a mission church, as it had

earlier, with Sunday services being performed by clergy from other
parishes.

In 1917, the building became the property of the newly21
organized English-speaking congregation of Sts.Simon and Jude.
The Roman Catholics were not the last German-language denomination
to establish a church in Bethlehem.
Bible Fellowship Church in 1884.

The Mennonites founded Ebenezer

Calvary Baptist Church was also a

congregation which used German in its services.
2
tence at the rather late date of 1911. 2

It came into exis-

To be sure, Bethlehem did not remain a community inhabited
exclusively by people speaking only German.

Many of the newcomers

knew only English, and, as time passed, that language tended to replace German as the primary means of communication.

However, only

four denominations which used English in their services from the
beginning established themselves in Bethlehem before 1890: Methodists

~., PP• 381, 383, Stephen Daday, "Histo:ey of the Catholic
Churches of Bethlehem, Pa,", Bethlehem Globe-Times, August 26,
1967, P• 22,

21

22 Frey, "Churches," P• 18.
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in 1854, Baptists in 1869, Episcopalians in 1872, and Pre·abyterians
in 1876.

Their presence indicated a growing diversity of interest

and an increase in stratification. 23
Members of the various congregations were well aware that their
churches represented specific status positions within the social
hierarchy.

The Methodsts were felt to be an essentially working-

class group, while the
the social ladder.

Episcopalians came from the upper rungs of

A history of Bethlehem's First Presbyterian Church

clearly shows this awareness of the relationship between
and social status.

rel~gion

"It was believed," says the congregation's historian,

"that there was an English speaking portion of the people, which is
not reached by the German pastors.

That there is a quiet and order-

loving portion which is not in sympathy with our excitable and
demonstrative Methodist brethren.

That

the~e

are those who are

strongly averse to Ritualism, especially with high and dry tendencies
wherever practiced."

Nor, despite the "profound respect entertained

for the Moravian Church," could many feel at ease as members of that
24
body.
By a process of elimination, then, the Presbyterian Church
of Bethlehem came into being in 1876.

23 see William King, History of Wesley Methodist Episcopal Church
of Bethlehem, Pa., Bethlehem, Pa., 1902, p. 11, Severtty•Five
Years of Trinity Church, Bethlehem, Pa., Bethlehem, Pa., n.d.,
unpaginated, James Robinson; Fiftieth Anniversary of the First
Presbyterian Church in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: 1875-1925,
Bethlehem, Pa., n.d. p. 9, Frey, "churches," p. 25.
24
Robinson, First Presbyterian Church, p. 8.
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The presence of non-Moravian Church in Bethlehem meant the gradual
erosion of the foundations on which the Moravians based their community
leadership.

New churches meant new social groups, with new interests

and new needs to be met.

The social institutions appropriate to a

purely Moravian village could not serve the requirements of a
heterogeneous, secular town.
Political changes reflected changing social conditions.

Before

1880, all but one of Bethlehem's Chief Burgesses had been Moravians.
After that date, election of a Moravian to that post would not be
a foregone conclusion.

Between 1880 and 1897, four men served as Chief

Burgess, none of whom was a Moravian.

George H. Meyers, a Lutheran,

Reld office for seven years, and Jacob Kemmerer, a Presbyterian, served
for six years.

Paul Kempsmith, another Lutheran, and C.M. Dodson, an
25
Episcopalian, each held office for two years.
}1oravians would again
be elected to this office, but only as representatives of one of
several religious organizations, not as a matter of course.
If the presence of a variety of non-Moravian churches marked the
breakdown of community in Bethlehem, so did the presence of a large
number of social and fraternal organizations.

Such voluntary organiza-

25 For dates of service of these men see Ordinances of Bethlehem,
pp. 186-194, and Ordinances of Town Council: Borough of Bethlehem,
~. Bethlehem, Pa., 1903, p. 194. For their religious
affiliations see Portrait and Biographical Record of Lehigh,
Northampton and Carbon Counties; ·pennsylvania, Chicago, 1894,
pp. 156-157, John P. Chamberlin, One Hundred Years of Nativity,
Bethlehem, Pa., 1963, pp. 35, 144-145, and Records of·salem
Lutheran Church, Bethlehem, Pa., 1851-1919, typescri~t on
deposit in the Bethlehem Public Library ,p. 204.
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tiona attempted to provide a sense of community for their members.
As such, they represented a desire to maintain elements of Gemeinschaft
26
in a society already far along the path toward Gesellschaft,
The
creation of such fraternal lodges in Bethlehem reflects the growing
integration of the borough into the industrialized national society.
27
Twenty-three of these organizations existed in Bethlehem by 1892,
An

examination of the dates of their founding reveals the rate at

which the sense of community disintegrated,

Of the nineteen organiza-

tiona whose founding dates could be established, thirteen came into
being after 1870; three in the 1870's, three in the 1880's and eight
in the years between 1890 and 1892.
of community had clearly disappeared.

By that point, a meaningful sense
On the other hand, despite the

congregation's initial disapproval, an Odd-Fellow's lodge had been
been established in Bethlehem as early as 1842; a clear indication
that the process of erosion was already underway.

28 The creation of

of an American Mechanic's Lodge in 1848, a Masonic chapter in 1854,
two more in the 1860's as well as a second Odd Fellow's lodge, and
a Grand Army of the Republic post, point to both a lessening sense of

26 on this see, Rowland Berthoff, An Unsettled People: Social Order
and Disorder in American History, New York, c, 1971, pp. 218232, 274, Robert A. Nisbet, Community and P~Ter (Formerly ~
Quest for Community) (Galaxy Books Edition), New York, 1962,
P• 266,
27 Bethlehem Daily Times, Sesgui-Centennial Industrial Ed~tion,
June 1892, pp. 13-14.
28 Levering, Bethlehem, p. 695,
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community in Bethlehem and a decline of Moravian dominance.
Between 1845 and 1900, Bethlehem gradually developed the social
complexity of a town whose citizens partook fully of the life of a
national society.

By the start of the twentieth century, Bethlehem

no longer belonged to the Moravians.

The presence of a number of

religious denominations indicated that the town's inhabitants had
interests and needs which the Moravian Church could not tneet.

On

the other hand, the Moravians did manage to dominate local affairs
for years after Bethlehem became a secular borough, and their desire
to avoid excessive industrialization gave Bethlehem a commercial and
residential character which the newer residents in the town continued
to maintain.

Thus while Bethlehem did acquire the aspects of

Gesellschaft, such acquisition took place gradually, and the
Bethlehem of 1890 had the enviable reputation of a modern community
which etill retained the charms of an· earlier

dey~
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CHAPTER THREE:
SOUTH BETHLEHEM: ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Located on the South bank of the Lehigh River opposite Bethlehem,
South Bethlehem came into existence in the 1850's, and was formally
incorporated as a borough in 1865.
welcomed industrial development.

Unlike Bethlehem, South Bethlehem
Its growth as a prosperous industrial

community mirrored the rise of the United States as an industrial
nation and, indeed, contributed to the nation's prosperity.

The

construction of the Lehigh Valley Railroad in the 1850's made
South Bethlehem a part of an increasingly integrated national
economy.

The railroad made it possible for South Bethlehem's indus-

tries to exploit local mineral resources such as iron and zinc and to
sell their finished products in a national market.

South Bethlehem

never experienced the Gemeinshaft existertce of Bethlehem.

From its

birth, the town's economic life endowed it with the characteristics
of Gesellschaft.
Economic prosperity highlighted South Bethlehem's existence as
an industrial community.
prosperity.

Bethlehem, to be sure, shared in that

Its residents found employment in the industries across

the river, invested in the iron and zinc companies located there, and
sold merchandise to South Bethlehem's citizens.
the two towns differed in spirit.

For all that, however,

Bethlehem remained a quiet

56.
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residential community, while South Bethlehem acquired all the
characteristics of a "boom town."

Prior to the creation of the city

of Bethlehem out of the two boroughs in 1917, South Bethlehem was the
larger of the two communities.

As the location of the steel works,

it served as the economic backbone of the area. 1 "There was a vitality
here," a former resident has noted, "a basic industrial thrust, a
roaring go ahead, get ahead atmosphere of America on the move."

2

South Bethlehem's economic prosperity had its origin in the
proximity of the town to the anthracite coal fields of northeastern
Pennsylvania.

The valley of the Lehigh River gave direct access to

the coal fields, a.nd it became the major route by which coal was
transported from the mines to the markets of New York and Philadelphia.
The construction of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Canal had brought
about the doom of Moravian Bethlehem, while completion of the Lehigh
Valley Railroad in 1855 ultimately resulted in the birth of South
Bethlehem.
Asa Packer, the moving spirit behind the Lehigh Valley railroad,
was a child of his age.

He devoted his life to an entrepreneurial

career well suited to take maximum advantage of the economic opportunities available in the individualistic American society of the

1Raymond Walters, Bethlehem Long Ago and Today, Bethlehem, Pa.,
1923, P• 63.
2

Catherin.e Drinker Bowen, Family Portrait,

Boston, c. 1970, p.

21.

3Felix R. Gerard, The Lehigh Valley Railroad: 1846-1946, New
York, 1946, p. 18.
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nineteenth century.

4

Born in Connecticut in 1805, Packer moved to

Pennsylvania in 1822, and apprenticed himself to a cousin as a
carpenter.

By 1831, he had

op~ned

a. boa; yard, and engaged in the

construction of canal boats used in hauling coal from the anthracite
fields to Philadelphia.

Successful at this, Packer expanded his

activities by taking out large contracts for the construction of a
series of dams and canal locks on the upper reaches of the Lehigh
River.

5

Familiar by now with the economics of the anthracite industry,

Packer acquired his own mining properties, and began shipping his own
coal on his own boats.

By the 1840's, he had become a wealthy man

and a recognized leader in both the business and political life of
Pennsylvania.

After serving two terms in the state legislature,

Packe.r secured the creation of Carbon County with the county seat
being located at his home of Mauch Chunk.

Upon the completion of his

second term of office in the legislature, Packer received an appointment
as a county judge in Mauch Chunk.
1853 to 1857.

He later served in Congress from

His political position in Democratic Party politics

in Pennsylvania became so secure that, at the Party's 1868 presidential
convention, he received a favorite son nomination.

Four years later,

the Democrats chose him as their candidate for governor, but in this

4For an understanding of the businessman in mid-nineteenth century
America, see John E. Sawyer, "The Entrepreneur and the Social
Orde:.r: France and the United States", in William Miller ed., ~
in Business: Essa s on the Historical Role of the Entre reneur,
Harper Torchbooks Edition , New York, 1962, pp. 7-22.
5William J. Heller, History of Northampton County, 3 Vols., New

York, 1920, Vol. II, PP• 4-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59.
he was unsuccessful. 6 At the time of his death in 1879, Packer had
7
the reputation of being one of Pennsylvania's wealthiest men.
In 1846, the Pennsylvania legislature granted Packer and a group
of associates a charter for a railroad.

The proposed Delaware, Lehigh,

Schuylkill, and Susquehanna Railroad would run from Phillipsburg, New
Jersey, across the Delaware

R1~er

to Easton, from where it would run

along the southern and western banks of the Lehigh to Mauch Chunk.
At Mauch Chunk, a connection would be made with the Beaver Meadow
Rnilroad which penetrated deeper into the coal region.

Completion of

this proposed line would open the coal fields to the markets of New
York and Trenton via the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the Morris
canal.

8

It would also permit the shipment of increased quantities of

coal to Philadelphia, a market which had been opened by the construction
9
of the Lehigh Canal in 1829.
Although chartered in 1846, the railroad company undertook no
construction for the next five years largely because of internal
10
dissension among its directors.
Moreover, in spite of the potentially

6Portrait and Biographical Record of Lehigh, Northampton, and
Carbon Counties, Chicago, 1894, p. 154.
7Heller, Northampton County, Vol. II, p. 5.
8Gerard, Lehigh Valley Railroad, pp. 17-18, w. Ross Yates, History
of the Lehigh Valley Region, n.p. 1963, p. 75.
9

~.,

PP• 63-64.

10Milton c. Stuart, Asa Packer, '1805-1879: Captain of Industry,
Educator, ·citizen, Princeton, N.Ja, 1938, pp. 17-18, Yates,
Lehigh Valley, p. 64.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60.
profitable future of the road, few inve&tors could be found.

Finally,

in 1851, Packer announced that he would build the road himself in
return for $2,500,000, of which $1,500,000 would be in company stock
and the remaining $1,000,000 in 6 percent bonds on the first mortgage.

11

Freed from the restrictions of his former associates, Packer
initiated construction in 1851.
named Lehigh Valley

Railr~ad

In April 1855, the tracks of the re-

reached a point opposite Bethlehem.

By September, tracks had been laid to Mauch Chunk, 46 miles from their
12
point of origin.
In the years after 1855, the Lehigh Valley Railroad

gre~or

Within a relatively short time, the road was double-tracked.

steadily.
Moreover,

since the company's success depended on carrying anthracite--seventyfive percent of its income derived from the transportation of coal-it soon branched into mining to insure itself a constant supply.

In

1889, for example, coal from its own colleries amounted to forty percent of the tonnage shipped on the line.

Through construction, and the

acquisition of other railroads by purchase or lease, the Lehigh Valley
had acquired slightly more than 1,800 miles of track by 1890.

It had

become a veritable empire: one could travel on Lehigh Valley tracks
13
from Ne't-7 York City through Pennsylvania to Buffalo.
The Lehigh Valley was not the only railroad to lay its track

11Gerard, Lehigh Valley Railroad, p. 9.
12 ~. p. 14, Joseph Mortimer Levering, A History of Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, 1741-1892, Bethlehem, Pa., 1903, pp. 721-722.
13Yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 76-77.
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opposite Bethlehem.

In 1852, the Pennsylvania legislature issued a

charter of incorporation for the Philadelphia, Easton, and Wind Gap
Railroad.

The company, which changed its name to the North Pennsyl-

vania Railroad the following year, had its origin in the fears of
Philadelphia businessmen for the continued prosperity of their city
once the Lehigh Valley Railroad had linked the anthracite fields
with New York City.

The solution to their problems appeared to lay

in the construction of a railroad of their own to connect Philadelphia
with the coal fields.

Work on the line started in 1852, and, by July

of 1857, the North Pennsylvania had reached a junction with the Lehigh
Valley at a point opposite Bethlehem.
promoters had been thwarted:

The hopes of the Philadelphi;·

the completion of the Lehigh Valley

Railroad eliminated the possibility of a direct link between Philadelphia and the antracite regions.

The North Pennsylvania would

henceforth be dependent on the Lehigh Valley for its connections to
the mining areas of the north.

Much of its future business would

result from the transfer of shipments from the Lehigh
14
to its own at the new junction.

Valley'~

lines

South Bethlehem came into existence at the point where the two
railroads met.

The activity which would take place at the junction

made it a natural site for a town.

As the terminus for the North

14Jay V. Hare, History of the Nortlt Pennsylvania Railroad
4
Phila., 1944, pp. 1-10, Yates; ·LehiBh·Valley, PP• 82-83.
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Pennsylvania line, South Bethlehem was the obvious location for an
engine houseo

The original structure built in 1857 had become in-

·adequate by 1870.

In that year, a roundhouse with fifteen engine

stalls and a tum-table replaced it.

Although primarily an anthra-

cite railroad, the North Pennsylvania also served as the principal
passenger link between the Lehigh Valley region and Philadelphia.

By

1879 seven daily trains ran each way between Philadelphia and South
15
Bethlehem.
Moreover, since South Bethlehem acted as a transfer
point between the two railroad lines, it stood in need of a depot.
The two railroads had shared a depot since 1859, but by 1867 it no
longer met the community's needs.

A new union depot costing twenty-

four thousand dollars replaced the older structure in that same year.

16

The economic and social ramifications of these actions were obvious:
they meant prosperity for South Bethlehem.

They also meant that South

Bethlehem's future would be determined by forces at work in the arena
of national affairs to which it had been linked by the railroad.
Railroads played a key role in the
inductrial society.

develop~ent

of a national

The integration of many separate railroad lines

into a nation-wide transportation system linked the various sections
of tbe country together.

Railroads provided a cheap and efficient

means of transporting goods of all kinds from one part of a continental-

15 F. Ellis, History of North~ton County Pennsylvania, Phila.,
1
1877, p. 211, Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 84, H.T. Clauder, Clauder's
Year-Book and Home Almanae for·l8~9, Bethlehem, Pa. 1879, pp.
65-66, 85.
16
Ellis, Northampton County, p. 211.
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sized country to another.

Manufacturers increasingly produced goods

for national, rather than local markets.

Moreover, production for

national markets had as its concomitant the creation of sources of
supply far from the location of the original place of manufacture.
In other words, the railroads encouraged the growth of an integrated
17
national economy,
The railroads did more than just provide American society with
a transportation system.
economic growth,

They also provided a direct impetus

~o

The initial construction of railroads as well as

their subsequent operation provided many Americans with jobs,

More-

over, while railroads transported the products of American industry,
they also created a demand for those products themselves,
consumed huge amounts of iron, steel, coal, and lumber,

They
A large snd

growing demand for rails, locomotives, and rolling stock aided the
growth of the American iron and steel industry,

Likewise, the

management techniques developed by railroad companies to control their
far-flung operations were eventually imitated by manufacturing concerns whose activities had expanded as the railroad network had grown.

l7This and the following paragraph are based on Alfred D.
Chandler Jr., "The Beginning of 'Big Business' in American
Industry", in The Business History Review, Vol. XXXIII, Spring,
1959'; PP• 4-6, George R. Taylor and Irene D, Neu, The American
Railroad Network, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, pp. 3-14, Edwartr\l;'e•-···
Kirkland, · Indust
Comes· of A e: Busirtess · Laber and Public
Policy, 1860•1899 Quadrangle Paperbacks Edition New York;
1967, pp. 46-51, J6hn A. Garraty, The·New·commonwealth: 1877~, (Harper Torchbooks Edition) New York, 1968, PP• 102-104.
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The stimulus which railroads gave to the nation's economic growth,
tl1ey also gave to South Bethlehem.

Indeed, even before the Lehigh

Valley or North Pennsylvania railroads had established themselves
physically in the community, they were responsible for increased local
business activity.

The knnwledge that railroads would locate on the

south bank of the Lehigh River encouraged what would be a major South
Bethlehem economic activity for decades: real estate speculation.
Prior to 1847, four farms owned by the Moravian congregation of
Bethlehem occupied the site of what later became South Bethlehem.
In that year, Charles A. Luckenbach, Bethlehem's first Chief Burgess,
procured an arrangement of sale for all but a few acres of this land
from the church.
On

The property was conveyed to him in April of

1848~

the same day he acquired title to the properties, Luckenbach began

selling off portions to various entrepreneurs, retaining only one,
In 1852, he laid out his property in town
18
lots, naming the result Augusta.
The next year saw the construction

the largest, for himself.

of three large frame houses, the first dwellings in the future borough.
In 1854, three other speculators, Charles and Ambrose Rauch and Charles
Brodhead, added their adjoining ,roperties to the town plots of:
Augusta.

They renamed the town Wetherill, after John P. Wetherill, a

prominent manufacturer of Philadelphia and father of a business
associate of Brodhead's.

The name Wetherill did not last long.

The

18 J. Davia Brodhead, Historical Sketch of South Bethlehem, South
Bethlehem, Pa., 1886, pp. 3-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65.
growing settlement was variously referred to as "the southern addition
to the Borough of Bethlehem", Bethlehem South, and, finally, upon its
19
incorporation as a borough in 1865, as South Bethlehem.
The prospect of railroad construction along the Lehigh River
gave encouragement to other economic activities besides real estate
speculation.

South Bethlehem's first major industrial enterprise, a

zinc works, became a reality with the arrival of the Lehigh Valley
Railroad.

A huge deposit of zinc ore, about eight miles long and two

and a half miles wide, existed in the nearby Saucon Valley.

The

presence of the deposit had been known for years, but the identity of
the ore had remained a mystery.

In the early 1830's, Jacob Ueberroth,

a farmer on whose property part of the deposit lay, thinking the
mineral might be iron ore, took a wagon-load of it to a furnace in
Berks County to be smelted.
was forgotten for some years.

The effort proved a failure, and mining
In 1845, a Bethlehem mineralogist,

William Tu Roepper, chanced upon samples of the ore, and correctly
identified it as calamine, the hydro-silicate of zinc.

For several

years Roepper and Robert Earp of Philadelphia tried to produce a
marketable zinc oxide.

Failing at this, they sought to sell the righta

which they had acquired to the deposit to the New Jersey Zinc Company,
but the company's directors declined the offer.

Samuel Wetherill, the

company's superintendent, saw potential in the Saucon Valley deposit,

19 Ibid., p. 6, Ellis, ~orthampton County, p. 210, Levering,
Bethlehem, PP• 720-726.
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and personally purchased Earp and Roepper's rights.

He had recently

invented and patented a process to extract zinc oxide from its ore,
and, in 1853, he set up two furnaces on a four acre lot purchased
from Charles Luckenbach.

Two years later, the state legislature

granted a charter of incorporation for the new Pennsylvania and Lehigh
20
Zinc Company which had a capital of one million dollars.
The company had its ups and downs over the next

f~w

years, but

it did succeed in turning out large quantities of various zinc products.
For example, the company's furnaces produced the first zinc white manufactured in the United States.

Renamed the Lehigh Zinc Company in

1860, the corporation continued to expand its activities.

Joseph

Wharton of Philadelphia had replaced Wetherill as superintendent in
1857.

He contracted with a Belgian firm to construct furnaces for

the production of metallic zinc, and several Belgian workmen and experts
were brought in to supervise the work.
produced its first metallic zinc.
21
1865.

In July of 1859, the company

The first sheet zinc was rolled in

The presence of the railroad in South Bethlehem made it advisable
for the zinc company to locate its plant there rather than at the mine
site four miles away.

From South Bethlehem, the company's products

could be shipped by rail almost anywhere in the country.
to locate the

~lant

The decision

in South Bethlehem made it a boon for the town's

20Yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 71-72, Ellis, Northampton·county, PP•
211-212, Guidebook of the Lehigh Valley·Railroad, Phila.,
1873, PP• 43-46.
21
Ellis, Northampton County, p. 212.
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economy.

The construction costs of the plant totaled $276,000, and,
22
by 1873, the company employed some 700 men at its works.
For more
than half a century, the zinc plant served as a mainstay of the local
economy.

In 1897, the works were taken over by the NeN' Jersey Zinc

Company which ran them until 1911 when operations were discontinued
and the site sold to the Bethlehem Steel Company.
The railroads did more for South Bethlehem's economy than provide
the community with transportation links; they also provided a market
for the products of local industry.

In the first years of operation,

the Lehigh Valley Railroad had no rolling stock of its own, and had
been obliged to rent it.

To meet this need, the firm of Abbot and

Cortright came into being in 1856.

Setting up a foundry and machine

shop, the company began to manufacture ore, gravel, and freight cars
for the Lehigh Valley.

The firm prospered and expanded its activities

to include precision machine work.

By 1907, the firm was employing

some 300 skilled machinists who turned out high grade machine parts
23
and castings.
South Bethlehem's most important enterprise, the Bethlehem Iron
Company, also benefitted from the railroad.

The discovery of iron

ore deposits in the Saucon Valley in the 1850's created a stir in the
area.

The discovery itself was not particularly startling, for iron ore

22 Guidebook of the Lehigh·Valley·Railroad, p. 43.
23 semi•Centennial: The·Borou h·of·south·Be~hlehem Souvenir Histor,
South Bethleh m, Pa., 1915, pp. 62-63. · ·south'Bethlehem Globe,
Mar. 30, 1907, p. 14.
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deposits of various types--limonite, black magnetite and gray
carbonate--had been known and mined in the area since the early
24
However, the small iron furnaces scattered
eighteenth century.
throughout the region had never been able fully to exploit these
resources.

The high cost of the charcoal used as fuel in smelting,

as well as an inadequate transportation system, made all but smallscale operations prohibitive.

What made the difference in the dis-

covery of local iron ore deposits in the 1850's had to do with
changes in technology.

In the 1830's, anthracite coal came into use
25
as a fuel in the smelting of iron.
Moreover, an expanding national

transportation

n~twork

made it possible to move the products of the

iron furnaces to markets some distances away.
Construction of the Lehigh Valley Railroad presented local
entrepreneurs the perfect opportunity to exploit the newly discovered iron dep9sits,

They realized that the railroads could bring

coal from the anthracite fields to the furnaces as well as transport
ores and limestone from nearby mines and quarries.

Moreover, besides

giving access to distant markets, the Lehigh Valley Railroad would
also create its awn demand for iron. 26

24walters, Bethlehem, p. 68, Yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 67-69,
25 w. Ross Yates, "Discovery of the Process for Making Anthracite
Iron", in Pennsylvania Masazine of·History and·Biography, Vol.
XCVIII., April 1974, PP• 206-223.
26 R.D. Billinger, "Beginnings of Bethlehem Iron and Steel", typescript on deposit in the Schwab Memorial Library, Bethlehem
Steel Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa,, n.d,, p. 2.
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Seeing in an iron furnace possibilities for the future expansion
of South Bethlehem, Charles Brodhead, a speculator in local real
estate, endeavored to have a government foundry established there.
With the aid of his uncle, Richard Brodhead, Senator from Pennsylvania,
he managed to convince the Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, of the
desirability of such a project.

Davis recommended to the Congress

that a foundry be established, and a Senate committee reported
favorably on the project.

However, conflicts over the exact location

of the proposed foundry prevented it from obtaining Congressional
approval.

Backers of the project thereupon abandoned their efforts

to gain government support in favor of a privately financed project.
In

th~

27

meantime, a Bethlehem businessman, Augustus Wolle, had

obtained possession of the ore deposit in the Saucon Valley, known
as the Gangwere mine, and proposed erecting a furnace at the mine site.
In 1857, in fact, he had secured a charter of incorporation for an
organization called the Saucona Iron Company.

This would have been

a disaster for those businessmen such as Charles Brodhead who had
invested heavily in South Bethlehem real estate.

With his financial

future at stake, Brodhead convinced Wolle to locate the proposed iron
company across the river from Bethlehem and also to expand the
company's activities to include the manufacture of a wide variety of
iron products instead of just limiting its output to pig iron.

Per-

suaded by Brodhead's arguments, Wolle had the company's charter amended

27 Levering, Bethlehem, p. 724.
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in March of 1a59 to embody this expansion of activities.

The company

now became known as the Bethlehem Rolling Mills and Iron Company.
Unfortunately, only a few subscribers to its initial stock issue could
be found.

Wolle, Brodhead, Charles and Ambrose Rauch, and Charles B.

Daniels 0 all Bethlehem mett 1 and, all but Daniels, speculators in
South Bethlehem real estate, were the first subscribers.

With the

exception of the Moravian Congregation, few additional investors
could be found to put their money into the new company because of
2a
the financial crisis which gripped the country at the time.
The company's fortunes improved with the decision to hire John
Fritz as superintendent of the proposed works in 1a60.

The thirty-

eight year old Fritz had already acquired a national reputation as an
iron-master of note when he left his post as superintendP.nt of the
Cambria Iron Works at Johnstown for South Bethlehem.

His decision

to take the job with the new firm caught the attention of potential
investors such as Joseph Wharton of Philadelphia, and this enabled
the company to proceed with its plans.
inspired was not misplaced.

The confidence which Fritz

During the next thirty-five years,

Fritz served as the company's chief engineer and general superintendent,
and, in the process, achieved an international reputation as a steelmaker of genius. 29

2aArundel Cotter, The Story of Bethlehem Steel, New York, 1916,
P• a, Levering, ·Bethlehem, PP• 724-725.
29walters, Bethlehem, P• 6a, Heller, Northampton County, Vol. II,
P• a, Peter Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth Century America:
An Economic Inguiry, Cambridge, Mass., c. 1964, pp. 104-106, 133.
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Revived by the appointment of Fritz, the company elected its
first board of directors in June of 1860, and the board, in turn,
appointed the firm's officers.

Asa Packer was among the company's

first directors, an indication of the important role which the Lehigh
Valley Railroad would play in the company's future.

Robert Sayre,

a Packer protege, and, like him, an official of the Lehigh Valley
Railroad, later replaced Packer on the board.

The directors named

Alfred Hunt of Philadelphia as president, but the real heart and
brains of the company was John Fritz.

Fritz designed the plant,

supervised its erection, and, for years to come, would personally
direct all the various branches of its operations.30
Ground-breaking ceremonies for the renamed Bethlehem Iron
Company took place in 1861, but progress came only slowly at first.
The outbreak of the Civil War created difficulties which delayed
completion of the first blast furnace until January of 1863.

The

first rolling mill did not go into operation until the summer of
1863.

The first iron was puddled that July, and the company pro-

duced its first commercial product, iron rails, for the Lehigh Valley
Railroad in September.
For the rest of the century, the history of the Bethlehem Iron
Company involved technological improvements and the consequent
expansion of its markets.

A machine shop began operations in 1865,

and a second furnace came into service in 1867.

1868 saw the erection

30Bethlehem Daily Times Sesqui-Centennial Industrial Edition,
June 1892, p. 26. Heller; ·Notthampton·county, p. 8.
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of a foundry.

That same year the company acquired the properties of

the Northampton Iron Company, located a short distance to the southeast of the Bethlehem works, and a third furnace thus became part of
the plant.

Construction of a Bessemer plant began in 1868, and in
31
October of 1873, the Company produced its first heat of steel.
The completion of a Bessemer plant indicates the close ties

between the Bethlehem Iron Company and the Lehigh Valley Railroad.
Railroads had long used iron rails for their tracks, but iron had its
drawbacks.

For one thing, it wore out.

useful life of only about four years.

The average iron rail had a
Replacement of worn-out rails

caused frustration and delays as well as high maintenance costs for
the railroads.

Steel rails were superior, but, before the intra-

duction of the Bessemer process, steel could not be produced in the
quantities required to replace iron rails with steel ones.

This

process, invented by an Englishman, Henry Bessemer in 1859, resulted
32
in the sale of English-made steel rails to American railroads.
The Lehigh Valley Railroad began experimenting with steel rails as
early as 1865,

The railroad's directors rapidly became convinced of

the superiority of steel over iron rails, and persuaded the Bethlehem
Iron Company to include a Bessemer plant in its works.

Assured of a

31Levering, Bethlehem, p. 725, Billinger, "Iron and Steel," p. 5.
Cotter, Bethlehem Steel, pp. 3-4.
32 Temin, Iron·and Steel, pp. 44-50, 222, Burton J. Hendrick, The
Life of Andre~ Carnegie, 2 Vols. Garden City, N.Y., 1932, vQI7 I,
pp. 184-186. Joseph F. Wall; Andre~ Carnegie, New York, 1970,
PP• 234, 262-264,
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market for its products, the company built a Bessemer plant and began
turning out steel rai.ls for sale to the Lehigh Vnlley Railroad in
October of 1873.

This made Bethlehem one of the first companies in

the United States to use the Beosemer process.

By 1885, the Bethlehem

Iron Company was reputed to be one of the largest producers of steel
33
rails in the country.
Prior to 1885, the Iron Company's output consisted principally
of such products as rails and pig-iron billets, much to the dismay of
John Fritz.

He had urged the company's directors to include structural

steel as one of its specialties, but was unsuccessful.

In his auto-

biography Fritz criticized the conservative directors for letting too
many opportunities pass by.

"I could plainly see the end of the Acid

Bessemer, everywhere," he wrote, "and especially with us, as the
company had let every ore property that was available and suitable for
the Bessemer process pass beyond their control, and the end was in
34
sight."
To forestall.the doom he saw coming for the company, Fritz
o·nce again pushed for expansion, and campaigned for an armor plate
35
plant.
This time he succeeded.
Fritz brought pressure to bear on the directors for an armor plate
and otdnance works because of an increasing interest shown by the

33Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 76, Cotter, Bethlehem Steel, p. 4,
Temin, Iron artd'Steel, pp. 132-136, 174, Brodhead; South
Bethlehem, p. 7, Wall, Carnegie, p. 313.
34John Fritz, the Autobiography·of John Fritz, New York, 1912,
PP• 174-175, the quotation is on page 184.
35 Ibid., PP• 182-188.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74.
Federal government in the domestic manufacture of such products.

The

government hoped to free itself from its reliance upon foreign steel
makers.

In 1884, members of the

u.s.

Gun Foundry Board visited the

Bethlehem plant as part of a tour to examine the capacities of
American steel mills for ordnance

~ork.

However, the company's

directors remained unwilling to accept Fritz's proposals until 1886
when William

c.

Whitney, the Secretary of the Navy, persuaded them
36
of the government's need for armor plate.
Having

con~itted

itself to the creation of an armor plate works,

the company expanded its facilities also to include a plant for the
manufacture of heavy forgings and castings.

Between 1888 and 1891,

the Bethlehem Iron Company erected the first armor plate plant in the
United States.

The cost of constructing open•·hearth furnaces and

various other facilities required major expenditures by the company,
and in 1889, the capital stock of the Bethlehem Iron Company increased
37
from two million to three million dollars.
After 1387, when the company received a four and a half million
dollar contract

f~om

the government, Bethlehem devoted itself almost

ex,-:lusively to military work.

By 1892, it bad· obtained over eleven

million dollars in government contractso

Placing an increased emphasis

on the manufacture of guns and other high-grade forgings, the company

36 Bethlehem Times, Nov. 13, 1884, p. 1, Cotter, Bethlehem Steel,

PP• 4-5.
37 Billinger, "Iron and Steel", p. 13.
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abandoned its Bessemer works and rail mills in the 1890's.

38

In the

depression of the 1890's, the company's reliance on government contracts helped it to survive the crisis, and the military requirements
of the Spanish-American War helped it to prosper.

During this same

period, the Bethlehem Iron Company produced the first high-speed
tool steel to be made in the United States, a product of such superior
quality as to astonish European competitors.

In 1899, the company

was reorganized as the Bethlehem Steel Company with a capital of
$7,500,000. 39
The residents of South Bethlehem observed the fortunes of the
Bethlehem Iron Company with undisguised interest, for their livelihoods
and the town's future depended upon the company.
activities expanded, the town grew.

As the company's

The immediate effect of the

company's presence in South Bethlehem, of course, was that it gave
employment to the town's residents.
ployed in the plant.

In 1873, some 700 men were em-

By 1885, the number had risen to 3,000.

In-

eluding the families of employees, some 7,000 people depended directly
upon the company at that point.

By 1910, the company employed slightly

more than 9,000 men. 40

38Bethlehem Times, April 15, 1887, p. 1, Bethlehem Times Industrial
Edition p. 26, Souvenir History, p. 60.
39Yates, Lehigh Valley, p. 136, Frank B. Copley, Frederick w.
Taylor: Father of Scientific Management, 2 Vola. New York, 1923,
Vol. II, p. 118, Cotter; ·nethlehem·steel, p. s.
40 Guidebook of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, p. 42. Brodhead, South
Bethlehem, p. 7, u.s. Bureau of Labor; Report on the Strike at
the Bethlehem·steel Works, Washington, 1910, p. 10.
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The fortunes of the Iron Company affected others
residents directly employed by it.

be~lcle

those

The merchants, professionals, and

all those whose livelihoods depended on providing goods and services
for South Bethlehem's residents likewise prospered or suffered in
direct relation to the ups and downs of the iron and steel trade.
With a monthly payroll of $110 1 000 in 1885, the company had a major
impact on the business community.

In good times payday meant a boom

for the merchants, in hard times possible bankruptcy.

For the workers,

hard times meant less work and either a reduced income or none at
all. '•l
South Bethlehem's first major economic activity had been real
estate speculation.

Both real estate speculation and housing con-

struction continued to play major roles in the town's economy for
decades.

As the company expanded its activities, and, as more people

were employed there, the borough's housing needs grew in proportion.
The building of houses for company employees provided employment for
many from the late 1850's onward.

In the 1880's, for example, J.

Stewart Allam, a local contractor, found his business so increased
that he had to establish his own planing mill.
men,of whom 200 were carpenters.

He employed over 300

The announcement of the Bethlehem

Iron Company's decision to manufacture armor plate under contract to
the Federal government set off an orgy of speculation.

Many came to

41Broadhead, South·Bethlehem, p. 7, ·Bethlehem·Times, Nov. 18, 1884,
p. 1, May 5, 1887, Dec. 1, 1884, p. 1; ·south·Bethlehem Globe,
Feb. 27, 1897, P• 1.
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South Bethlehem to purchase real estate or to establish businesses
in anticipation of a boom.

In the early 1890's, a local lawyer and

politician, J. Davis Brodhead, purchased several farres to the east
of the borough and laid them out in lots.

By 1901, these former

farms had become the borough of Northampton Heights, a suburb of
42
South Bethlehem.
The construction and real estate businesses in South Bethlehem
remained in a seller's market from the early days of the borough
through the First World lvar.

A shortage of housing and consequent
43
high rents prevailed throughout this period.
Indeed, during the
First World War the Bethlehem Steel Company found it necessary to
resort to public meetings and publicity campaigns encouraging
property owners to rent their houses and spare rooms to company
employees.

Unable to secure sufficient housing for its workers, the

company persuaded the
massive building

Fede~al

campaig~,

government to step in and launch a

an ironic development in view of the com-

pany's often-expressed hostility to government interference in
44
private enterprise.
Building and loan associations reflected South Bethlehem's

42

Harvey F. Trumbore, "Reverier of an Old Timer", Bethlehem
Globe-Times, July 13, 1945, p. 6, Bethlehem Times, May S,
1887, P• 1, Feb. 23, 1892, P• 4.
43
Frank Koester, City Planning Report for·the'City'Planning
Commission (mimeograph), New York, 1919, p. 67; ·Bethlehem
Times, Jan. 24, 1884.
44
South Bethlehem Globe, Nov. 10, 1917, p. 1, Report on the
Abandonment of the Bethlehem Project, Feb. 10, 1919, p. 2,
in Record Group 3,
Records of the United States Housing
Corporation, National Archives.
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prosperity and accompanied its real estate boom.

The high rents

which prevailed in South Bethlehem encouraged people to buy their
own homes.

Moreover, home ownership was considered a sure sign of

respectability for both the American-born working man as well as
his immigrant counterpart.

The real estate developers and building

contractors knew this, and launched several of these savings
associations.

To be sure, the developers sought to improve their

own finances by dcing so, but they also felt that, by helping the

workingman to attain the status of a property owner, they were
improving the community itself.

By 1915, South Bethlehem had five

building and loan associations, a point of pride to community
leaders.

The building and loan associations made it possible for

·---

many of those who had been lured to South Bethlehem by its prosperity
45
to have a share in it.
By 1900, South Bethlehem had become a thriving and prosperous
town.

Asa Packer's Lehigh Valley Railroad had created an indus-

trial community where only farms had existed before.

The railroads

had made it possible to exploit the natural resources of the Lehigh
Valley, and had bound South Bethlehem to the rest of the nation with
ties of iron and steel.

South Bethlehem's growth and development

45caroline w. Manning, The Immigrant Woman and Her Job , in
Bulletin of the Woman 1 s Bureau, No. 74, Washington, 1930, p.
54, Souvenir History, P• 58. Ellis, Northampton County, P•
213. For a discussion of building and loan associations in
nineteenth century America see, Stephen Thernstrom, Pove~y
and Pro ress: Social Mobilit in a·Nirteteenth Centur Cit,
Atheneum Edition) New York, 1969, pp. 116-125, 127.
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had not been an isolated series of events, but were an integral part
of the nation's emergence as an industrial society.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE POPULATION OF SOUTH BETHLEHEM

Population growth accompanied South Bethlehem's economic
development.

By 1910, the town had nearly 20,000 inhabitants.

They

were a diverse lot: some had come from villages in Eastern Europe or
along the shores of the Mediterranean, while others had journeyed but
a short distance from nearby farms.
heterogeneous town.

The result was a socially compleJt,

South Bethlehem did not become a melting pot.

On the contrary, the narrow confines of the town contained a number

of distinct ethnic communities each with its own traditions, values,
and institutions.

In short, as South Bethlehem became an industrial

town, it also acquired many of the social characteristics of much
larger metropolitan centers.

The processes of industrialization,

immigration, and urbanization, so obviously present on the national
scene, also had their manifestations in the much smaller arena of
South Bethlehem.
Local topographical conditions imposed strict limits on South
Bethlehem's potential for growth.

The railroad junction, and the

industrial plants which gave life to the community, had all been
located on a narrow flood plain of the Lehigh River.

This flood plain

extended south of the river for only a few hundred yards before it met
the lower slopes of South Mountain, a northern extension of Virginia's

so.
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Blue Ridge, which paralleled the river at this point.

Since the town's

industrial establishments occupied most of the available level areas,
South Bethlehem's residential areas developed on the lower slopes of
the mountain.

At the point of its greatest development, South

Bethlehem thus covered an area only little over a mile in length and
only about a quarter of that in width.

Within the compass of these

narrow limits, thousands of people from a wide variety of ethnic and
religious backgrounds lived and worked.
South Bethlehem grew rapidly.
had but 947 residents.

1

In 1861, the fledgling community

In 1870, the number had risen to 3,556.

1910, South Bethlehem's population had

gro~~

to 19,973.

By

A major part

of this population growth resulted from the arrival of immigrants in
the borough.

In 1870, for example, 1,106 of the town's 3,556 residents

had been born abroad.

The census of 1890 similarly revealed 2,694

immigrants among South Bethlehem's 10,302 inhabitants.

By 1910, the

foreign community of South Bethlehem, made up of immigrants and their
American-born children, comprised two-thirds of the borough's
population or 13,841 out of 19,973.

By contrast, a similar segment

of Bethlehem's population comprised only one-sixth of the total, or
2,238 out of 12,837. 2

1

In 1917, representatives of some 64 different

Delos F. Wilcox, Report on the Transit Prob~~m of Bethlehem, Pa. 1
and Vicinity, (mimeograph) Bethlehem, Pa., 1918, pp. 20-23.

2Joseph Mortimer Levering, A History of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania:
1741-1892, Bethlehem, Pa., 1903; ·Nirtth'Certsus·~f'the United States,
Vol. I, Washington, 1872, p. 253, ·Eleventh'Census ·of the United
States, Vol. IV, Washington, 1895, p. 455, Thirteenth Census of
the United States, Vol. III, Washington, 1913, pp. 590, 593.
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ethnic groups were reported to be living in South Bethlehem.

As a

municipal official later noted, this was indeed a community to which
3
the word polyglot aptly applied.
South Bethlehem's economic development, rapid population growth,
and ethnic diversity made it a town which differed in spirit from
Bethlehem.

South Bethlehem's rampant growth made it typical of what

Page Smith has called a "cumulative" town.

That is, it did

t~ot

come

into existence as the result of careful planning by an organized group.
On the contrary, South Bethlehem blossomed and grew as a result of many

individual decisions made by people from a wide variety of backgrounds.
They all came to South Bethlehem in search of economic opportunity, and
only similar economic motives united them.

Chance and the common desire

to achieve a degree of financial success alone gave this random
conglomeration of people the semblance of a community.

4

Indeed,to

Catherine Drinker Bowen, who lived in South Bethlehem during this period,
the town had the aspect of "another place and another planet, a Wild
West of its own." 5 In a town whose inhabitants could be unkindly
character:l.zed as "border ruffians", social integration was at a minimum.

Johnsto~, Mayor of the
City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1919, p. 27.

3Archibald Johnston, Message of Archibald

4For general discussion of this process, see, Page Smith, ~
City Upon a Hill: The Town in American History, New York, 1966,
p. 107, Rowland Berthoff, An'Unsettled·People: ·social Order and
Disorder in American History, New York, c. 1971, p. 225.

5catherine Drinker Bowen, Family·Portrait, Boston, c. 1970, p. 21.
6The quotation is from~., p. 25, see also Smith; City·Upon a
Hill, pp. 32-35.

-
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South Bethlehem, in other words, fitted Ferdinand Tennies' concept
of Gesellschaft,
Little beyond the political institutions of the borough existed
to give South Bethlehem's residents a sense of membership in a
community.

However, in an age which valued individualism so highly,

little power had been placed in the hands of governmental authorities.
This held true for all levels of government, from the national down
7
to the municipal,
State laws limited the power of borough governments
to such activities as laying out and maintaining streets, regulating
markets, preventing animals from running at large, keeping the peace,
regulating sewers and cesspools, and providing fire protection.

To

create a sense of community in a time when economic success had
greater value in most men's eyes, was the task of the people who
settled in the town.

Some would seek to achieve this goal and attempt

to create those institutions which would provide a sense of security
and order, but, others, their eye on the main chance, would not.
The diverse ethnic origins of South Bethlehem's residents made
for a minimum of social integration.

Distinctions between ethnic

groups stratified the town's population much more rigidly than did
class differences.

Indeed, in a very real sense, ethnic groups were

7For some contemporary observations on this see, James Bryce,
The American Commonwealth, 2 Vol. (Capricorn Books Edition)
New York, 1954, Vol, I, PP• 27-34, Vol, II, PP• 359-367, John
A, Garraty, 'The·New·commonwealth'l877•1890, (Harper Torchbooks
Edition) New York, c, 1968, pp. 226-258, Sam Bass Warner, Jr.,
The Private City: 'Philadelphia'in·Three·stages of'Its Growth,
Phila,, c, 1968, PP• 61-62, 99-123, 152-157,
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themselves social classes.

Each group maintained their traditional

beliefs, values, and behavior patterns and created their own
religious and social institutions.

Life was lived within the frame-

work of an ethnic community, and the members of one group usually
remained indifferent to, if not ignorant of others.

Thus while some

people attained positions of wealth and leadership within their own
community, their status did not necessarily cross ethnic boundaries.
John Gosztonyi, and Anthony Costelucci, for example, might be recognized
as wealthy and respected leaders of the Slovak and Italian communities,
but this did not gain them entry into the upper social class of South
Bethlehem.

Psychologically, there were thus many South Bethlehems in

existence at the same time, and the boundaries of one did not often
coincide with the boundaries of another.

8

Many of the early inhabitants of South Bethlehem had German
backgrounds.

Some came as immigrants from Germany and Austria, while

others, speaking Pennsylvania Dutch, had been born in the Lehigh
Valley.

A few German-speaking Moravians moved to the south side of

the Lehigh River from Bethlehem.

8south Bethlehem Globe, May 29, 1904, p. 1, April 12, 1905, p. 1,
May 1, 1905, Po 1, May 22, 1905, P• 7, Mar. 29, 1907, P• 1,
William J. Heller, History of Northam!ton County, 3 Vola., New
York, 1920, Vol. IIi:, pp. 521-522, 61 -617, Rowland Berthoff,
"The Social Order of the Anthracite Region, 1825-1902",
Pennsylvania Magazine of·Histo:l and'Biography, Vol. LXXIX,
July 1965, 274-275, Ferdinand Tonnies; ·community and Society
(Gemeinschaft·und·Gesellsehaft)Charles P. Loomis Ed., (Harper
Torchbooks Edition), New York, 1963, p. 47, Colin Bell and
Howard Newby, Community·Studies: ·An·Introduetion·to the·study
of the Local Community, New York, 1962, p. 62.
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Moravians never exercised the same influence in South Bethlehem
that they did in the older town across the river.

Their numbers

remained small, for most of their co-religionists had little interest
in the affairs of South Bethlehem, and preferred to remain in
Bethlehem,

Neverthelesa 0 a small contingent of Moravians did settle

in South Bethlehem, and they provided the town with its first
institutional religious services.

Beginning in the summer of 1859,

Moraviana living in South Bethlehem held religious services in
private homes.

In 1861, some sixty Moravians petitioned their

Church's Home Mission Society for authorization to establish a
congregation in South Bethlehem.

A regular congregation was organized

on Christmas Day 1862, and construction of a church building begun the
following year.

However, financial difficulties delayed completion

of the structure, and the congregation sold the unfinished building
to the newly organized Lehigh University in 1866.

The congregation

then began work on a second church building which they consecrated
in 1868. 9
South Bethlehem's Moravian congregation held its services in
German.

This did not please everyone, and a second, English-

speaking congregation of twenty members, came into being in 1868.
This second Moravian congregation did not remain in existence for very
long.

When its pastor transferred his allegiance to the Presbyterian

Church, so did most of his flock.

They organized a Presbyterian

9Levering, Bethlehem, pp. 731-732.
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congregation in 1869, and completed construction of a church building
10
by 1872.
The establishment of Luther.an and Reformed churches in So11th
Bethlehem indicated the presence of the Pennsylvania Dutch in the
borough.

A Lutheran congregation, St. Peter's, came into being in

1863, and, within a year, it had built itu own church.
tion grew rapidly.

On January 1, 1870 alone, it admitted 72 new

communicants to membership,

Moreover, as St. Peter's grew in size,

it grew in importance as well,
taken on the

The congrega-

~astoral

By the 1870's, its minister had

duties of churches in nearby Freemansburg and

Lower Saucon Township. 11 The Lutherans of St. Peter's also assisted
in the establishment of the First Reformed Church of South Bethlehem.
Founded in 1867, the Reformed congregation did not complete its own
church building until 1872, and it had the use of St. Peter's for
services until then,
Most of South Bethlehem's Pennsylvania Dutch residents clung
tenaciously to their ethnic identity.

Thus, German remained the

language used in St. Peter's religious services until 1919,

Only at

that point did the congregation's members assent to alternate the use
of German with English in Sunday Services.
abolish German language services until 1938,

The Church did not finally
Lutherans desiring to

attend services in English sought membership at St. Mark's Church, a

10 James Robinson, Fiftieth'Anni~ersary·of·the'First·Presbyterian
Church in Bethlehem; ·pennsylvania: '1875•1925, Bethlehem, Pa,,
n,d,, P• 9,
11
St. Peter's First 100 Years, Bethlehem, Pa,, n.d., pp. 10, 15,
19' so.
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congregation formed :i.n 1888.

12

The Pennsylvp·:da Dutch were not South Bethlehem's only Germanspeaking residents.
in the borough.

Immigrants from Germany and Austria also settled

Although German immigrants began to arrive in the

town in the 1860's,

ne~1rly

two decades earlier than the Austrians,

the Austrians eventually outnumbered them.

In 1920, for example,

the town claimed 584 residents of German birth compared with 1,351
13
born in Austria.
Immigrants from Germany neve·r formed a self-conscious ethnic
community in South Bethlehem.

Most of the Germans had Lutheran back-

grounds, and, by joining the already existing Lutheran congregations,
were rapidly assimilated by the Pennsylvania Dutch.

To contemporary

observers, it seemed remarkable how quickly German immigrants adopted
Pennsylvania Dutch ways.

"It takes but a short time", wrote one, "to

twist their German into a sense of the local vernacular.

The work of

amalgamation between the two tongues is rapid and often very nearly
14
complete."
Identifying themselves with the Pennsylvania Dutch made
it easier for German immigrants to enter into American life than they
might have otherwise.

As they settled in South Bethlehem, German

12
Historical Souvenir of St. Peter's Lutheran Church 1 Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, 75th Anniversary, Bethlehem, Pa., n.d., p. 13.
13
Manuscript Census schedule, Ninth Census of the United States,
Fourteenth Census of the United·states, Vol. III, Washington,
1922, p. 889. This census gives a more precise indication
of the ethnic origins of immigrants because of the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire after World War I.
14
Quoted in W. Ross Yates, History of the Lehigh Valley Region,
n.p. 1963, p. 102.
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immigrants found themselves mingling with a native American group
which had itself recently left the farm for an urban-industrial
environment.

The German immigrant of Protestant

ba~kground

thus

did not have to undergo the distressing struggle for acceptance that
his Catholic counterpart did.

As a result, no social organizations

of a distinctly German immigrant nature came into being in South
Bethlehem.

Instead, the German newcomers could join existing social

and fraternal organizations such as the Elks, or Knights of the
Golden Eagle which in South Bethlehem had a large Pennsylvania Dutch
membership.

German political clubs which elsewhere might have been

composed exclusively of German immigrants had speakers address them
15
in both Pennsylvania Dutch and High German.
Unlike the Germans, Austrian immigrants did not become part of
the Pennsylvania Dutch community,

Most of the Austrian immigrants

were Roman Catholics, and the Pennsylvania Dutch, like most
Protestant Americans, viewed the Catholic Church with suspicion and
16
distrust.
As a result, the Austrians created a community life of
their own,
The Austrians organized a Catholic Parish in 1886.

Named in

15Bethlehem Daily Times, Sesqui-Centennial Industrial Edition,
June 1892, p. 22, also·~hlehem·Times, Oct, 28, 1890, p. 1,
Nov. 1, 1890, p. 4.
16
Ibid., Feb, 3, 1892, P• 4, Feb, 6, 1892, p. 4, Feb. 9, 1892, p.
~For anti-Catholic feelings among the Pennsylvania Dutch, see
Emerson H. Loucks, The Ku KlUX'Klan in·Pennsylvania, Harrisburg,
1936, pp. 29-30, 36, 38-39, 86-87, 89, for a general account of
American Anti-Catholicism see John Higham, Strangers in the Land,
Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925, (Atheneum Edition),
New York, 1965, pp. 77-87.
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honor of St. Bernard, this church had become inadequate by 1895.

In

that year, the congregation began work on a new church, this one
17
dedicated to the Holy Ghost.
The old church continued in use as a
parochial school.

In both the church and the school, German served
18
as the language of instruction.
The Irish appeared on the scene in South Bethlehem about the same
time as the Pennsylvania Dutch.

Irishmen settled in the town even

before it had been formally incorporated as a borough.

The first

Irish residents in the town came as laborers helping to construct
the Lehigh Valley Railroad,

Later, more of them arrived in the borough

seeking employment in the iron and zinc works.

An 1861 survey of

South Bethlehem's population revealed that of the town's 947 residents,
19
387 were Irish Catholics.
By 1863, South Bethlehem's first Catholic
parish, the Church of the Holy Infancy, had been created to serve the
20
Irish community's religious needs,
Prior to the arrival of immigrants from Southern and Eastern
Europe in the 1880's and 1890's, the Irish comprised the largest
ethnic group in South Bethlehem.

In 1870, of 1,106 immigrants living

in the borough, 672 carne from Ireland.

Moreover, another 435 of the

17Heller, Northampton County, Vol, I, pp. 382-383, Bethlehem Times,
Mar. 1, 1896, p. 1.
18 rbid,, Oct. 24, 1892, P• 8,
19 Levering, Bethlehem, p. 731.
20 semi-Centennial: The Borough of·south Bethlehem; ·pennsylvania;
Souvenir·History, South Bethlehem, Pa,, 1915, pp. 45-46.
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town's inhabitants had Irish-born parents.

Since the total population

of South Bethlehem numbered only 3,556 at the time, the Irish
community accounted for nearly one-third of the town's population.
In 1880, the Irish community totalled 1,658 out of 4,925, again
nearly a third of the town.

By this time, however, the American-born

children of Irish parents far outnumbered those born in Ireland: 1,042
to 616. 21
Considering their numbers, the Irish in South Bethlehem naturally
became a potent political force.
Bethlehem at the time of its

Moreover, being present in

incor~oration

South

as a borough, the Irish

had the opportunity to assist in the creation of local political
parties.

Thus, they did not have to serve apprenticeships in already

established organizations, but could start near the top.
Irish in South Bethlehem became Democrats.

Most of the

As a result, South

Bethlehem's wards usually returned a heavily Democratic vote in almost
every election.

This contrasted sharply with the Republican majorities

usually found in the cities and larger boroughs elsewhere in the
22
Lehigh Valley.
The Irish shared political power in South Bethlehem with the
Germans.

The Irish dominated the partnership,

however~

For example,

South Bethlehem's first Chief Burgess, James McMahon, had been born
23
in County Limerick.
Moreover, out of a total of 178 terms available

21Manuscript Census schedules; 'Nirtth·census·of'the·united'States,
and Tenth Census·of·the·united'States.
22Yates, Lehigh Valley, pp. 114-115, 117-118.
23
Portrait and Biographical Record of Lehigh, Northampton, and
Carbon Counties, Pennsylval1ia; ..£hicago, 1894, p. 187.
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on the borough council between 1865 and 1886, 87 were filled by men
with Irish surnames and 44 by those with German ones.

The remaining

48 terms were held by individuals whose names give no clear indication
24
of ethnic background.
The relationship between the Irish and the
Germans in local politics can be seen in a quarrel which resulted
over the appointment of an Irishman as postmaster in 1892.

"The

office by natural rotation should go to a German this time," a disappointed office-seeker wrote to the local newspaper, "for the Irish
25
have had it for two terms,"
Before the advent of the "New Immigration" which began to make
itself felt in the borough in the 1880's, no other ethnic groups in
South Bethlehem had an importance equal to that of the Irish and
Germans.

Although the 1870 census listed only 74 Belgians living

in South Bethlehem, they comprised the next largest immigrant group.
They had originally come to South Bethlehem at the request of the
26
Zinc Company's owners to help set up and run the plant.
There were
never enough of them to form a stable community: no Belgian church
or social organizations came into being in South Bethlehem.
Only a handful of immigrants from Great Britain settled in the

24 A list of officeholders is included in J. Davis Brodhead,
Historical Sketch of the Borough of South Bethlehem, South
Bethlehem, Pa., 1886, pp. 127-134.
25
Bethlehem Times, Nov. 19, 1892, p. 4.
26 Brodhead, South Bethlehem, P• 8, F. Ellis; 'llistory of·Northampton
County, Pennsylvania, Phila., 1887, p. 212 1 Manuscript census
schedule, Ninth Census,
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borough.

The 1870 census returns reveal the names of only 31 English

and 24 Welsh-born residents.

By 1880, the number had dwindled to 22
27
and 13 for the English and Welsh respectively.
In neither case did
a significant ethnic community arise.
Only a few Negroes lived in South Bethlehem.

In 1900, they
28
numbered 115 out of a population of over thirteen thousand.
Given
the importance of color distinctions in American life, the Negroes
did not achieve acceptance as members of the native American society
in South Bethlehem, and had to create their own community life.

The

organization of an African Methodist Episcopal congregation in 1894
reflects its existence.

However, the members of the congregation

were too few in numbers, and too lacking in wealth to erect a church
building of their own for several years.

Until the dedication of St.

John's Zion A.li.E. Church in 1902, the congregation worshipped in a
29
room in South Bethlehem's Municipal Building.
Perhaps because
Negroes received a cool reception when applying for work at the steel
30
mill, the Negro community remained small.
In any case, the Steel Company failed to make use of Negro labor in the local plant even during the

27 Manuscript census schedules, Ninth Census and Tenth Census.
28
Twelfth Census of the United States, Vol. I, Washington, 1901,
p. 640.
29 south Bethlehem Globe, Sept~ 2, 1907, p. 1.
30
Ibid., May 18, 1907, P• 3. Aug. 2, 1917, P• 3, Aug. 13, 1917,
p. 1, Bureau of Planning and Development, The People of
Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1967 1 p. 58.
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1920's, when Southern Negroes began migrating to northern industrial
centers to act as replacements for the immigrant laborers excluded
from the United States by restrictive immigration laws.

Instead, the

Bethlehem Steel Company preferred to send representatives to northern
Mexico and southern Texas to recruit Mexican labor.

Over a thousand

Mexicans thus arrived by train from Mexico in April and

~my

of 1923.

31

A shift in the geographical origins of American immigration took
place toward the end of the nineteenth century.

Prior·to the 1880's

most immigrants had come to the United States from such places in the
northern and western parts of Europe as England, Ireland, Germany and
Scandinavia.

From the 1880's on, however, an increasingly larger per-

centage of immdgrants came from lands in the south and east of Europe:
Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, Greece and Turkey.

Disturbed by the

unfamiliar appearance and cultural patterns of the more recent immigrants, many Americans considered thetn to be inherently different from
immigrants who had come to the Untted States in the past.

A distinction

between the "old" immigration and the "new" immigration passed into
general usage.

It became an article of faith among many Americans that

the newcomers were not readily assimilable to American society.

Such

reasoning would eventually lead to the restriction of immigration in
32
the 1920's.
Before that happened, however, millioos of these "new"

31Paul s. Taylor, Mexican·Labor·in the·u~s~: ·Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,
Berkeley, Calif., 1931, PP• 2-5.
32 Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration, Chicago, 1960, pp. 177··182, Oscar Handlin, Race ·and ·Nationality ·in ·American Life, (Anchor
Books Edition), New York, 1957, pp. 74-110.
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immigrants arrived in the United States, and, from among those millions,
some made their way to South Bethlehem.
By the 1920's, representatives of several of the newer immigrant
groups had established flourishing colonies in South Bethlehem.

Slovaks,

Hungarians, Poles, Slovenes, Italians, Greeks, Russians, and Eastern
European Jews settled in the borough.

Although many of these immigrants

originally intended to return to Europe after working in the United
States for a few years, numbers of them became permanent residents instead.

In the case of each of these ethnic groups, the creation of

churches and mutual benefit societies signalled the presence of a
stable and permanent community.
The Slovaks were the first of the new immigrant groups to settle
in South Bethlehem.
1870's.

They first appeared in the borough in the

lat~

They had come from the anthracite regions where immigrants

from Eastern Europe had been finding work for the previous decade or
so.

From the coal fields Slovak immigrants made their way to South

Bethlehem and other small industrial towns which lay along the tracks
33
of the Lehigh Valley Railroad.
The newcomers obtained jobs at the
Iron Company, and, in time, were joined by others of their fellow
countrymen.

Transiency characterized most of the early Slovak arrivals

in South Bethlehem, but gradually members of the colony developed roots
34
in the community and became permanent residents.
In January of 1891,

33 victor R. Greene; ·The'Sla~ic·communitt·on·strike: Immigrant
Labor in·Pennsylvania'Artthracite, Notre Dame, Ind., c. 1968,
pp. 34-36, Yates, ·Lehigh·valley~ pp. 77, 101-103.
34Bethlehem Times, July 22, 1890, P• 4.
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the Roman Catholic Parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius was organized
for the benefit of South Bethlehem's Slovaks, and the contractors
completed work on the church building by October of that year.

With

its own regular pastor, this became the first Slovak parish in the
diocese.

By 1903, the original structure had become inadequate and

the congregation replaced it with a new building.
continued in use as a parochial school.
35
enrollment of 400 pupils.

The old church

In 1915, the school had an

Not all of the borough's Slovaks belonged to the Catholic Church.
Lutherans accounted for a small percentage of the total.
Catholics~

Unlike the

the Lutherans were too few in number to establish a church

of their own for a number of years.

Until 1911, they attended Slovak

language services held for their benefit at St. Peter's Lutheran Church.
In August 1911, the Slovak Lutherans formed St. John's Slovak Lutheran
Church, and purchased two building lots.

However, the congregation's

small size and consequent lack of funds delayed construction of a
church building until 1918.
36
in 1922.

The congregation acquired its own minister

Once an ethnic group had attained a degree of stability and
permanence, it followed in the footsteps of the Irish, Germans, and

35

~·•

36

Apr. 28, 1891, p. 4, Oct. 9, 1891, p. 4, Diamond Jubilee
Souvenir Book, 1891-1966 Saints·cyril·and Methodius Parish,
Bethlehem, Pa., 1966, pp. 30, 34, 84; Souvenir·nistory, p. 22.
John Daniels, A History of St~ ·John·Evartgelical·Lutheran Church,
Bethlehem, Pa., 1951, pp. 1-2.
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Slovaks and organized a church.

Consequently, the founding dates of

an ethnic group's church can thus be looked upon as a benchmark indicating the point at which transiency ceased to be a major factor
in the development of an immigrant group's community life.

Thus, in

1902 both the Magyars and the Italians established their own
Catholic parishes:

St. John Capistrano for the !t1mgarians and Our
37
Lady of Pompeii of the Holy Rosary for the Italians.
South
Bethlehem's Polish community organized St. Stanislaus parish in
1905.

38

Slovenian Catholics--known locally as the Windish--formed a
39
congregation named in honor of St. Joseph in 1913u
Not all of the Magyars or Slovenes in South Bethlehem were
Catholics, and the Protestants amonp, them founded their own churches.

Magyar Protestants organized the First Hungarian Reformed Church in
40
1906.
Slovenes of the Lutheran faith set up St. John's Windish
Lutheran Church in 1914. 41
Two Orthodox Churches named after St. Nicholas came into existence in South Bethlehem within a year of each other.

The earlier of

the two churches, started in 1914, belong to the borough's Greek

37

Golden Jubilee of St. John Capistrano Hungarian Roman Catholic
Church of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania 1903-1953, Bethlehem, Pa., ncld.
pp. 7-11, South Beth1~hem·Globe, Sept. 19, 1904, p. 1, July 21,
1902, p. 2, Beth1~hem'Globe•Times, Feb. 27, 1967, p. 31.

38 south Bethlehem Globe, June 7, 1905, p. 1.
39
Golden Jubilee 1914-1964·st• Joseph's·church, Bethlehem, Pa.
n.d., PP• 11-14o
40
Souvenir History, p. 47, South·B~thl~hem·Globe, Sept. 10, 1906,
p. 1.

41Heller, Northampton County, Vol. II, pp. 61-62, Bethlehem GlobeTimes, "Bi-centennial Edition," June 24, 1942, P• 21.
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community, while the second, foundad in 1915, was a White Russian
42
congregation.
In 1917, Ruthenians from Eastern Hungary established St. Peter
and Paul's Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite.

This group had hut

few members, and, although the congregation erected a basement church
in the year of its organization, the church building was not completed
43
until 1942.
A small Jewish community came into being in South Bethlehem in
the 1880's.

Its members came mostly from Russia, Hungary, and

Lithuania.

After several attempts they organized the congregation of
44
Brith Sholom in 1889, and constructed a permanent synagogue in 1897.
To members of ethnic communities, their churches meant more than
just a religious association for common worship.

In many respects,

the parish replaced the peasant village which most of the immigrants
had so recently left.

In the peasant mind, religion had little to do

with personal conduct, rather it was a magical process by which man
came into contact with the mysterious forces that ruled the universe.
By integrating man into the scheme of things, the Church made life

42 Edwin Frey, "History of the Protestant and Orthodox Churches
of Bethlehem, Pa.", Bethlehem Globe Times, Aug. 26, 1967,
p. 21, see also ~·• Feb. 28, 1967, p. 38.
43~., May 16, 1970, P• 5.
44

.
William Frankel, History of the Early Jewish·community of
Bethlehemp Pennsylvania, Bethlehem, Pa., 1955, pp. 6-12,
South Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 13, 1890, pp. 1-2.
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intelligible for him.

45

As such, the Church served as the locus of

all social activity, by its sanctioning of the mutual obligations of
family and village life.

The seeming social disorder of the

individualistic society around them dismayed most immigrants.

Un-

familiar with the language and customs of the Americans, they attempted
to recreate a semblance of the more orderly society from which they had
come.

Thus the establishment of a Church in an ethnic community had

a high priority.

A Church of their own would act as a center of

social life for immigrants and provide them with a meaningful sense
46
of membership in a community.
In a similar fashion, every ethnic community also created mutual
benefit societies.

Besides providing their members with insurance

benefits, these associations had another, more important function.
Like the Church, they provided the ethnic community with a sense of
cohesion and unity.

Such societies reinforced the immigrant's sense

of participation in a collective entity far less confusing than the
47
individualistic American society.
Indeed, in South Bethlehem's

45Kenneth D. Miller, Peasant Pioneers: An Interpretation of the
Slavic People in the United States, New York, c. 1925, p. 57,
Oscar Handlin, The·u·rooted: 'TheE ic·stor ·of the Greac
Mi ration that made the·American·Peo le Universal Library
Edition New York, c. 1951, pp. 117-124, William I. Thomas, and
Florian Znaniecki, The Polish·Peasartt in·Europe and·America, 2
Vols~: New York, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 205-288.
46

~.,

Vol. II, pp. 1523-1526, Handlin, ·uprooted, pp. 125-143.

47 Berthoff, Unsettled People, pp. 273, 371-372, 444-447. Thomas
and Znaniecki; Polish·Peasant, Vol. II, PP• 1517-1523, Emily
Green Balch; our·slavie·Fellow·citizens, New York, 1910, 378382.
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ethnic communities, the creation of a mutual benefit society proceeded the creation

of

a parish church.

Those societies established

after a church had been founded were usually intimatelt connected
with it as well.

Thus, the Irish had their Emerald Beneficial Associa-

tion and Ancient Order of Hibernians, the Austrians their
Society, and the Poles a St. Stanislaus Society.

Fran~

Joseph

Other such

organizations included the First Hungarian Sick and Beneficial Society,
the Slovak Catholic Union, the Slovak

E~ngelical

Jednota, the South

Bethlehem Windic Society, the Brotherhood of St. Nicholas and the
48
Italian Mutual Benefit Society.
As a form of Gemeinschaft, the immigrant community depended on the
strength of primary group relationships as well as on formal institutions
such as churches and benefit societies for its continued existence.

The

primary group serves to relate the life of the individual to the
society around him.

The warm, intimate, and personal associations of

such primary groups as families, friendships, neighborhoods, and
villages gave direction and meaning to life.
of course, developed in a cultural context.

Such relationships are,
Since immigrants could but

rarely gain immediate acceptance by American primary groups because
of cultural differences, they re-created in the United States, those
49
primary group relationships they had known at home.
Thus, the ethnic

48 Bethlehem Times, April 27, 1885, p. 1, June 23, 1885, p. 1,
Mar. 6, 1888, p. 1, April 11, 1887, p. 1; ·souvertir'History,
pp. 21-23, Po 71, Daniels, ·st~ ·John's, p. 1.
49
On primary groups see, Milton M. Gordon, ·Assimilation in
American Life: The Role·of Race, ·Religiort; ·artd·National Origins,
New York, 1964, pp. 31-32, see also Charles P. Loomis and John
c. McKenney, "The Application of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
as Related to other Typologies," in Tennies, Community and
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communities of South Bethlenem did not consist of random conglomerations
of strangers sharing nothing but similar ethnic backgrounds.

On the

contrary, the members of the town's immigrant colonies almost always
came from limited geographical areas.

They had usually been born in

the same province, and often in the same village.
A process of chain migration operated to bring together people
who had shared close ties in Europe.

As individuals settled in South

Bethlehem, they wrote home describing conditions in the town.

Their

letters generally received a wide circulation among relatives and
friends.

Often these letters

~ontained

requests that wives or friends

join the writers, or, in some cases, the letters simply stirred up a
desire among those still at home to emigrate.

In any case, most

later immigrants to South Bethlehem often came to the town bearing
letters addressed to friends and relatives.

so

Thus, in South

Bethlehem, the Catholic Slovaks came mostly from the province of
Saris, while their Lutheran compatriots came from Zvolen.

The

borough's Italian community came from a group of villages near Naples.
The Greeks originated on the island of Khios, off the Turkish coast,
and in two adjoining villages on the nearby mainland.
from Austrian Galacia.

The Poles came

The Magyar community was populated by immi-

grants from the four counties of Vas, Veszprem, Sopron, and Zala in
northwestern Hungary.

The Slovenes in the town originated in the

Society, pp. 14-15, see also Thomas and Znaniecki, Polish
Peasant, Vol. II, pp. 1117-1122, 1389-1391, 1513-1Sl7.

so South

Bethlehem Globe, Jan. 19, 1905, p. 8, Mar. 29, 1907,
p. 1, Nov. 29, 1907, p. 1.
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district of Prekmunje, in what is now northeastern Yugoslavia.
Austrians came from the province of Carniola,

The

A survey of the town's

immigrant population, taken in the 1920's revealed that the Austrians,
Magyars, and Slovenes who settled there had all come from an area of
a hundred miles square, where today the borders of Austria, Hungary,
51
and Yugoslavia meet.
Although large metropolitan areas saw the emergence of ethnic
enclaves inhabited solely by one or another immigrant group, such
ghettos did not develop in South Bethlehem.

Indeed, as Kenneth Miller

pointed out some years ago, such ethnic neighborhoods were rarely to
52
be found in the smaller industrial towns of Pennsylvania.
In South
Bethlehem, the chronic housing shortage and the town's limited size
prevented the creation of ethnic residential districts,

Instead, the

"foreign section" of South Bethlehem served as one big ghetto where
53
a variety of ethnic groups rubbed elbows.
The only exception to
this rule occurred in the case of the Catholic Slovaks.

When their

church had been built in the early 1890's, no housing construction
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . , ) .•

51

.3.1\..JIII'~- ....

John Daniels, "The Slovaks and America," (Unpublished M,A,
thesis), Lehigh University, 1947, p. 64, St. Joseph's Church,
p. 12, Souvenir History, pp. 21-23, Bethlehem Globe-Times, Feb.
27, 1967, pp. 36, 38. Caroline W, Manning, The Immigrant Woman
and Her Job, in Bulletin of the Woman's Bureau, No. 74,
Washington, 1930, p. 20,
52
Miller, Peasant Pioneers, p. 55, For the situation in large
cities see, David Ward, Cities·and·Immigrants: A·Geography of
Change in Nineteenth Century·America, New York, 1971, pp. 109121.
53
Bethlehem Times, Oct, 29, 1895, p. 1, South Bethlehem Globe,
Sept. 13, 1904, p, 1, May 23, 1906, P• 1, Sept. 10, 1906, p. 8,
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had as yet taken place in the immediate area.

The church's pastor

took the opportunity to purchase land surrounding the building which
54
he then sold to his parishioners as building lots.
By the time the
other new immigr&nt groups organized churches, South Bethlehem had
been built up considerably, and the Slovak example could not be
duplicated.

In any case, the Slovaks did not completely dominate

the area around their church; Poles, Slovenes, and Magyars lived
there

3S

well.

Moreover, by 1915, six other ethnic churches could

be found within a five minute walk of the Slovak church: two Hungarian,
one Italian, one Polish and two Slovene or Windish, as they preferred
55
to be known.
Among the immigrants from Eastern Europe, intergroup hostility
was rare,

Being peasants, the immigrants displayed little of the

nationalistic feelings common to their middle-class countrymen.

Even

the Slovaks who had been subject to the discrimination of the Hungarian
policy of "Magyarization" in Europe, expressed little of the antipathy
toward Magyars that many Slovak leaders and editors insisted they
56
should feel.
On the contrary Slovaks, Magyars, Poles, and Slovenes
mingled freely in South Bethlehem.

They attended one another's weddings,

funerals, and christenings, and in some cases established ritual kinship

54 Souvenir History, p. 22,
55
The Bethlehem, Pa~ ·city ·nirectorz ·1915..;.1916, Asheville, Nt. c.
1915, pp. 721-724, 729-737, 742-746.
56
See Kenneth D. Miller, The Czecho..;.Slovaks·irt'America, New York,
1922, pp. 74-76, ·south·Bethlehem·Globe, Oct. 10, 1902, p. 1.
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relations across ethnic lines by becoming the godparents of one
57
another's children.
The ease with which members of these various
groups interacted can be seen in the membership of Catholic Poles,
Magyars, and Slovenes in the Slovak parish prior to the creation of
their own congregations.

58

If the recent immigrant groups did not display antipathy toward
one another, ethnic hostilities did, nevertheless, manifest themselves in South Bethlehem.

For the most part, such hostilities came

from native Americans and members of the "old" immigration, and were
directed against the newcomers.

Nor did anti-alien sentiments

originate with the less respectable members of the society.

On the

contrary, both the local rowdies as well as members of the middle
class referred to Eastern Europeans as "Huns" and "Hunkies" and to
Italians as "Dagoes".

Such derogatory terms appeared regularly in

local newspaper articles as generic designations rather than as
59
consciouR labels of abuse.
As small-town organs the local newspapers
were hardly likely to express attitudes of which their readers disapproved.

Moreover, in the absence of opposition to the unfavorable

image d·rn:tm of the immigrants, the hostile opinions expressed in the
newspapers must be assumed to reflect the values and prejudices of

57

South Bethlehem Globe, May 6, 1904, p. 1, Nov. 10, 1891, p. 1.
For godparent status as a form of ritual kinship, see Robert T.
Anderson, Traditional'Eutope: A'Study·in·Artthtopology and History,
Belmont, Calif., 197l,·pp. 146~147.
58
cyril and Methodius, p. 30; South Bethlehem·Globe, Oct. 20, 1902,
p. 1.

59 Bethlehem Times, June 17, 1890, p. 1, Aug. 17, 1893, p. 2,
Sept. 13, 1904, P• 1, May 23, 1906, p. 1.
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their subscribers more or less accurately.
Immigrant status in itself did not serve as the criterion by
which an individual or group was judged.

Neither the Irish nor the

Germans came in for any abuse; rather, they themselves expressed antipathy for the newer immigrants.

Indeed, so alien did immigrants from

Southern and Eastern Europe appear to local observers, that the Irish
and the Germans acquired~ facto status as native' Americans.

The

Germans had mingled with the Pennsylvania Dutch and had become
indistinguishable from them.
never came into question.

Consequently, their status as Americans

Likewise, the Irish, who clearly had immi-

grant status, had been among the first groups to inhabit South
Bethlehem and could therefore be viewed as being among the community's
"founding fathers."

The local Irish residents thus had a relatively

high status within the town's social

hie~archy

from the start.

They

had not been forced to struggle for social acceptance in the same
way their countrymen, settling in the large metropolitan areas, had.

60

It is a significant indication of status rankings in the borough that
a Souvenir History, issued on the occasion of South

Be~hlehem's

50th

anniversary, did not list either the Germans or the Irish in the pages
61
devoted to the "Foreign Population."
Yet according to the Federal

60

See John Higham, "Another Look at Nativism", Catholic
Historical Review, XLIV (1958), pp. 155-156, esp. n. 13, p.
155, on the Irish immigrants' problems. in a large city see,
Oscar Handlin; ·nostort•s·Immi tartts: 'A'Stud 'irt'Aceulturation,
(Atheneum Revised Edition , New York, 1968.
61
See Souvenir History, pp. 21-23.
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Census of 1910, ?eople of German and Irish birth made up sizeable
62
portions of South Bethlehem's population.
Ethnic hostilities in South Bethlehem arose out of social and
economic differences.

The newcomers were different in both customs

and appearance from the natives, and Americans simply could not
comprehend life-styles other than their own.

They attributed such

immigrant behavior as boisterous parties or strong displays of
63
emotion to an inherent inferiority.
More importantly, however,
very real status anxieties motivated the antagonism of the Irish and
Germans toward the new

i~tgrant

groups.

in South Bethlehem feared for their jobs.

German and Irish workingmen
Eastern~cEuropeans,

after all,

came to the borough seeking employment in the steel mills where many
Irish and Germans worked.

In time, the newcomers began moving from

positions as common laborers to the furnaces; jobs once held exelusively by members of the older groups.

Perceiving themselves

threatened, the "old" innnigrants reacted in a hostile fashion.
64
petition thus increased ethnic tensions.

Com-

The anti-immigrant sentiments which found expression in South
Bethlehem may have had local causes, but they also had national causes

62

Thirteenth Census, Vol. III, p. 593.
63
Bethlehem Times, Dec. 15, 1885, p. 1, Sept. 16, 1891, p. 1,
South Bethlehem'Globe, Sept. 13, 1904, p. 1, May 11, 1907, p.
1, Sept. 10, 1906, P• 1.
64
Bethlehem Times, May 27, 1894, p. 1. This was a widespread
phenomenon in the steel industry, see John A. Fitch, The
Steelworkers, New York, 1911, p. 31, see also Higham,~nother
Look at Nativism," PP• 156-158.
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as well, and the two cannot be separated.

In the main, such feelings

developed in response to the continuing industrialization of the
United States.

As industrialization proceeded, it lessened the validity

of the standards and values which had served as guidelines for behavior
in an older society.

A national, industrial society did not operate

in accord with the standards appropriate to life in a small town.
Society had become increasingly impersonal, and so, too, had human
relationships.

When decisions made in some distant city could change

his whole life, the individual began to feel lost and helpless.

Nor

could the social mechanisms of community pressure alter the state of
things, for often those whose decisions influenced local affairs lived
at a distance, and were not subject to community sanctions.

Indeed,

the creation of a national transportation network had made the local
community itself dependent upon outside forces.

In such a situation,

then, the immigrant, whose presence in the community was a direct
result of industr:f.alization, became a symbol of all that appeared to
be wrong with the new society.

Americans could not separate the

strangeness of the aliens in their midst from the strangeness caused
65
by industrial change.
Thus, anxiety characterized the native Americans' view of the
immigrant.

65

The natives saw the world they had known disappearing in

Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for·order: ·1877-1920, (American
Century Series Edition) New York, c. 1967, pp. 44-76, Samuel
P. Hays, The Response to'Irtdustria1ism: '1885~1914, Chicago,
1957, PP• 71-76, 99-100.
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a complex society in which variety of classes and ethnic groups vied
for status and power.

A racist ideology extolling the genetic

superiority of Anglo-Saxons and positing the inferiority of the new
immigrants emerged out of the status anxieties of New England's
patrician intellectuals.

They felt that immigrants from Southern

and Eastern Europe· could not be assimilated into the mainstream of
American life because of the newcomers' supposed inherent inability
to adopt civilized behavior.

The dissemination of such beliefs

helped to create a climate of opinion which would eventually lead to
66
immigration restriction.
In spite of ethnic hostilities, ambivalence c.ften characterized
the attitudes expressed about South Bethlehem's immigrants.

On one

hand, some newspaper articles often derided immigrant life-styles
and appearance, while others made the immigrants appear picturesque.
Moreover, the local newspapers did not promote efforts to assimilate
the newcomers, and editorials about "the inunigrant problem" reflected
wire service descriptions of metropolitan conditions rather than the
67
local situation.
While local residents indicated their dislike of the newcomers,
they also realized that the newcomers contributed to South Bethlehem's

66Higham, Strangers irt'the Land, pp. 87-105, E. Digby Baltzell,
The Protestartt'Establishmertt: 'Atistoctac ·and·caste·in America,
(Vintage Books Edition , New York, 1966, pp. 87-109, Barbara
Miller Solomon, ·Ancestors and'Immigrartts~ · 'A'Changing New
England Tradition (Science Editions), New York, 1965.
67

Bethlehem Times, Feb. 18, 1891, p. 4, see also Berthoff, "The
Social Order of the Anthracite Region," p. 270.
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prosperity--a prosperity which they welcomed.

The Hungarian and

Slovak steelworkers and the Italians employed in the local construction
industry were recognized as contributors to the local economy.

More-

over, the cigar and textile factories which began to dot South
Bethlehem after 1900 all employed immigrant women.

Indeed, these

factories had been established in the town precisely because the
immigrant communities provided a large pool of previously untapped
68
female labor.
No one expressed any desire to remove the steel
mills and textile factories simply to rid the

to~m

of immigrants.

In spite of the fact that many wished the immigrants would go
away, they did not, and, instead, continued to be an important element
in the growth and development of the community.

In the course of time

attitudes changed, and instead of traating members of ethnic groups
with contempt, native Americans act:lvely sought their assimilation
with American culture.

Assimilatiot& took time, however, and as late

as 1937 a survey of the town's educational facilities asserted that
the primary task of local schools was "amalgamating cultures in order
to mold a desirable American cultural product. 1169

Yet, in spite of

the desire to eliminate all national differences in an American
melting pot, ethnic identities continued to persist.

In 1939, the

authors of the Northampton County·Guide, a W.P.A. project, considered

68 Bethlehem·Times, Aug. 14, 1886, p. 1, Oct. 6, 1890, p. 1.
South Bethlehem·Globe, Mar. 5, 1906, p. 1, Manning; ·Immigrant
Women, pp. 4-s, 12.
69
William E. Arnold, et al., Surve~ of the Schools of·Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, Bethl~eil, Pa., 19 7, pp. 17-18.
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the following paragraph to be indicative of life in the community:
Along Third Street are Greek restaurants, redolent
with boiled lamb and syrupy coffee; Italian
groceries with windows strung with fiery sausages
and Parmegiano and Coceocarollo cheese; Russian
tea houses and Roumanian restaurants and Polish
pool rooms and Hungarian societies. National,
fraternal and musical clubs flourish, and native
costume celebrations of the various nationalistic
groups are held with pomp and ceremony every
Sunday during the summer in Central Park, and are
known as "Nationality Days." 70
South Bethlehem. in the fifty years between 1865 and 1915, contrasts sharply with the Bethlehem of the same period.

The town on the

north side of the river resisted industrialization and grew slowly.
Even though diversity of interests separated its inhabitants somewhat,
the population remained fairly homogeneous, and the town presented the
world with the picture of a sedate appendage to an inddstrial nation.
South Bethlehem, on the other hand, was anything but a sedate,
homogeneous community.

Compared to Bethlehem, the younger community

appeared to explode rather than grow.

It welcomed industrialization,

and rapidly filled up with people of diverse ethnic, religious, and
cultural backgrounds.

The inhabitants lived in a bustling town

which contained a bewildering variety of small ethnic communities.
Diversity of interest among Bethlehem's inhabitants seemed like rockribbed solidarity when seen in the light of the multitude of linguistic
and cultural barriers which divided the residents of South Bethlehem.
Rather than an appendage of the industrial society of late nineteenth
century America, South Bethlehem was that society in microcosm.

70Northampton Courtty Guide, Bethlehem, Pa., 1939, p. 147.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE SOUTH BETHLEHEM ELITE

Comprising an ethnic community, not unlike those formed by
immigrants, a small group of upper class families dominated South
Bethlehem from its beginnings until the turn of the century.

Re-

siding in an area known as Fountain Hill, these elite families
directed the activities of the Lehigh

Vall~~

Iron Company, and other enterprises.

In so doing, they controlled

the fate of the community.

Railroad, the Bethlehem

Fortunately for South Bethlehem, the

local elite did not act irresponsibly toward the community.

On

the contrary, taking their religious obligations as members of the
Episcopal Church seriously, they used their wealth to benefit the
town, providing it with such things as a hospital and an orphanage.
However, by the turn of the century, the elite community's founding
generation began to die off, and few of their successors felt a
compulsion to maintain the tradition of noblesse oblige.
South Bethlehem's elite families constituted a self-conscious,
well-defined community, with a strong sense of its own identity.

A

major factor in the emergence of this group as a coherent community
was the connection of many of its members with Asa Packer's various
enterprises, a fact reinforced among some by ties of both blood and

lW.
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marriage with the industrialist and his descendants,

Moreover, since

the children of South Bethlehem's elite frequently married one
another, their cotmnunity wao·, in reality, one large family.

As a

result, primary group socialization served to inculcate a strong sense
of group identity and distinctiveness.
A common membership in the local Episcopal parish, the Church of
the Nativity, provided additional support to the elite's sense of
community,

Having originally initiated the movement for organizing

a congregation, members of South Bethlehem's elite contined to serve
on the parish vestry.

Indeed, membership on the vestry came to

represent a clear indication that an individual belonged to the elite
community,
In 1858, Robert H. Sayre, the chief engineer of the Lehigh
Valley Railroad, decided to establish his headquarters in South
Bethlehem, where the tracks of the North Pennsylvania Railroad and
the Lehigh Valley formed a strategic junction.

This marked the

effecti•le start of South Bethlehem's upper class community.

Sayre

built a permanent residence on a spur of South Mountain known as
Fountain Hill, located at the borough's western edge.
imitated his example,

1

Others soon

William H. Sayre Jr., Robert's brother and

general agent for the Lehigh Valley as well as assistant to the

1John w. Jordan, Historic·Homcs·an.d·In.stitutions·artd Geneologieal
and Personal·Memoties'of 'the·tehigh'Vallet'of'Penrtsylvania, 2
Vol,, New York, 1905, Vol. I, pp, 234-237, John P. Chamberlain,
One Hundred Years·of·Nativity, Bethlehem, Pa., 1963, pp. 15-16,
For the origin of the name Fountain Hill, see Earl J. Bauman,
"The History of Fountain Hill," (Unpublished M.A. Thesis)
Lehigh University, 1951, pp, 112-113,
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president, constructed his own rambling Victorian mansion across the
street.

With him came his father, the elder William Sayre, n business
2
partner and friend of Packer's.
Shortly after the Sayres moved to South Bethlehem, they were
joined by Elisha Packer Wilbur and his family.

A nephew of Asa

Packer, Wilbur became president of the Lehigh Valley after Packer's
death in 1879.

The Wilbur family was destined to be of major impor-

tance in the economic development of South Bethlehem.

They actively

involved themselves in banking as well as the Iron Company and the
Lehigh Valley Railroad.

3

Garrett B. Linderman, Packer's son-in-law, moved to South
Bethlehem in 1870.

Trained as a physician, Linderman had graduated

from the New York City College of Physicians and Surgeons.

In 1856,

he married Lucy Packer, and retired from the medical profession in
order to take an active interest in his father-in-law's business
affairs.

Like the Wilburs, Linderman was active in banking and the

affairs of the Lehigh Valley Railroad and the Bethlehem Iron Company.

4

The Sayre, Wilbur, and Linderman families served as the core of

2chamberlain, Nativity, p. 15, Ruth Hutchinson, "The Discovery
of Fountain Hill," in Bethlehem Globe-Times, Dec. 23, 1967,
P• A-3.
3Jordan, Lehigh Valley, pp. 79, Semi-Centennial: ·The Borough of
South Bethlehem, ·pennstlvania·souvenir'History, South Bethlehem,
Pa., 1915, p. 3. William J. Reller; 'Hist~r~·of·Northampton
County, 3 Vols., New York, 1920, Vol. III, pp. 508, 519-520.
4Portrait and Biographical Record of Lehigh, Northampton, and
Carbon Counties, Chicago, 1894, pp. 8-13.
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South Bethlehem's elite, but other families also belonged to this
group.

William

w.

Thurston, president of the Bethlehem Iron Company,

H. Stanley Goodwin, superintendent of the Lehigh Valley R.ailroad,
Andrew N. Cleaver, a banker and manager of several coal mining firms
owned by the Packer interests, William L. Dunglison, another banker,
and John Smylie, a major stockholder in the Iron Company and owner of
a firm manufacturing precision parts for locomotives, became members
of the local elite.

So, too, did Tinsley Jeter who moved from

Philadelphia to South Bethlehem in 1860 so that he might supervise
more closely the construction of the Ironton Railroad, a project
connecting his iron mines with the Lehigh Valley Railroad.

These men

all built their mansions in the Fountain Hill area, and became part of
South Bethlehem's upper class.

5

The men heading South Bethlehem's upper-class families in the
nineteenth century did not fit the pattern of rags-to-riches so
beloved of Horatio Alger.
good.

6

On the contrary, they began their careers already well prepared

for success.
Frances
1870's.

Theirs was not the story of poor boy making

w.

In this they conform to a profile first developed by

Gregory and Irene D. Neu for industrial leaders of the

Of old, Anglo-American stock, their families had roots in

5Jordan, Leltigh Valley, Vol. I, pp. 258-60, Heller, Northampton
County, Vol. III, pp. 594-595, Chamberlain; ·Nativity, p. 16.
6For
and
The
and

a discussion of Alger see, Richard Weiss, "Horatio Alger, Jr.
the Response to Industrialism," in Frederic Cople Jaber, Ed.,
Age of Industrialism·in America: ·Essays in·social·Structure
Cultural Values, New York, c. 1968, pp. 304-313.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114.
New England.

They generally received a better than average education,

and did not obtain their first employment until about age eighteen,
much later than the average American of the time.

Usually of an

Episcopal, Congregational, or Presbyterian background, they had been
raised in an atmosphere in which business and a relatively high social
7
standing were intimately associated with family life.
Most of the South Bethlehem elite conformed rather closely to
this typology, as did Asa Packer, the elite's spiritual father.

8

The

Sayre and Wilbur families, for example, originated in New England,
belonged to the Episcopal faith, and had received fairly high levels
of education.

9

Tinsley Jeter and Garrett B. Linderman deviated from

this norm vnly in that the former was the scion of an old Virginia
10
family, and the latter of a Pennsylvania one.

An entrepreneural background was not a necessary prerequisite
for entry into the South Bethlehem elite.

A ranking position in

certain local institutions, plus, of course, a decent family background, made an individual acceptable.

Thus the director of St. Luke's

Hospital, William L. Estes, became an honored member of the local
establishment.

The presidents of Lehigh University were also warmly

7Frances W. Gregory and Irene D. Neu, "The American Industrial
Elite in the 1870's: Their Social Origins," in William Miller,
Ed., Men in·Business: Essa s·on the'Historical Role of the
Entrepreneur, (Harper Torchbooks Edition , New York, 1962, pp.
193-204.
SHeller, Northampton County. Vol. II, pp. 3-5.
9Jordan, Lehigh Valley, Vol. I, pp. 234-237, Vol. II, pp. 7-9.
10
Portrait and Biographical Record, ppa 8-13p Jordan, Lehigh
Valley, Vol. I, pp. 258-60.
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received by the residents of Fountain Hill as the acceptance of Henry
Coppee, Robert A. Lamberton, Thomas M. Drown, or Henry s. Drinker
attested.

Professors could also be numbered among the elite.

For

example, William H. Chandler, Professor of Chemistry married a
daughter of Robert Sayre and served on the Board of Trustees of St.
Luke's Hospital, a position of no little prestige.

Benjamin

w.

Frazier, another I.ehigh professor, served as a vestryman of Nativity
Episcopal Church, another position highly regarded by the upper
11
class.
Since the Episcopal Church loomed so large in the elite's social
life, its rectors were included in the upper-class community as a
matter of course.

This was no condesce·,lding gesture on the part of

parishioners, for many of the clergy came from backgrounds which would
have granted them access to local society in their own

right~

Indeed,

several young men from prominent South Bethlehem families later be=
12
came Episcopal clergymen.
Besides a common social background, ties of kinship and marriage
helped to unite the Fountain Hill elite into a self-conscious
community.

Garrett B. Linderman, for example, married Asa Packer's

1lwilliam L. Estes, Jr., Ed., William L. Estes, 1855-1940: The First
Superintendent, 'Director·and'Chief·surgeort·of·st~ Luke's Hospital:
An'Autobiography, Bethlehem, Pa., 1967, pp. 64-65, Chamberlain,
Nati~ty, p. 33, Catherine Drinker Bowen; 'A'Historx·of·Lehigh
University, Bethlehem, Pa., 1924, pp. 94-105, Jordan, Lehigh
Valley, Vol. I, pp. 234-237, ·parish 'Artrtalsj ·church of the Nativity:
Bethlehem·southj 'Pennsylvania; '1862•1902, n.p., n.d., p. 214.
12 Chamberlain, Nativity, pp. 18, 72, for a discussion of the relation
between the clergy and small town elites, see Page Smith, As a
City Upon a Hill: The Town in American History, New York, 1966,
p. 74.
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daughter, Lucy.

Their son, Robert Packer Linderman, married Ruth May

Sayre, the daughter of Packer's chief engineer, Robert H. Sayre.
Linderman's daughters, Sally and Lillian, married two of Elisha
Wilbur's sons Warren and Eldridge Packer.

Elisha Wilbur was Asa

Packer's nephew and his successor as president of the Lehigh Valley
Railroad.

Anotlter of Elisha Wilbur's sons, Rollin, married Nancy

Lamberton, daughter of a Lehigh University president. 13
Robert H. Sayre, married four times.
first wife married into the local elite.

His three daughters by his
Ruth married Robert P.

Linderman, Elizabeth married Andrew N. Cleaver, an official of the
E.P. Wilbur Trust Co., and Eliza married William H. Chandler, a
Lehigh Professor.

Sayre's second wife was the widow of the late

Senator Richard Brodhead and an aunt by marriage of Garrett B.
Linderman.

SayTe's third wife, whom he married in 1879, was a daughter

of Asa Packer.

Thus, Robert H. Sayre's family had ties throughout

the local elite community and contributed to the feeling that
Fountain Hill belonged to a clan of entrepreneurs. 14
The Episcopal Church of the Nativity served as an institutional
focus for the elite community's life.

The appearance of Robert H.

Sayre and Tinsley Jeter as permanent residents in South Bethlehem
marked the start of Nativity parish.

The families of both men were

13Heller, Northampton Courtty, Vol. III, p. 165, Jordan, Lehigh
Valley, Vol. I, pp. 209-212, Vol. II, p. 9, Chamberlain,
Nativity, pp. 17, 44; ·south'Bathlehem·Globe, Jan. 5, 1907, p.
1.
14
Jordan, Lehigh Valley, Vol. II, p. 9.
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d~vout

Episcopalians, and attended the lay services Jeter held in his

home every Sunday afternoon beginning in 1860.

In May of 1862, the

members of this small group established a Sunday school in the station
,,..

of the North Pennsylvania Railroad.

William H. Sayre Jr. became
15
the superintendent, a post he held until his ueath in 1909.
The creation of a. Sunday school led to the formation of an
Episcopal parish within a relatively short time.

In July of 1862,

the Diocese of Pennsylvania sent the Reverend Elephalet Potter as
a missionary to Bethlehem and Allentown.
regular services in South Bethlehem.

In September, he began holding

The presence of a clergyman

encouraged the local Episcopalians to establish a legally constituted
parish.

On November 8, 1862, they organized a temporary vestry con-

sisting of Jeter, Robert Sayre, his father and brother, John Smylie,
and Ira

Co~tright,

a founder of the Iron Company.

The new vestry

launched a fund-raising campaign, and, by the following August,
$18,000 had been collected.

On Christmas Day 1864, the congregation
16
held its first religious service in the newly completed church.
In May of 1863, the Annual Diocesan Convention, meeting in
Philadelphia, accepted the parish into the diocese.

In the course of

the meeting, two new members were added to the vestry:
and Solomon W. Roberts of Philadelphia.

Asa Packer

Neither of these men lived

in South Bethlehem, and never attended any meetings of the vestry.

15Nativity·Annals, p. 4v Chamberlain, ·Nativity, p. 18.
16 Ibid., PP• 18-23.
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As the parish historian notes, their inclusion was probably due to
17
contributions they had made to the church.
Packer, in any case,
had close ties to the original vestrymen.

In June of the same year,

the Reverend Potter became Nativity's first rector.
Nativity Church acted as a parent organization for Bethlehem's
Trinity Episcopal Church.

In 1869, Nativity's vestry established a

mission Sunday school in Bethlehem with H. Stanley Goodwin as
superintendent.

Shortly afterwards, the rector began holding ser-

vices on Sunday evenings.

A parish was soon organized, and by

January of 1872, the construction of Trinity Church was completed.
Several members of its first vestry also served on Nativity's:

Charles

Dodson, William Dunglison, H. Stanley Goodwin, and Robert Sayre.
Only Dodson lived in Bethlehem, and he withdrew from Nativity's vestry
18
in 1879.
The residents of South Bethlehem considered Nativity to be the
Church of the borough's upper-class community, as indeed it was.
This association between the elite and the Episcopal Church was not
a merely local development, but reflected the national status of the
Episcopal Church.

In American society the various denominations have

always served to unite people of similar outlooks and social standing,
and, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the Protestant Episcopal
Church had emerged as the major upper-class religious denomination in

17 Ibid., P• 23.
18Nativity Annals, pp. 45, 53, 68, Seventy•Five Years·of·Trinity
Church: Bethlehem; Pa., Bethlehem, Pa., n.d., pp. 1-2.
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the United States.

It had been the church of the southern planter

aristocracy from earliest colonial times, and, during the eighteenth
century, the merchant elite of the northern cities also turned to it
in increasing numbers.

To the upper classes of American society, the

Episcopal Church represented a link with the aristocratic traditions
of England which, they felt, their wealth should permit them to
emulate.

In the years after the Civil War, the Episcopal Church

expanded its membership as newly rich industrialists eagerly conformed
19
to the customs of the class they aspired to join.
The founders of Nativity Church came from families long
affiliated with the Episcopal Church.

They were not recent converts.

William H. Sayre, Sr. had been instrumental in the creation of St.
Mark's Episcopal Church in Mauch Chunk during 1835.
Packer, Sayre had served on St. Mark's first vestry.

Along with Asa
This long-

established relationship of the founders with the Episcopal Church
became a source of no small pride to members of the parish.

20

Indeed,

it would appear that more recent converts to the Episcopal faith
received less than full acceptance by the Fountain Hill elite regardless
of their 'i'Yealth.

I11 any caH:Je• th11. wealthy members of Bethlehem's

Trinity Episcopal Church, some of whom were recent converts, did not
21
socialize extensively with the residents of Fountain Hill.

19 E. Eigby Baltzell, Philadelphia·Gentlemen: The'Making of a
National·Upper·class, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, PP• 225-233.
20

21

Chamberlain, Nativity, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 29, Hutchinson, "Discovery of Fountain Hill,"

p:-A'-3.
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The Church was not the only institution designed to buttress the
Fountain Hill elite's sense of community.

Like Episcopalians else-

where, the local elite sought to perpetuate an upper-class life-style
intimately connected with membership in the church.

Thus, a school

for the daughters of Fountain Hill families, Bishopthorpe Manor,
opened its doors in 1868.

It was located on a property which had

come into the hands of Tinsley Jeter who suggested that it be used
for a school.

Jeter's proposal met with diocesan approval, and

Nativity's rector and vestry became the school's board of trustees.
Jeter acted as the school's first president.

He improved the property

at his own expense, and leased it to the trustees rent-free until they
could raise the money to purchase the school.
largest contribution to the fund.
22
in 1871.

Jeter himself made the

The school became church property

Lehigh University was another local educational institution in
which the Fountain Hill

~entry

took special interest.

Founded in

1865 by Asa Packer as a "polytechnic college," its emphasis was on
such subjects as engineering.

Although Lehigh was founded as a non-

sectarian institution, it had close ties with the Episcopal Church.

A

devout Episcopalian, Packer turned for advice in founding the school
to William B. Stevens, the Episcopal Bishop of Pennsylvania.

Bishop

Stevens became the first president of Lehigh's board of trustees, and,
until 1897, the Bishop of the Diocese of Eastern Pennsylvania always

22

Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 296-312, Nativity
Annals, p. 48, Bauman, "Founta::iU Hill," p. 31.
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became the board's president.

Indeed, because of Lehigh's close

connection with the Episcopal Church, the University received per23
mission to send delegates to the diocesan convention of 1888.
The Fountain Hill gentry maintained a strong interest in the
affairs of the University.

The first board of trustees included

Robert H. Sayre, William H. Sayre Jr., and Garrett B. Linderman.
Nativity's rector, Reverend Elephalet Potter acted as the Board's
secretary and Elisha Wilbur, who became a trustee in 1879, was its
24
treasurer.
For years, these men gave of their time and money to
Lehigh, and took a great interest in its success.

The connection of

the school with the local elite could also be seen in the close
social relations between the Fountain Hill residents and the presidents
and faculty of Lehigh.

Members of the latter

g~oup

served on

Nativity's vestry and married into the families on what residents of
South Bethlehem referred to as "Episcopal Hill."

Students from the

University, coming from the proper backgrounds, were likewise welcorned into the homes on Fountain Hill.

Marriages between Lehigh
25
students and daughters of the local gentry were not uncommon.
For

most of the nineteenth century, the relationship between Lehigh and
Fountain Hill was a family one.

23 Bowen, Lehigh University, PP• 8-9, 84, Jonathan w. Miller,
History of·the'Diocese·of·central'Penns11Vartia~ '1871~1909,
2 Vols. Fracksville, Pa., 1909, Vol. II, p. 239.
24Bowen, Lehigh University, pp. 84, 92.
25

Chamberlain, Nativity, pp. 25, 34, Hutchinson 1 "Discovery of
Fountain Hill, 11 p. A-27..
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The close ties of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United
States with the Church of England colored its view of society.

The

American Church had originated in the Anglican Communion, and had
never lost touch with the medieval ideal of being a truly catholic
church which ministered to the whole community, not just to elite
groups.

Strongly influenced by the Christian Socialism of their

Anglican cousins, Episcopal clergymen organized and supported movementa to improve the lot of the American workingman.

Indeed, the

Episcopal Church was clearly in the forefront of the Social Gospel
movement of the late nineteenth cent.ury.

To the degree that wealthy

Episcopalians heeded their clergy's reminders of a Christian's
responsibility toward society, they also followed their aristocratic
26
impulses and acted out of a spirit of noblesse oblige.
In South Bethlehem, the Episcopal elite took their religious
responsibilities seriously.

Indeed, Nativity was established in

South Bethlehem in order to provide the many working men who lived
there

~>Tith

a church.

An 1862 circular requesting aid in the con-

struction of a church noted that:
Bethlehem South is immediately opposite the
Terminus of the North Pennsylvania Railroad.
It now contains a population of one thousand
inhabitants. Most of these are persons of
very modest means, and a great majority are
laborers, mechanics and workmen in the
zinc and iron works of the place. The Iron

26 Henry F. May, Protestant Churches and Industrial America,
(Harper Torchbooks Edition), New York, 1967, pp. 182-186,
Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 230ff., Smith, City
Upon a Hill, p. 94.
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Furnace and Rolling Mill of the Bethlehem Iron
Company are now nearly completed, and will soon
bring a large addition to the population. There
is no church of any kind in·the place, a want
severely felt by all, but more especially by the
laboring classes, who are less able and less disposed to go the distance required to reach the
churches on the other side of the river.z7
In spite of the good intentions of Nativity's founders, the
parish did not acquire working-class members.

Churches of other

denominations more congenial to the town.' s working-class inhabitants
soon came into existence in South Bethlehem, and most workmen joined
them instead of Nativity.

Moreover, the town's residents considered

Nativity to be a church for the carriage trade.

In an unsuccessful

attempt to belie this, the families living near the church made it a
point to leave their carriages at home and walk to services.

28

Although the efforts to attract workmen from the zinc and iron
works to services at Nativity failed, the Episcopalians did not
abandon efforts to reach members of the "laboring classes."

Since

the workmen did not come to Nativity, Nativity went to them.

In

August of 1873, Nativity's rector held services at the Leckaweki
Springs Hotel about a mile west of the church.

The hotel was located

near the Shive Governor Company, a factory owned by John Smylie, a
member of Nativity's vestry.

Smylie had ,just moved his factory from

Philadelphia and he wanted to provide a chapel for his employees.

27 Nativity·Annals, p. 9.
28

Italics in the original.

Chamberlain, Nativitz, p. 33.
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With $1,000 provided by Robert H. Sayre, St. Mary's Chapel was built
on a plot of land Smylie donated to the parish.
crated in April of 1875,

The chapel was conse-

From then on, regular services were held

every Sunday, and sunday school classes were led by Sayre until his
29
death in 1907.
At the initiative of William

w.

Thurston, vice-preBident and

later president of the Iron Company, a second chapel, St. Joseph's,
was opened in 1882.

It was located "at the foot of Lehigh Mountain,

opposite No. 3 Furnace," about a mile to the east of Nativity.

The

services, held in a small cottage, attracted worshippers from among
those employed in the Iron works, and, before long, a larger building
was needed,

Thurston persuaded Joseph Wharton of Philadelphia, a

director of the Iron Company, to donate a plot of land for the
P•

~pose,

The chapel was completed in 1884 with Thurston himself

paying the construction cost of $2,500,

30

The Episcopal leaders did not confine their community activities
to purely religious affairs.

One of their projects was the establish-

ment of St. Luke's Hospital,

The idea originated with NativHy's

rector, Cortland Whitehead who had come to the parish in 1870.

At that

time, the closest hospital was in Philadelphia. Not even the Bethlehem
31
Iron Company had so much as a dispensat:y.
Whitehead at f:f.rst thought

29

.ill.!!••

P• 34,

30 rbid., pp. 44, 50,
31Estes, Autobiography, pp. 66-67, 80,
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in terms of a small cottage hospital run by the parish, and suggested
this to the trustees of Bishopthorpe Manor at a board meeting in
1872.

The trustees responded enthusiastically to the idea, obtained

a charter, and began soliciting funds.

In June of 1873, St. Luke's
32
Hospital was opened in a house in South Bethlehem.
Within a short time of its founding, the hospital outgrew its
original facilities.

Given financial assistance by Asa Packer, the

hospital's trustees acquired the grounds of a former water cure known
as the Hydropathic Institute located in the Fountain Rill area.
Packer also bequeathed $350,000 to St. Luke's upon his death in 1879,
and as a result, considerable expansion was undertaken.

In 1881, the

trustees recruited Dr. William L. Estes as director of the hospital.
He remained in charge of St. Luke's for forty yearsp and under his
direction it developed into a hospital whose reputation eventually
attracted cases from all over the eastern United States.

In 1884,

St. Luke's established a training school for nurses, the third such
33
in the United States.
The founders of St. Luke's at first intended the hospital to be
a denominational institution.

However, it quickly became apparent

that only a non-sectarian hospital would receive community support, and
the hospital's charter was amended to that effect.

Although the new

charter permitted members of other denominations to sit on the Board

32 souvenir·Ristory, pp. 54-55, Chamberlain; Nativity, pp. 30-32.
33
Estes, Autobiography, pp. 76-79, 104-108.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126.
of Trustees, the hospital still retained its Episcopalian ties.

The

charter required the Bishop of the diocese to be president of the
board, and for a majority of the board members to be Episcopalians.

34

Among the residents of South Bethlehem serving on the board were
Tinsley Jeter, Elisha Wilbur, Garrett B. Linderman, Robert H. Sayre,
William H. Sayre, and H.s. Goodwin.

These men and their families

took an active interest in the hospital and gave freely of their
money, time, and energy.

Both Wilbur and Sayre donated wards to the

hospital, and Sayre, shortly before his death in 1907, presented St.
35
Luke's with a pathology laboratory.
The Episcopal gentry's concern for South Bethlehem's welfare
was not limited to the establishment of a hospital.

At the urging

of Nativity's rector, the Reverend Kinlock Nelson, the vestry gave
its support to the creation of a Workingman's Club in South Bethlehem.
This club opened its doors in February of 1885, with Robert H. Sayre,
William

w.

Thurston, Tinsley Jeter and other Fountain Hill residents
36
serving on the executive committee.
Nelson, like other Episcopal
clergymen of the day, was aware of the social problems arising from
an industrial society.

By creating the club, he hoped to provide

working men with "facilities for social intercourse, instruction and
rational recreation at a very small cost." 37

34

The club was non-

Miller, Diocese, Vol. I, p. 247.

35 Estes, Autobiography, pp. 62-63; ·souvenir'History, p. 54.

36Nativ~ty Annals, P• 83.
37
~·· p. 84.
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denominational and open to anyone who cared to join.

The club fur-

nished its members with evening classes in mechanical drawing and
mathematics, a library, an athletic program, baths, and "Public
38
Entertainments at frequent intervals."
The club proved to be short-lived.

Although 242 men joined

within two months of its opening, by the spring of 1886 the club had
closed down.

Three factors accounted for the club's failure:

the

absence of level ground in South Bethlehem for the athletic program,
the lack of a permanent staff, and the large number of rival social
39
organizations competing for members.
The Fountain Rill gentry did not perform all of their community
activities through the agency of the Episcopal Church.

In 1882, for

example, William W. Thurston used his own resources to establish an
orphanage in South Bethlehem after a smallpox epidemic had ravaged
tl1e town and caused over a hundred deaths.
Thurston finance the orphanage by himself.

For the next four years,
40

When Thurston's health

began to fail in 1886, it became necessary to place the Children's
Rome on a more secure footing.

Accordingly, the Home was incorporated

in November 1886, with the directorship composed of members of the
41
community's leading families.

38 Ibid., P• 84.
39 Bethlehem'Times, Apr. 9, 1886, p. 1, Chamberlain, Nativity, p.43.
40 Bethlehem Daily·Times; ·sesgui•CentP-nnial·Industrial·Edition,
June, 1892, p. 14; ·souvenit'Ristorl, p. 55.
41Bauman, Fountain Rill, p. 48-50, Souvenir·Ristory, pp. 55-56,
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During the next few years, the number of children at the Home
increased, and it became necessary to expand its facilities.

Thurston

purchased a plot of land, and public subscriptions raised $3,700.
Children's Home's new quarters were ready for occupancy in 1888,

The
In

1895, a donation of land and buildings permitted the home to relocate
on a six-acre tract in Salisbury Township, near the Lehigh County
line.

Between 1882 and 1910, the Home cared for nearly a thousand

children ranging in age from 2 to 14.

After 1918, the Children's Home
42
waa financed by the Bethlehem Community Chest,
The Fountain Hill elite did not limit their involvement with
South Bethlehem to philanthropy.

They took an active role in the

town's political and economic life as well,
South Bethlehem's first borough council.

Elisha P. Wilbur sat on

He served two more terms

as councilman before being elected to serve five one-year terms as
Chief Burgess,

The voters of South Bethlehem likewise chose H, Stanley

Goodwin, Superintendent of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, to eighteen
terms as Chief Burgess, and he served continuously from 1875 until
his death in 1892,

Goodwin was a Republican, and maintained his

popularity in a town so staunchly Democratic that local humorists
declared the favorite sport of the inhabitants was stoning Republican
43
parades.
The major economic interests of South Bethlehem's elite were

42 Bethlehem·children's Home·Momertto 1910, South Bethlehem, Pa,,
1
1910, pp, 3-4, Bauman, 11Fountain Hill, 11 p. SO,
43
Souvenir History, p. 16, .T. Davis Brodhead, Historical Sketch
of South Bethlehem, South Bethlehem, Pa., 1886, pp. 127-130,
Edwin Frey, "History of the Protestant and Orthodox Churches
of Bethlehem, Pa." Bethlehem Globe-Times, Aug. 26, 1967, p. 25.
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coal mines, the Lehigh Valley Railroad,
Company.

~nd

the Bethlehem Iron

As president,.,vice-presidents, superintendents, directors

and major stockholders of these firms, the Sayres, Wilburs, Lindermans,
and others held South Bethlehem's economic future in their hands.
These same men "<-lere also involved in business activites of a more
limited scope, and of more immediate effect on the community.

When

the Bethlehem South Gas and Water Company was organized in 1864,
Elisha P. Wilbur served as president, and Robert and William Sayre,
44
John Smylie, and H.S. Goodwin sat on the board of directors.
Elisha P. Wilbur organized South Bethlehem's first bank, the E.P.
Wilbur Trust Company in 1870, and Garrett B. Linderman organized
the Lehigh Valley National Bank across the river in Bethlehem two
45
years later.
Both directly and indirectly, then, the settlement
o~'Fountain

Hill was the locus of economic power which controlled

South Bethlehem.
In 1900, Nativity became the Cathedral Church for the newly
46
created Diocese of Bethlehem.
The location of South Bethlehem as
an Episcopal residence indicated Nativity's status as a church of
the wealthy and powerful.

In one sense, however, the choice of

Nativity as a Cathedral served as both an epitaph as well as an
encomium, for, by the turn of the century, the dominance of the

44 F. Ellis; History·of·Northampton·countYi Pennsylvania, Phila.,
1877, p. 211.
45
Ibid., p. 213, ·Bethlehem Times·Industrial Ed., p. 22.
46
Chamberlain, Nativity, p. 73.
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Fountain Hill gentry in the affairs of South Bethlehem came to an
end.
One reason for Fountain Hill's decline was the passing of the
generation which had made the neighborhood a center of wealth and
power.

Garrett B. Linderman died in 1885, William W. Thurston died

in 1890 and was followed by H. Stanley Goodwin in 1892.

In 1907,

Robert H. Sayre passed on, as did Elisha P. Hilbur in 1911.
children did not follow in their footsteps.

Their

Only two members of

the second generation achieved anything approaching the status of
their fathers:

Warren A. Wilbur and Robert P. Linderman, and

Linderman died of blood poisoning in 1903 at the age of 39.

The

other surviving male children of the founders left South Bethlehem
47
to pursue careers elsewhere.
Before 1900, membership on Nativity's vestry had been a sure
sign of status in the community.

However, the deaths of its original

members left the vestry unable to make good its losses.

After 1908,

local businessmen instead of industrialists dominated the board.
Only two vestrymen represented the older groups:

Andrew N. Cleaver,

a contemporary of the founders and Warren A. Wilbur.

Indeed, interest

in church affairs declined so much that by 1917 the rector was asked
to prepare a schedule of vestrymen to usher on Sundays to insure their
48
attendance at services.

47 Hutchinson, "Discovery of FountainHill," pp. A-4, A-12,
Souvenir'History, p. 3; ·Nativity·Annals, p. 204, Jordan,
Lehigh Valley, pp. 7-9.
48 chamberlain, Nativity, PP• 73, 81.
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Other signs of change accompanied the vestry's decline.

By 1903,

the Bethlehem Steel Company no longer belonged to the Fountain Hill
elite, but had become the person property of Charles M. Schwab who
49
was transforming it into a firm of international consequence.
Likewise Bishopthorpe Manor closed its doors in 1902 because of a
lack of endowment.

When it reopened in 1908, it did so as a
50
privately owned institution.
The disappearance of the Fountain Hill gentry was the local
manifestation of a more general, national phenomenon.

As industrializa-

tion had created the local elite community, continuing industrialization
caused its decline.

As the national economy became integrated, local

elites were absorbed into an emerging national metropolitan elite.
The centralization of economic power in the major urban areas of the
country created a centralized national upper-class.
interests resulted 1n a shared life-style.

Shared economic

New England boarding

schools and fashionable eastern universities became family surrogates
molding the various local aristocracies:, to a common national pattern.
Exchanging a local orientation for an expanded cosmopolitan one, the
new national elite nevertheless maintained its familiar life-style.
The children of upper-class families continued to intermarry and to
51
pursue careers of approved status in the elite community.
The

49 Gertrude G. Schroeder, 'The Growth'Of'Major·steel Companies:
1900•1950, Baltimore, 1950, pp. 48-49.
50
Souvenir History, p. 35.
51Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877•1920 (American
Century Series Edition), New York, 1968, p. 111, Baltzell,
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departure of the Fountain Hill elite from South Bethlehem was
symbolized by the life of Francis B. Sayre, the son of Robert H.
Sayre.

In 1913 he married Jessie Wilson, daughter of President

Woodrow Wilson, and later pursued a distinguished career in the
52
Foreign Service.
Sayre's marriage marked the end of an era in
South Bethlehem's history.
The Fountain Hill elite gave South Bethlehem a group of leaders
who exercised an enormous influence on the town's development.

Their

financial resources made them the unquestioned arbiters of the town's
economic growth, and this resulted in their assumption of social and
political leadership as well.

Moreover, influenced by their membership

in the Episcopal Church, the Fountain Hill industrialists also emerged
as the community's moral leaders.

Their concern for the local

community's welfare, as well as their ability to implement that
concern put them at the pinnacle of the local status hierarchy.

No

other local groups possessed the resources to challenge them, and,
indeed, none wanted to.

Moreover, in a South Bethlehem made up of

many social and economic groups from a wide variety of ethnic and
cultural backgrounds, the Fountain Hill leadership provided the town
with a sense of community as '-Tell as continuity and stability.

"7hereas

Bethlehem's Moravian traditions had served to assimilate newcomers

Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 103-129, Maurice R. Stein, ~
Eeli ee·of·commurtit :'Art Inter retation·of·Ameriean Studies,
Harper Torchbooks Edition New York, 19 3, p. 59.
52

South Bethlehem Globe, Nov. 25, 1913, p. 1, Hutchinson,
"niscoveey of Fountain Hill," p. A-14.
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into existing patterns of social relationships, South Bethlehem had
to create its own patterns, a task which the residents of Fountain
Hill found themselves obliged to carry out.

The families on

Fountain Hill had developed roots in the community and felt that
they had responsibilities toward it.

As a local historian once

noted, "they had supplied a tone and a social life that were of the
53
best American-Victorian tradition."

53 Raymond lvalters; Bethlehem ·Lons Ago· and ·Today, Bethlehem, Pa.
1923, p. 62.
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CHAPTER SIX
BETIILEHEM IRON BECOMES BETHLEHEM STEEL

The Bethlehem Iron Company was reorganized as the Bethlehem
Steel Company in 1899.

By this time the South Bethlehem elite no

longer had much influence over its affairs, and control of the company passed into the hands of Charles M. Schwab who made it into
the nation's second largest steel producer.

With the change of

ownership carne methods of management based on impersonal bureaucratic principles to replace the informal procedurP.s of the previous
regime.

Because Bethlehem Steel was the economic heart of the local

community, it was the means by which the values of a mature industrial society, which these new techniques represented, became a part
of the lives of the town's inhabitants.
Bureaucratic methods of industrial management comprised but the
tip of an iceberg, for they were only one manifestation of a fundamental change taking place in American life.

After a half-century

of intensive industrialization, the individualistic philosophy which
underlay the nation's economic expansion no longer seemed to be an
appropriate guide to behavior in a complex society.

A new ethos, one

derived from the experience of the industrial corporation, and based
on bureaucratic ideals of rationality, order, impersonal regulations,
and centralized decision-making, came to dominate American life.

134.
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is the purpose of this chapter to describe this transformation, and,
by using Bethlehem Steel as an example, show how the values of
corporate industrialism became part of American life.
A philosophy of individualism held the allegiance of the American
people for most of the nineteenth century.

For Americans, the ideal

man was totally self-reliant, and European visitors to the United
States such as de Tocqueville noted that the complex network of
obligations and relationships which, in Europe, bound the individual
to the rest of society, simply did not exist in the United States.
A belief in the equality of all men had replaced notions of social
hierarchy, and Americans asserted that each man's destiny lay in his
own hands,

1

Thus, Americans resented any efforts by government or by

society in general to interfere in the lives of individuals.

The

relatively fluid social structure of nineteenth century America, which
alarmed Europeans, was a source of pride to the people of the United
States.

Where Europeans saw impending chaos, Americans believed that

a natural harmony -- much like Adam Smith's invisible hand -- would
preserve stability in a society of individuals freed from the artificial
2
social order of Europe.
For Ralph Waldo Emerson, an unrestrained individualism appeared to
be the means by which mankind could achieve moral perfection.
1

3

To

.

Alexis de Tocquevtlle; ·nemoeract'irt'America, J.P. Mayer and Max
Lerner, Eds., New York, c. 1966, p. 478.

2
John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol·for·an Age, (Galaxy
Books Edition), New York, 1962, pp. 207-213.
3

Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selected Prose and Poetry, Reginald L. Cook,
Ed., (Rinehart Edition), New York, 1963, pp. 165-180.
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most Americans, however, individualism appeared to be the means by
4
which they could achieve economic success.
The consequence of a
wide-spread belief in uninhibited individualism was an era of
restricted governmental authority and laissez faire economics.
Richard Hofstadter noted:

As

"The same forces in American life that

had made Jacksonian equalitarianism possible and had given to the
equalitarian theme in the agrarian romance its most compelling appeal
had also unleashed in the nation an entrepreneurial zeal probably
without precedent in history, a rage for business, for profits, for
5
opportunity, for advancement."
A materialistic individualism dominated the values of post-Civil
War America and encouraged economic growth.

The absence of a

traditional European social order meant that Americans lacked the
European's traditional attitudes regarding property, occupation, and
business activity.

6

Instead, men's lives revolved around the quest

for wealth, and most Americans gave their approval to an ethic of
economic exploitation.
un~qual

Competition, ruthlessness, acquisition, and

wealth received the approbation of clergymen, academics,

judges, lawyers, and politicians.

Legislative enactments and judiciai

4ward, Jackson, pp. 166-180.
5Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: ·From·Bryan·to·F~D.R.,
(Vintage Books EditionJNew York, 1955, pp. 39-40.
6John E, Sawyer, "The Entrepreneur and the Social. Order: . France
and the United States," in William Miller, Ed.; Men·in·Business:
Essa son the Historicsl'Role·of·the Erttre·reneur, (Harper Torchbooks Edition , New York, 1962, p. 20,
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decisions institutionalized such values and gave them legal status.

7

The mores of the time made it an age dominated by the spirit of the
entrepreneur.
For many nineteenth century Americans, the entrepreneur
personified the ideal man:
his own destiny.

the self-reliant individual who created

A psychological profile of the entrepreneurial

type, developed by the late economist Joseph Schumpeter, goes far to
show how well such a mentality meshed with the mores of the time.

The

entrepreneur, Schumpeter noted, was first and foremost an innovator.
Entrepreneurs were rarely either inventors or capitalists.

TI1ey seldom

possessed a deep understanding of technological processes, and few of
them risked their own capital.

Instead, the typical entrepreneur was

one who saw the commercial value of other men's new ideas, and persuaded men with capital to invest in

ne~-1

ventures.

As an innovator,

the entrepreneur had to ,ossess unbounded confidence in himself and
his ideas, and needed the energy and drive to pursue them regardless
of opposition,

Moreover, as Schumpeter pointed out, the entrepreneur

often made business an avenue of social advancement:
he sought to gain recognition and social distinction.

through business
Thus, the entre-

preneur aggressively pursued success, but he pursued success for its

7Louis M. Hacker; ·The·world of Andre~·carnegie: ·1865•1901, New
York, c, 1968, PP• 57-85, See also Richard Hofstadter; Social
Darwinism·in·Americart Thought (Beacon Press Revised Edition),
Boston, 1966, pp. 13-104, and Robert Green McCloskey, American
Conservatism ·in ·the Ase ·of 'Ertterptise 1 '1865 ...1910: ·A ·studt:of.
William Graham·sumrter; ·stephen·J~ 'Field; ·and·Artdte~·carnegi6 1
(llar.,e.r Torchbooks Edition), New York, 1964, PP• 1-21.
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own sake, not for the wealth it would bring.

For him wealth served

primarily as an indication of achievement, it did not bring pleasure
in itself.

The entrepreneur derived his real pleasure from the

accomplishment of the tasks he set for himself.

As an innovator, an

adventurer, and an interloper, the entrepreneur embodied the values
of American society, and men like Andrew Carnegie and John D.
Rockefeller becatne heroes to the 1\..merican public.

8

If the American industrial economy owed its origins and growth
to the competitive spirit of the nation's entrepreneurs, that same
competitive spirit had little place in the highly developed and complex
economy which had come into existence by the end of the nineteenth
century.

At that point, the nation 1 s economy required stability rather

than innovation, and control rather than competition.

The modern

industrial corporation proved to be the means by which these needs
could be met.
Corporations had long been known as a device for limiting the
liability of investors in a business venture only to the extent of
their investment if a creditor brought suit against the firm.

By

the end of the nineteenth century, however, this financial aspect of
the corporation had been superseded by the corporation's function as

8Joseph Schumpeter; The·Theory of ·Economie·Development:An
Inguiry·into·Profits, ·capital; ·credit; ·Intereat·and·the'Buainess
Cycle, Cambridge, Maas., 1934, pp. 90-94, the classic biographies
of Carnegie and Rockefeller are: Burton J. Hendrick, ·The Life·of
Andrew Carnegie, 2 Vole., Garden City, New York, 1932 and Allan
Nevins, Study in·Power: ·John D. ·Rockefeller; ·Industrialist and
Philanthropist, 2 Vola., New York, 1933.
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the administrative unit of industrial production.

By combining many

formerly competing firms under one centralized leadership, the new
corporations brought stability to American industry.

Besides

horizontal combination, vertical integration of all manufacturing
processes from the obtaining of raw materials to marketing also became a characteristic of the industrial corporation.

In such complex

organizations, managerial talents were of greater value than entrepreneurial ones, and by the first decade of the twentieth century,
bureaucrats were replacing entrepreneurs as the dominant figures in
the American business world.

9

Bureaucracy is characterized by centralized decision-making,
hierarchical chaine of command, impersonal regulations, and specialized
departments staffed by career professionals who hold office b' virtue
of a technical competence or expertise in a particular field.

Because

a bureaucratic organization emphasizes the rationalization of activity
it produces stability and order, and this enables the organization to
10
plan for the future instead of being at the mercy of events.

9Ed.wo.od C., Kirklnn~ ~ Tn~uRtry Comes of A e: Business Labor and
Public Policy, 1860-1897, Quadrangle Paperbacko Edition ,
Chicago, 1967, pp. 195-215, John Tipple, "Big Businessmen and
a New Economy," in H. ~-layne Morgan, The Gilded Age, Revised
Edition, Syracuse, New York, c. 1970, pp. 13-30, William Miller,
"The Business Elite in Business Bureaucracies: Careers of Top
Executives in the Early Twentieth Century," in l-1iller Men in
Business, pp. 286-305.
10The classic analysis of bureaucracy is Max Weber; 'The ·Theory of
Social and·Eeonomic or anization, Talcott Parsons, Ed., (Free
Press Paperback Edition , New York, 1968, pp. 324-341, for a
more recent analysis, see, Robert K. Merton, ·social Theory and
Social Structure, Enlarged Edition, New York, 1968~ pp. 249278.
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In the case of the industrial corporations, economies of scale
resulted from the standardization of processes and the greater
efficiency which bureaucracy made possible.

All this made for

profitability, and the success of the systematically organized
corporation led to the

~pread

of such managerial methods through-

out the American business world. 11
Large scale technological production required administrative
procedures to cope with the demands made on corporations whose manifold activities involved them in an economy of continental scope and
complexity.

The nation's railroads, because they were the first to

face the challenge of handling large amounts of men, money, and
materials were the first business establishments to institute
bureaucratic managerial controls.

As mileage and traffic increased,

railroads created specialized departments to carry out such tasks as
maintenance, traffic, planning, and accounting, all of which were
supervised by a central office.

As examples of bureaucratic organiza-

tion, railroads thus served as models for later corporations to
12
emulate.
Methods of systematic management were as necessary in the factory
as they were in the administrative offices, because continuity and

11Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy. and Structure:· Chapters in
the History·of·the Irtdustrial·Enterprise, Cambridge, l1ass.,
1962, PP• 8-41.
12Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Railroads: Pioneers in Modern
Corporate U.anagement,"·Busirtess'History·Review, Vol. XXIX,
Spring, 1965, PP• 16-40.
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stability would be impossible without total control of manufacturing
13
processes as well.
The capacity of American factories to meet the
demands of a growing market had grown.

However, as companies expanded

their operations, they often lost control of these operations, as new
and specialized departments were added to existing factories.
Coordination between departments performing separate, but related,
functions was often nil, and the result was confusion, waste, and
internal disorder.
the factory itself.
cratic

Thus, systematic management was necessary within
Just as in the administrative structure, bureau-

uaed in the plant to standardize procedures and
14
create chains of command.
With professional experts in charge of
met~uJa ~~ta

technical

~rocesses

A

control no longer depended on personality.

situation such as Captain Bill Jones' refusal of Andrew Carnegie's
offer of a partnership because he feared it 'might create a gap
between him and his men would not happen under the new system.

15

The implications of scientific management went beyond industrial
organization to include the whole complex of relationships between
technology and society, or, in other words, between man and machine.
Its proponents often compared the funct1.oning of a factory -- and later

13sudhir Kakar, Frederick Taylor: A Study·in Personality and
Innovation, Cambridge, Mass., c. 1970, P• 105.
14
Joseph A. Litterer, "Systematic Management: Design for
Organizational Recoupling in American Manufacturing Firms,"
·Business History·Review, Vol. XXXVII, Winter, 1963 11 pp. 369-391.
15 Robert A. Hessen "A Biography of Charles M. Schwab, Steel
11
Industrialist," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia
University, 1969, p. 55.
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of society in general -

to a machine.

The machine was an example

of rationalized organization whose every specialized part contributed to the machine's functioning.

So it was with a social system;
16
each individual was seen to be a part of a larger whole.
Moreover,
just as the functioning of a machine was based on the systematic
application of scientific law so, too, could scientific systematiza17
tion be applied to human social groups.
There was, of course, a
depersonalizing element in all of this; systematic management left
little room for personal idiosyncracy or autonomy.

As Frederick W.

Taylor, "the father of scientific management,,, bluntly declared:

"In

the past man has been first; in the future the system must be first."

18

Taylor, moreover, was referring not only to the factory but to the
general society as well.

In a tinte when the social controls appropriate

to an individualistic society proved inadequate in an urban-industrial
world, an ethic of organization had great appeal.

To thoughtful

Americans the application of scientific methods to the social structure
of the factory seemed applicable outside it as well.

As Samuel Haber

has noted, the rationally organized factory "became one of those places
where an important segment of the American intelligentsia saw the
16

John ~alliam Ward, "The Ideal of Individualism and the Realicy
of Organization," in Earl F. Cheit, Ed., The·Business·Establishment, NeY York, 1964, pp. 62-63.

17 Robert H. Wiebe, ·The·seareh·of Order: 1877•1920, (American
Century Series Edition), New York, 1968, pp. 151-154.
18
.
Frederick w. Taylor; The·Principles·of·seientific·Manasement,
New York, 1911, p. 7.
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future -- and saw that it worked".
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19

The development of bureaucratic concepts of industrial organization had a major impact on the Bethlehem Iron Company.

Moreover,

because the company's affairs were of crucial importance to South
Bethlehem, these concepts, and the value-system they represented,
eventually influenced events in the community as well.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Bethlehem Iron Company
had shed its reputation as a small, locally owned firm specializing
in the manufacture of rails for anthracite railroads.

This change in

status was the direct result of the company's decision to enter the
ordnance and armor plate fields.

The nature of the new market required

company officials to familiarize themselves with a world previously
alien to them, for they now found themselves dealing with politicians,
20
government bureaucrats, and representatives of foreign governments.
Moreover, to keep ahead of such competitors as the Carnegie Steel
Company, Bethlehem's officials had to keep abreast of national
political and economic developments as well as technological advances.
In other words, for the Company to survive, its leaders had to abandon

19 samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in
the Progressive Era, 1890•1920, Chicago, c. 1964, p. xi.
20
Hessen, "Schwab", pp. 166, 175-178, Arundel Cotter, The Story
of Bethlehem Steel, New York, 1916, pp. 3-7.
21 s.G.to7. Benjamin, "The Works of the Bethlehem Iron Company",
Harper's Weekly, Vol. 35, Mar. 14, 1891, p. 194, R. Hughes,
11 From Ore to Armor Plate,"·cosmopolitan, Vol. 28, Feb. 1900,
pp. 405-413, Hessen, "Schwab", 177-180.
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their previous local orientation for a more cosmopolitan one.
Related to the company's

entran~e

22

into new fields of production

was a change in the nature of its ownership.

Prior to the late 1880's,

the Bethlehem Iron Company had been owned and operated by the families
of the local elite.

However, in order for the company to enter the

armor plate field, it needed additional capital.

The funds came from

Joseph Wharton of Philadelphia, a financier of note who later established the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania.
Wharton had been involved in the company's affairs since its creation
in the 1860's, but after 1889, he possessed a quarter of the company's
23
stock and majority of its bonds.
Wharton thus had an important
influence upon the firm's activities and it was at his insistence that
24
the company was reorganized in 1899 as the Bethlehem Steel Company.
In 1899, the Bethlehem Iron Company had a capital of $7,560,000.
In that year, the newly organized Bethlehem Steel Company obtained
control of the Iron Company's various properties on a 999 year lease
on a guaranty of six percent on the outstanding stock.

The lease was

later cancelled, Iron Company stock was exchanged for Steel Company
bonds paying six percent, and the properties were transferred outright

22

For a discussion of local and cosmopolitan orientations, see,
Merton, Social Theory, pp. 441-474.

23 Frank B. Copley, Frederick·w. Taylor: ·Father·of·seientific
Management, 2 Vola., New York, 1923, Vol. II, p. 7. R.n.
Billinger, "Beginnings of Bethlehem Iron and Steel", typescript
on deposit in the Schwab Memorial Library, Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa., n.d., p. 13.
24
Horace B. Davis, Labor and Steel, New York, c. 1933, P• 189.
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to Bethlehem Steel.

25

The reorganization ended the active involve-

ment of the Fountain Hill elite in Company affairs.

Edward T.

Stotesbury, a Philadelphia banker and later a J.P. Morgan partner,
as well as other Philadelphia and New York financiers joined Wharton
on the company's board of directors.

Of the seven members of the

revised board of directors, only one, Robert P. Linderman, the
company'~

the firm.

president, was associated with a family that had founded
26

Joseph Wharton was cne of the first financiers in the country to
recognize the value of the systematic organization of industry, and
it was at his initiative that Frederick W. Taylor went to Bethlehem
in 1898 to

improv~

the company's works.

Th~

Cou1pany's expansion of

its operations in the 1890's had not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in managerial control.

The office of general

superintendent, as John Frttz had molded it, did not concern itself
with plant operations, but with the design and erection of buildings
and machinery, and with the planning of developments.

Thus, no one

man was responsible for coordinating the activities in the plant as
a whole.

The actual operation of the works

wa~

left to the heads of

various departments, such as forging, melting, tempering, and machine
shop.

Since, at this time, the company employed between five and

25 cotter; ·Bethlehem·steel, p. 6.
26

South·Bethlehem·Globe, Aug. 28, 1901, p. 1.
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six thousan.d men, the resulting confusion and waste were intolerable.

27

Thus, Wharton decided to secure the services of •raylor who had
organized the works of the Midvale Steel Company, Bethlehem's com28
petitor in the manufacture of ordnance.
Taylor arrived in South
Bethlehem in May of 1898 with the understanding that he was to
improve the efficiency of the various shops by introducing a piece29
work system to increase production.
Taylor did not have the same conception of his task as did the
men who employed him.

For Taylor, the entire plant was to be viewed

as a whole whose parts had to be studied in detail, their operations
systematized, and finally organized into a coordinated system.

Thus,

the introduction of a piece rate system in the company's machine shops
meant first of all studying the methods, procedures, and tools used
in the shop, and only then setting about the rational reordering of
operations.

Taylor's favorite tools were the slide-rule and the stop30
watch, and, in fact, he was the originator of the time-motion study.

AR a result of his studies, Taylor at times went so far as to design

27 copley, Taylor, Vol. II, p. a, see also, Ressen, "Schwab," pp.
302-305. See also, Frederick W. Taylor to Robert P.. Linderman,
June 2, 1898, in Taylor Collection, Stevens Institute of
Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey.
28 Frederick w. Taylor to Russel Davenport, Jan. 4, 1898, Taylor
Collection.
29 copley, Taylor, Vol. II, p. 14.
30 Kakar, Taylor,pp. 69-72, Frederick w. Taylor to Robert P.
Linderman, May 27, 1898, Taylor Collection.
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new tools and machinery for the shops whose activities was
31
systematizing.
The scientific management of industry meant for Taylor the total
control of all activities within a plant.

He thus saw his task as

including the introduction of standardized inventory controls,
methods of cost accounting, hierarchical chains of command, and higher
32
wages for labor.
This latter caused Taylor's employers some
difficulty.

He had been brought in to increase productivity and reduce

labor costs, and they could not seem to follow his argument that re33
duced labor costs had to be coupled with higher wages.
His system
was based on piece-work rates, and if company officials wanted the
men to work harder they had to pay them more.

"My experience," he

wrote, "is that it is necessary to pay them on Piece Work from 25
to 50 per cent more than they can get on day work in order to stimulate
34
them to their maximum."
Taylor, as we have noted, saw the industrial
plant as an integrated system, and, by paying labor higher wages, he
sought to convince workmen
their employer's.

t~at

their interests were the same as

Taylor had no use for employers who cared only for

profit and did not consider their worker's welfare.

35

He believed

31Taylor, Princinles of Scientific Management, pp. 114-118,
Copley; Taylor, Vol. II, pp. 117-118.
32 Frederick w. Taylor to Robert P. Linderman, April 4, 1898,
Taylor Collection.
33
Frederick w. Taylor to Russel Davenport, Jan. 4, 1898, Taylor
Collection,
34Frederick w. Taylor to Robert P. Linderman, Jan. 19, 1898,
Taylor Collection,
35 copley, !aylor, P• 54.
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that the proper implementation of his programs would insure labor's
cooperation with management, and that a contented labor force would
36
feel no need to resort to labor unions to obtain decent treatment.
Taylor's approach to the problems of industrial activity can be
seen in his systematizing of one of the most menial tasks in the
37
Bethlehem Works: shovelling.
When he arrived at the works, the
company employed some 600 men to move such materials as light ash,
coal, coke, or ore about the steel yard wherever needed.

The men

owned their own shovelsp worked in large groups, and their activities
carried them all about the yard which, by that time, covered an area
about two miles long, and, in places, about half a mile wide.
Taylor's first steps in reorganizing this activity was to run a
series of tests to determine the optimum shovel load for a firstclass worker.

He concluded that a load of 21 pounds was the ideal

weight for a first-class shoveller.

He also concluded that one kind

of shovel would not do for handling all types of material, but that
special shovels should be designed for specific tasks; a large one
for ashes, for example, and a small one for ore.
As a result of Taylor's investigations, work in the steel yard
was systematized.

The men no longer used their own shovels, but were

given specially designed tools for each assignment.

This meant the

erection of tool rooms at various locations about the yard so that the

36 Frederick w. Taylor to William Crozier, Apr. 20, 1910, Taylor
Collection, see also Taylor, ·Principles·of·Scientifie Management,
pp. 10, 17-19, 72-77.
37This and the following paragraphs are based on ~·• pp. 6571.
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men would have the proper equipment immediately at hand.

To

eliminate the waste motion of men wander1bg about the yard, a yard
staff was organized which planned work at least a day in advance,
so that when individuals checked in, they would know what their
jobs for that day would be.

Large maps of the steel yard indicating

the location of men and jobs permitted the staff to move gangs from
one spot to another.

A telephone network was installed in the plant

to insure effective communication between the planning staff and the
labor gangs.

Once the yard was mapped, the relationship in time and

space of various jobs could be seen, and reorganization of the yard
itself soon followed.

Materials were then delivered or dumped

according to a logical sequence.
Taylor's efforts at systematizing the yard produced remarkable
results.

After three years, 140 men did the same

600 had done previously.
was reduced by 50 percent.

amoun~

of work

The cost per ton of handling materials
During the last six months of Taylor's

stay at Bethlehem, when all the work in the yard had been
systematized, the savings to the company amounted to between $75,000
to $80,000 a year, after including the cost of a planning staff, new
tools, and a wage increase of 60 percent for the workmen.
Taylor's efforts at reorganizing activities in the steel works
did not meet with universal approval.

For one thing, he was an

abrasive, tactless man who stubbornly insisted that his course of
action was always the right one, and that those who questioned him
38
were his enemies.
As important as his personality in creating

38

Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, P• 150.
59, 148-151.

Kakar, Taylor, pp. 39-40,
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opposition to Taylor's methods were the methods themselves.

The

most conspicuous element in Taylor's management system was its
39
imperso~ality.
As in all bureaucratic schemes, scientific management left little room for personal autonomy.

At Bethlehem, the

personal element dominated the company's management staff.

After

years of ownership by local families, the Bethlehem Iron Company
had become a hotbed of nepotism.

Nepotism, of course, was the

traditional means of recruiting loyal staff when most firms were
small family affairs and management was personal.
arrived at Bethlehem, the company had
had become a synonym for incompetence.

g~cwn

40

By the time Taylor

in size, and nepotism

Taylor represented the

winds of change at Bethlehem, and people who held positions because
of personal connections resisted those changes.
Taylor was dismissed fDom the company's employ in May of 1901.
His activities had resulted in the creation of two factions:
Taylor and anti-Taylor.

pro-

The anti-Taylor faction was the larger of

the two, and, moreover, it had the sympathetic ear of the company's
president, Robert P. Linderman.

In a sense, Taylor had been hired

over Linderman's head by Wharton, a company director.

Although

nominally employed by Linderman, Taylor was, in reality, accountable
to Wharton.

It was to Wharton that he had to show results, but it

39 Haber, Seierttifie.·Manaeement, pp. 24, 28-29, Kakar, Taylor,
PP• 68-69, 105,
40
...
Copley, Taylor, Vol~ II, pp. 7-8, 21, on nepotism in business
see Miller, 11 The Business Elite", in Miller; ·Mert ·in Busi~_!,
pp. 292-293.
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was to Linderman that he had to go for authority to produce those
results. 41 However adequate Linderman may have been in directing
the company's financial affairs, he did not have a technological
42
background and had to rely on his staff for information.
Since
many of his subordinates were hostile to Taylor, Linderman's understanding of Taylor's goals and methods was, naturally, limited.
In any event, Taylor and Linderman did not get on very well, and in
the spring of 1901, Linderman bowed to pressure from the anti-Taylor
faction.

Upon Taylor's return from vacation, Linderman informed

him that after May 1, 1901, his services would no longer be required. 43
The dismissal of "that man" caused a collective sigh of relief from
many company employees.

Three months later, the Bethlehem Steel
Company acquired a new owner: Charles M. Schwab. 44
There were two legacies of Taylor's stay at Bethlehem.

His

attempts to improve efficiency led to the development of high-speed
tool steel.

His studies of the art of cutting metals resulted in

the discovery that tools made from chromium-tungsten steels would do
from two to four times as much work when heated to the melting point.
This tool steel revolutionized the machine industry of the United

41 copley, Taylor, Vol. II, PP• 10, 22.
42
Ibid., pp. 145-146, see also Haber, Scientific·Martagement,
~5, footnote.lO.
43 Robert P. Linderman to Frederick w. Taylor, April 17, 1901,
Taylor Collection.
44
Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, PP• 154-155.
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States, and has been credited with enabling the United States to
outstrip
One.

45

G~rmany

in the production of. munitions during World War

Also, Taylor and an assistant, H.s. Gantt introduced a task-

bonus system for piece-work in the Bethlehem plant.

It involved

payment of a straight hourly wage plus a bonus for additional work
with a set time period.

This was reinforced by a bonus paid to

the shop foreman as an incentive encouraging him to teach and help
his men.

46

What Gantt and Taylor denounced as a misuse of this

system under Schwab was to lead to serious labor trouble at Bethlehem
47
in 1910.
When Charles M. Schwab purchased the Bethlehem Steel Company for
$15,000,000 in August of 1901, he

~l'as thi.rty-ni~e yem::;

president of the United States Steel Corporation.
the steel industry had been meteoric.

oJ.rl » fl.n.d the

Schwab's rise in

At the age of eighteen he

obtained a job as an engineer's helper for a dollar a day at the
Carnegie-owned Edgar Thomson Steel Works.

Six

yea~s

later, at the

age of 24, he advanced to superintendent of the COiupany's Homestead
Works.

Two years after that he returned to the Edgar Thomson Works

as its general superintendent.

After the bitter Homestead strike of

1892, Carnegie ordered Schwab to restore normal relations in the plant.

45

Kakar, Taylor, pp. 102-105.

46

Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, p. 128, see also Taylor; Principles
of Scientific·Management, pp. 121-122.
47
... ,
H.S. Gantt, Work; Wages·and·Profit, 2nd edition, New York, 1910,
pp. 111-113, Frederick w. Taylor to William Crozier, Apr. 20,
1910, Taylor Collection.
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Upon the successful completion of this task, Schwab served as the
manager of both the Homestead and Edgar Thomson Works.

In 1897, at

the age of 35, he became president of the Carnegie Steel Company.
Receiving bonuses that amounted to six percent of the company's
profits, Schwab was earning more than a million dollars a year.

48

When the United States Steel Corporation -- the first American
corporation to be capitalized for more than a billion dollars organi~ed

was

in 1901, Charles M. Schwab became its first president.

Schwab's appointment was more than simply a recognition of his
abilities as a steel-maker, it was also a reward for his efforts
in making the corporation a reality.

Indeed, the idea of a great

corporation which would rationalize the steel industry, and end
ruinous competition by combining rival firms into one organization,
was first broached by Schwab at· a dinner given in his honor in New
York on December 12, 1900.

In what may be the most important after-

dinner speech in American business history he told an audience which
included J.P. Morgan and Edward H. Harriman about the state of the
contemporary steel industry.

The promise of the American steel

industry was great, he said, and American technology was far in
advance of its European competition.

He felt, however, that the

industry was not living up to its promise:

there was too much

duplication of product and too much destructive competition.

A single

48 E. Neal Hartley, "Charles Michael Schwab," itt'Dictionary·o£
American·Biography, Vol. 22, Supplement. 2, New York, 1958, pp.
601-602. Joseph F. Wall; 'Artdrew·carnegie, New York, 1970, pp.
'.31-534, 666, 668-
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giant firm, rationally organized, would end all that, and, by
rationalizing production and distribution, create great profits.
In such a firm, each of its plants, strategically located, would
specialize in a single product and thus dominate its market area.
A centrally directed sales force could coordinate production and
distribution.

The consequences of integration would be great

economics in manufacturing, and great profits which, in turn, could
be used to find new uses for steel, permitting the opening of new
.
49
markets and the reaping of record profits.
Schwab was not making concrete proposals in his

sp~ech,

but

was giving voice to a vision he had of the steel industry's future.
His visions were infectious, however, and, at least one of his
listeners, J.P. Morgan, caught the disease.

Morgan called Schwab

aside after his speech, and interrogated the steel man for half an
hour about his ideas.

During the course of the next few weeks,

Schwab drew up lists of what companies should be included in the
proposed merger, and carried out the negotiations between Morgan
and Andrew Carnegie, whose Carnegie Steel Company was to be the heart
of the new firm.

In all this he was a success, and the United States

Steel Corporation, chartered in New Jersey with a capitalization of
$1,403,000,000, came into being on Apr.il 1, 1901.

On April 16,

Schwab, then aged 39, became the new corporation's first president.

so

49Hessen, "Schw~b", pp. 20S-208, Wall; ·carnegie, pp. 785-793.

so Sidney B. Whipple, "Notes on Mr. Schwab's Life," Unpublished
typescript, 2 Vols. 1935, on deposit in the Charles M. Schwab
Memorial Library, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa.
p. 86, Hendrick, Carnegie, Vol. II, p. 1~8.
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Schwab held his position as president of the United States Steel
until August of 1903, when he resigned.

u.s.

Steel were not happy ones.

His years at the head of

He quarrelled often and bitterly

over matters of policy with the board of directors, most of whose
members were financiers, not practical steelmen.

~loreover,

he

aroused the displeasure of J.P. Morgan by ill-considered speeches
and a public deportment which did little to contribute to a
reputation for maturity and a sense of responsibility.

Since the

initial public reaction to the formation of the uSteel Trust" as it
became known was hostile, Schwab's construction of the largest and
most lavish mansion in New York City, and his well-publicized

pres~nce

at the gaming tables in Monte Carlo did not improve the firm's image.
However, it was Schwab's involvement in the United Ship-building
scandal, which his biographer calls "one of the seamiest scandals
in American industrial history," which forced him out of the
presidency of

u.s.

Steel. 51

Schwab's involvement in the Shipbuilding debacle grew out of his
acquisition of the Bethlehem Steel Company in 1901, only a few
months after he became president of United States Steel.

He purchased

80,000 shares from Bethlehem's Chairman Joseph Wharton, 60,000 from its
president Robert P. Linderman, and another 20,000 shares on the open
market.

Since the firm had only 300,000 shares outotanding, this

was enough to give him a controlling interest.

The transaction cost

5 lnessen, "Schwab", pp. 213-280, the quotation is on p. 249,
Wall, Carnegie, pp. 799-802.
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him $15,000 1 000; $7 1 500,000 of it was in cash and he gave his notes
52
for a like sum at six per cent.
This was a personal investment
of Schwab's, and he did not feel that ownership of Bethlehem conflicted with his role as president of United States Steel.

J.P.

Morgan disagreed, however, and convinced Schwab to turn Bethlehem
over to him, with Schwab having the option to repurchase it at the
original price should he ever decide to leave

u.s.

Steel,

53

In 1902, Schwab was persuaded to include Bethlehem Steel in a
recently organized corporation called the United States Shipbuilding
Company,

Schwab repurchased Bethlehem from Morgan, and delivered it

to the corporation,

In return he received $10,000,000 in bonds, with

Bethlehem's plant and properties as the collateral in case of default.
lie also obtained 10,000,000 each in preferred and common stock,

Thus,

if the merger failed, he would at least reacquire Bethlehem Steel,
if it succeeded, he stood to make a fortune,

54

The United States Shipbuilding Company failed, and it failed
spectacularly,

Of the nine subsidiary companies in the corporation,

only one, Bethlehem Steel, was solvent,

When Bethlehem's officials

were instructed to turn over its profits to the corporation, they
refused, and the corporation collapsed,

Buying out the other investors

in the defunct firm, Schwab united the most valuable portions into the

52 Hessen, "Schwab," p, 254, Alfred Henry Lewis, "Owners of
America, Part V: Charles M, Schwab," Cosmopolitan, Vol. 45,
Oct, 1908, p. 485.
53
Cotter, Bethlehem Steel~ pp. 8-10.

54Heseen, "Schwab," P• 256,
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Bethlehem Steel Corporation which was chartered in New Jersey on
55
.
December 10, 1904 with a capitalization of $30,000,000.
Schwab had nearly total control over the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation.

Owning three-quarters of its stock in the firm's early

years, and remaining its largest stockholder for a long time afterwards,.
Schwab was in a position to do pretty much as he pleased.

In the years

after taking control of Bethlehem Steel, Schwab transformed the small,
specialized company into the second largest manufacturer of a
diversified line of steel products in the United States.

He also

established a steel empire east of the Pittsburgh district, an area
which u.s. Steel had ignored.

He was convinced that steel could be

produced successfully on the East Coast with iron ores from Cuba and
South America instead of being dependent on ores from the Lake
Superior region.

Through plant expansions and mergers Schwab reached

his goal by the start of World War I, little more than a decade after
56
his resignation from u.s. Steel.
Schwab found Bethlehem devoted to the manufacture of a specialized
line of products such as heavy forgings, ordnance and armor plate.
Although profitable, such products had a limited demand, and Schwab
set off on a program of expansion into other areas of production.
Bethlehem entered into the structural steel market, something that

55~., pp. 288-289, Cotter; 'Bethlehem·steel, p. 10.
56
.
. .
Gertrude G. Schroeder, 'The·Growth·of Major·steel·companies:
1900•1950, Baltimore, 1950, pp. 47-50.
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,John Fritz had failed to get the company's directors interested in
57
daring the 1880's.
Taking a chance, Schwab purchased the patent
rights to a structural steel beam recently invented by Henry Grey.
Grey's invention was a design for making in one piece the big beams
used :f.n the construction of large buildings.

In the past, structural

beams had been formed by riveting together a number of different
sections of steel.

Grey offered the rights to his beam to virtually

every intportant steel firm in the country, but

~-1ithout

results.

Only

Schwab had seen the potential of Grey's beam, but when he sought to
acquire t:he patent for

u.s.

Steel, he was overridden by the directors.

Once in C•ontrol of Bethlehem, Schwab decided to manufacture Grey's
beam.

Convinced of the new beam's potential, Schwab poured all the

money he owned or could borrow into constructing a plant to produce
it.

The new Saucon Plant of the South Bethlehem works doubled the

size of the existing plant as well as ita labor force.
gamble paid off.

Schwab's

Grey's light, strong, and inexpensive beam made

feasible the erection of skyscrapers, and, Bethlehem for many years
remained the major producer of structural steel in the United States.
Schwab's ownership of Bethlehem Steel also resulted in changes
in the company's

organizations~

resisted when Frederick

w.

structure, changes which had been

Taylor proposed them.

definite managerial hierarchy was established,

Under Schwab, a
Centralized control

57

John Fritz, The Autobiography of John Fritz, New York, 1912,
pp • 17 4-·177 •
58
Cotter, Bethlehem Steel, p. 44, Eugene G. Grace, Charles M.
Schwab, New York, 1947, PP• 32-34, Hessen, "Schwab", pp. 296302, Whipple, "Notes", p. 257-258.
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of operations replaced the virtual autonomy of departments which had
existed under the previous regime.

The office of General Manager

was created to coordinate sales and production, and the able Eugene
59
G. Grace was named to the position.
Schwab did not tolerate
nepotism and inefficiency; if an individual did not produce he was
asked to resign.

Moreover, Schwab firmly believed in promotions

from within; he brought no new people with him when he took over the
company.

The only immediate changes in personnel Schwab made were

to ask for the resignation of the firm's president and vice
president -- men who could not accept Schwab's methods.

As president

he installed Archibald Johnston, a man whom Taylor considered to be
60
one of the few really able executives under the old regime.
As an
incentive, Schwab introduced an executive bonus system similar to that
which had been in effect when he was employed by Andrew Carnegie.
Monetary rewards, he believed, would increase the productivity of his
subordinates.

As Bethlehem prospered, bonuses rose to fantastic

heights, and Schwab became as famous for his "Boys of Bethlehem," as
61
Carnegie had been for his "Young Geniuses."
In a time when the bureaucrat was replacing the entrepreneur as
the representative American business leader, Schwab's career marks
him as a transitional figure.

His rise to prominence in the steel

59 Hessen, "Schwab"~ pp. 302-304.
60

south Bethlehem Globe, June 30, 1906, p. 1, Copley; 'Taylor,
Vol. II, P• 140.
61
Cotter, Bethlehem Steel, pp. 20-22, "One of Schwab's 'Boys of
Bethlehem'," Literary Digest, Vol. 55, Nov. 3, 1917, p. 87.
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industry, had been the result of his. promotions through the hierarchy
of the Carnegie Steel Company to the office of president, and from
there to the presidency of United States Steel.

To be sure, his

rapid advancement was the result of talent and ability, but they
were talents and ability of a bureaucratic rather than an entrepreneurial nature.

Schwab's rise had been the result of Carnegie's

recognition of his talents:
way to the top.

Schwab had not carved out his own path-

Only at a rather later age than usual, and only

after he had been forced out of

u.s.

Steel, did Schwab launch an
62
entrepreneurial career by gaining control of Bethlehem Stee1.
Although Schwab's career was essentially a bureaucratic one,.

his outlook was conditioned by the

individualistit~

values of the

era into which he had been born.

He was, as William Miller has noted,
63
a hostage to his image of a freer past.
Thus, Schwab's view of his
life and career was conditioned by a value system which celebrated
the entrepreneur.

In later years, for example, he referred to him-

self as a "barefoot boy" with little education who rose to prominence
as a result of nothing more than hard work and a desire to succeed.

64

In actual fact, however, Schwab's life did not conform to such a
Horatio Alger-like formula.
intimated.

His family was not as destitute as he

His father, John Schwab, owned a small woolen mill in

62Hessen, "Schwab,"·passim, see.also, Miller, "Business Elite,"
in Miller, Ed.; ·Men·in·Business, p. 293.
63 tbid.
64

Whipple, "Notes," PP• 5-11.
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western Pennsylvania, and had profited from providing the Union Army
with blankets during the Civil War.

He likewise owned part of a
65
livery stable and a small stage-coach line.
Although Schwab's

family'did experience some deprivation, it was not a grinding poverty,
but more in the nature of a deferred satisfaction of immediate wants
in the expectation of future success.
Schwab never expressed a great regard for the value of formal
education in preparing a man for success.

He considered practical
66
experience of greater importance than a college education.
He
always pointed to himself

~s

a man of limited schooling who had never-

the less risen to the top of his chosen field.

However, like his

stories of boyhood poverty, Schwab's description of his education was
tailored by his view of himself as a self-made man.
St. Francis College in Loretto, Pennsylvania.

Schwab attended

To be sure, the school

provided little more than a high school education at the time, but
in the 1870's even this was more education than most Americans received.
In any case, Schwab completed courses of instruction in both sur·reying
and engineering, valuable assets in an economy becoming more industrialized
67
every day.
Of his early days in the steel industry Schwab liked to relate
how, as a boy, Captain Bill Jones of Carnegie Steel found him
work~ng

as a grocery clerk and offered him a job driving stakes for

65Hessen, "Schwab", pp. 10, 18-19, Grace, ·sehwab, P• 5.
66
Charles M. Schwab, Succeeding·with'Whlt'You·nave, New York, 1917,
pp. 32, 35.

67Hessen, "Schwab", p. 27.
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an engineer for the sum of a dollar a day.

68

This, like other

aspects of Schwab's early life needs clarification.

He did not

enter the job market until the age of eighteen, somewhat later in
life than the average

~-1orkingman.

His first job, and the only one

he ever held outside of the steel industry, was as a grocery clerk-a

~-1hite-collar

position.

His background and education had not

prepared him to look f ~rward to a career as a manual laborer.

lfuen

he took the job as an engineer's helper he did so with the
expectation of acquiring enough practical knowledge to obtain a
l1igher-ranking position.

Indeed, in many respects, Schwab conformed

to the profile established by Neu and Gregory of industrial leaders
in the 1870's:

he came from a middle-class background, had acquired

a better than average education, entered the job market at a later
age than was customary, and had expectation of rapid job mobility.
To be sure, Schwab did differ from the standard profile.

He was not

of Protestant English stock or of New England background, but was the
grandson of an early nineteenth century German immi.grant to
Pennsylvania.

He also differed from the profile in that he belonged

to the Catholic Church instead of the Episcopal or Presbyterian, but
these differences were relatively less significant than the similarities.
Schwab's career at Carnegie Steel was the story of an incredibly

68 Whipple, "Notes", p. 22.
69
Frances w. Gregory and Irene D. Neu, "The. American Industrial
Elite in the 1870's: Their Social Origins," in Miller, Ed,
Men in Business, PP• 193-204, Hessen, "Schwab", pp. 4, 16-17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69

163.
rapid rise.
hierarchy.

It was, however, a rise through a bureaucratic
Bureaucrats hold their positions and receive promotions

because of their professional competence, and such competence was
what brought Schwab to the attention of his superiors.

At a time

where the steel industry was still at the stage of rule-of-thumb
operations, Schwab set up a chemistry laboratory in his home, and
worked far into the night studying the relatively young sciences
of chemistry and tnetallurgy.

By making himself indispensible to

Captain Jones, he acquired the post of Jones' chief assistant.

In

this way he became known to Andrew Carnegie who appointed Schwab,
then aged 24, head of the Homestead Works.

Possessing a photographic

memory, Schwab developed an expert knowledge of all branches of
steelmaking, a knowledge which helped him rise to the presidency of
Carnegie Steel.

70

Schwab possessed more than a technical knowledge of steelmaking;
he also possessed the valuable ability to convince people to do what
he wanted.

He was a born salesman and an accomplished speaker.
71
Reportedly, he could sell auybody anything.
He was, as a later
critic once noted, "a born actor: with his baritone voice, his ready
flow of language, his golden-toothed smile and, above all, his
marvelous gift for bursting into tears without a moment's notice,
he knows how to fascinate enemies, Senators, government prosecutors,

70

Whipple, "Notes", pp. 15, 17.
71
Arundel Cotter, "Charles M. Schwab,"·Moody's·~$azine, Vol.
18, July 1915, p. 324.
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justices and rebellious stockholders."

72

Congenial and democratic,

Schwab administered the various steel firms he headed with what one
73
historian has called a "gay ruthlessness."
At Bethlehem Steel,
for example, he reorganized the managerial hierarchy and then subjected his subordinates to an almost constant pressure.

If they

did not meet expectations they were dismissed, but if they exceeded
74
expectations they received substantial bonuses.
Schwab's combination of bureaucratic talents and entrepreneurial drive transformed
Bethlehem Steel from a manufacturer of

special~zed

steel products

to a diversified industrial giant.
In 1917 Schwab published a little volume entitled Succeeding With
What You nave.

In it, he gave the ambitious young man a series of

helpful hints on achieving success in the business world.
was simply one of hard work and total devotion to the job.

His formula
"If a

young man entering industry were to ask me for advice I would say:
Don't be afraid of imperiling your health by giving a few extra hours
to the company that pays your salary," he wrote.

Failure, in Schwab's

mind, was the result of a reluctance to do more than what was

expected~

"I have yet to hear an instance where misfortune hit a man because he
worked overtime.

I know lots of instances where it hit men who did

not ••• More serious than physical injury is the slow relentless blight

72

"Bethlehem Bonuses," New Republic, Vol. 67, July 15, 1931, p.220.

73 navid Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919,
Philadelphia, c. 1965, p. 20.
74
Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, PP• 158-164.
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that brings standstill, lack of advancement, final failure."

The

real key to advancement was to do more than one's fellow workers.
"All successful employers of labor are stalking men who will do the
unusual, men who think, men who attract attention by performing
more than is expected of them.
their worth felt.

These men have no difficulty in making

They stand out above their fellows until their

superiors cannot fail to see them."

Education was of little value

compared to hard work, nor was genius required to achieve success,
Ordj.nary men, using their normal abilities in a whole-hearted
devotion to the job were as capable of reaching the top, Schwab be75
lieved, as those with a college education.
Schwab's little homily on success gives some insight into the
manner in which he adjusted the values he acquired during a more
individualistic era to the realities of a society which had become
increasingly organized,

It will be readily observed that the advice

which Schwab offered his readers contained nothing new.

Rather,

Schwab merely articulated values which Americans had long held dear:
success and failure were both the result of an individual's moral
qualities.

The ambitious man succeeded because he worked hard and

devoted all his energies to his chosen calling.

Success was the reward

for effort, and failure was the result of its absence.

Other than a

willingness to labor hard, success required no special talents; it
could be achieved by anyone willing to pursue it.

75

A man's destiny

Schwab, Succeeding, PP• 11, 14, 26, 32-35.
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lay in his own hand.

Schwab's advice bore a close resemblance to

the values expressed by Americans in Alexis de Tocq,ueville' s
76
day.
However, there was a world of difference between Schwab's
advice and that given by Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Self-reliance

played little part in Schwab's formula for success.

Nowhere did

he suggest to his readers that they strike out on their own, blaze
new trails, or become entrepreneurs and create their own
businesses.

On the contrary, Schwab recommended that they apply

their talents and energies within an organizational framework.
Success came because an individual stood out from the crowd when he
worked harder than his fellow employees, and thus gained the
recognition of his superiors.

Displays of zeal and competence would

result in advancement in a corporate hierarchy.

Success, as Schwab

explained it, meant obtaining promotions not achieving independence.
Thus, the expressions Schwab used seemed to indicate a continuity of
values from the mid-nineteenth

cen~ury

to the first dec&des of the

twentieth, but, in reality, close examination shows instead, a
replacement of one set of values by another.

In many respects,

Schwab's adaptation of his values to a changed reality mirrored a
process which took place in the minds of many Americans as they
attempted to cope with a complex urban-industrial society.
Although Americans displayed an initial hostility to bureaucratic values, an organizational ethos gradually became part of the

76

See above, pp. 134-138.
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American scene.

The dislike of. the giant industrial combinations

when they first began to appear in the American arena, soon gave
way to acceptance as people recognized their importance to the
continued functioning of an industrial economy.

77

In a society

grown increasingly complex and impersonal, a value-system stressing
cooperation rather than competition appeared more and more
appropriate.

The transition from one set of values to another was

not a difficult one for, as we observed in the case of Charles M.
Schwab, bureaucratic ideas seemed to continue the reign of traditional
small-town values.

Energy, efficiency, frugality, promptness,

perseverance and a host of other values were common to both systems.

78

Thus, Americans redefined what they meant by individual:fr:m, and by the
early twentieth century individualism had come to be measured by
participation in society rather than maintenance of an aloof distance
from it.

As the analogy of a machine came to be used as a

description of society, the true individualist was declared to be the
person who devoted himself to functioning as a specialized part of
79
that machine.
Just such an attitude permeated Herbert QJ.",_cf~l:;yi' s
'·

The Promise of American Life, a book of great influence on the climate

77

Richard Hofstadter, "What Happened to the Antitrust ~1ovement?
Notes on the Evolution of An American Creed", in Cheit, Ed.,
The Business Establishment, pp. 113-132.

78Hofstadter, Age·of Reform, p. 225, Wiebe, Search for·order,
PP• 133-134.
79ward, "Individualismand Organization", in Cheit, Ed., The
Business Establishment, pp. 62-63, 68-69, Taylor, ·prirtcrpres
of Scientific·Management, pp. 125-127.
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of reform politics during the Progressive period.

80

In bureaucratic

organization, a professional competence is highly prized, and in a
complex society, professionalism became the new individualism of
the American middle class.

Teachers, lawyers, doctors, social

workers, engineers and other experts created professional organizationa which set the standards for entrance into those professions,
They thus became the recognized practitioners of their specialized
81
occupations within an impersonal and variegated society.
A
collective individualism replaced an atomistic individualism or, to
use David Riesman's terminology, Americans abandoned "inner
82
direction" for "other-direction,"
The true individualist, it was
now said, functioned as part of a team, and a homogeneous, not a
pluralistic, society should be the goal for which Americans strove.

83

Although the residents of South Bethlehem were not aware of it,
Schwab's acquisition of Bethlehem Steel meant that the relationship
which had long existed between the company and the community was to
change..

As in most small industrial tolms, the inhabitants took an

80Herbert Croly:,,· The Promise of American Life, (Capricorn Books
Edition), New York, 1964, pp. 427-441.
8
lwiebe, Search for Order, p. 111-132,
82 navid Riesman, The Lonely·crowd: A Study·of·the Chadging
American·character, New Haven, c. 1950, pp. 14-17, 19-25,
see also Michael Kammen; P~ople·of'Paradox: ·An·Inguiry·concerning the Otigirts·of·Am~tican·civilization, New York, 1972,
pp. 266-267, for a discussion of "collective individualism."
83 For example, see CroL.:;v;•;. Promise ·of ·American ·Life, pp. 399454,
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almost proprietary interest in the company's affairs.

84

Since the

company had been in the hands of local owners for decades, it was
naturally assumed that Schwab's purchase of the former Linderman
mansion indicated that Schwab would continue the traditions established by the old Fountain Hill elite.

This was not the case, for

Schwab's orientation was to a world of national and international
85
financial and industrial affairs.
He had no special loyalties to
a small Pennsylvania steel town.

He was a product of corporate

industrialism, and it was the Bethlehem Steel Corporation not South
Bethlehem on which he lavished his attentions.

If he placed any value

on the community, it was merely as a source of labor.

The strike

which occurred in February of 1910, precipitated a collision between
these two value systems, which forced South Bethlehem to look at
its~lf

in an entirely new light.

84

Copley, Taylor, Vol. II, pp. 45-47, see also·south·Bethlehem
Globe, May 24, 1905, p. 1, June 3, 1905, p. 1, Mar. 1, 1907,
P• 1, Sept. 14, 1907, P• 1. Wall, Carnegie, PP• 581-583.
85
Fo:r discussion of the itnpac·t of corporate industrialism on
small towns, see Page Smith~ AS a CitY Upon a'Hill: 'The'Town
·in·Amerieart History, New York, 1966, p •. l07, and Maurice R.
Stein;·The·Eelipse of·communit: ·Art·Inter retation·of·Ameriean
Studies, (Harper Torehbooks edition , New York, 1964, pp.
85-86, 90-91.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1910

Charles M. Schwab brought to South Bethlehem a new and unt:amiliar
set of attitudes regarding the management of industrial operations
when he acquired control of the Bethlehem Steel Company.

The im-

plementation of these attitudes led to the outbreak of a strike ut
the company's South Bethlehem Works in February of 1910.

Although

the strike originated in a dispute over wages and hours, it soon
developed into something more than a conflict between labor and
management.

It became a struggle between the company and the

community itself, and, as such, marked a collision between opposing
systems of values.

In that sense, the victory of the company, after

a long and drawn-out struggle, meant the triumph of the values of an
urban-industrial society over those of the small town.
Schwab often proclaimed himself the ftiend of labor.

"The best

understanding that can be reached between capital and labor is achieved
when you make the workmen realize that they are as much a part of the
business as the stockholders", he stated.

1

"When reductions have to

1sidney B. Whipple, "Notes on Mr. Schwab's Life," Unpublished
typescript, 2 Vola., 1935, on deposit in the Charles M. Schwab
Memorial Library,. Bethlehem St~el Corporationp Bethlehem. Pa.,
PP• 71-72.
170.
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be made the proper thing to do is to call the men in and take them
into your confidence.

Show them your cost and profit sheets.

Demonstrate your position, frankly, and honestly, and you'll have no
trouble."

2

Congenial and accessible, Schwab was, as an individual,

a favorite among his workers. 3 This friendship for labor had its
limits, however, for Schwab would not allow unions in the companies
he ran.

"I will not permit myself to be in the position of having

the labor dictate to the management," he declared.

4

To some of

his critics, Schwab's stand on labor smacked of hypocrisy.

"The

fact to be observed in all this", one wrote, "is that where unpleasant
things have to be said about labor, Charlie doesn't say them.

Some-

one else does the talking, and thus it is with entire truthfulness
that Charlie can declare that my happiest reflection on my past
business career, has to do with my relation to the workingman."
Schwab's attitude

towar~

5

labor was that of the entrepreneur.

He

viewed labor as simply one more factor in the production of steel
which had to be accounted for; unions were a disruptive factor in
attempts to rationalize business.

Like Andrew Carnegie, Schwab saw

2
~·~~ P• 74.

3Frank P. Stockbridge, "S<:hwab, Leader of Men," The World's Work,·
Vol. 36, July, 1918, p. 2.47.
4clarence w. Barron; ·They. Told .Barron: ·.conversations ·and
Revelationa·of·an·American·Pepts'in'Wall'Street, New York, 1930,
P•

82.

5Arthur Strawn, "A Man of Heart,"·Anterican·Mercury, Vol. 12, Oct.
1927, P• 142.
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little conn.ection between wages and productivity.

Seeking to maximize

profit, Schwab viewed the question of wages in terms of their relati·on
to low operating cost.

As president of Carnegie Steel, he consistently

sought to cut wages, as an easy way to cut costs.

6

Under Schwab, the

wages paid at Bethlehem were said to be the lowest in the steel industry. 7
Of particular complaint among the Bethlehem Steel Company's employees was Schwab's bonus system.

As designed by Frederick

w.

Taylor

and H.s. Gantt, this system was intended to reward workers for
efficiency and, by so doing, increase production.

An

increase of

30 to 60 percent in wages, they believed, would encourage the men to
see that their interests and those of their employers were identical.
For the employer, the bonus system would result in an increased
productivity as well as lower his over-all costs.

8

The bonus plan as

employed by Schwab retained the mechanics of the system designed by

6David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 40-41, Robert A. Hessen, "A Biography
of Charles M. Schwab, Steel Industrialist," Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, Columbia University, 1969, pp. 130, 133. For a
general discussion of the entrepreneurial attitude toward labor
and unions, see, Edward c. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age:
BusinessA-Labor and Public Policy, 1860-1897 (Quadrangle Paperbacks Edition) Chicago, 1967, pp. 362-363, Joseph F. Wall,
Andrew Carnegie, New York, 1970, pp. 343-346, 624-628.
7"The Bethlehem Strike," The Survey, Vol. 24, May 21, 1910, pp.
308-309.
8Frederick w. Taylor; ·The·Prineiples·of·seierttifie.-Martagement, New
York, 1911, pp. 39, 74, 121-122, n.s. Gantt; ·work; ·wases ·and
Profit, 2nd Ed., New York, 1913, pp. 72~73, 110-115, Frank B.
Copley, ·Frederick W~ 'Taylor: ·Father·of·Seierttifie Martagement,
2 Vola., New York, 1903, Vol. II, pp. 127-133.
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Taylor and Gantt, but ignored its spirit.

In practice, the plan

called for an hourly rate and a bonus of 20 percent if the work
assigned was completed within a specified time.

If more than the

assigned work was completed within the set time, an additional bonus
of 50 percent was paid.

Although Schwab was proud of his plan, and

publicized its use, not all of his employees shared his enthusiasm.
They claimed that the plan worked to their detriment, for, they said,
it was used as a speed-up, and, under it, the normal work rate was
gradually increased.

The bonus, in effect, became a necessity in

order to bring earnings up to the level of wages prevailing elsewhere.

9

Since the men naturally sought to earn as much as possible during the
regular work day, they were often tired by the end of their normal
shifts and resented company demands that they work overtime.
The question of overtime work was an issue of particular bitterness among employees.

Overtime work had been paid for at the rate of

time and a half prior to the recession of 1907.

Since that time,

however, overtime work was paid for at the regular hourly rate.10 By
1910, the company was earning near record profits, and so its
refusal to pay an increased rate was particularly irksome to the men
who had to work overtime.

Moreover, overtime work was not a question
of choice: a. ·refusal to do such work often meant dismissal. 11

9John A. Fitch, The·steelwotkers, New York, 1911, p. 342. United
States Bureau of Labor; 'Report on·the·strike·at·the Bethlehem
Steel Works, Washington, 1910, p. 15.
10 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
11Ibid
p. 15, "The Bethlehem Strike,"·The·survex, p. 306.

-··
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Long hours were resented by both the company's skilled
machinists as well as its unskilled laborers.
there were 9 1 184 men on the payroll.

In January of 1910,

Over 97 percent of the work

force had a normal work day of at least 10 hours 25 minutes, with
51 percent of the total force working 12 or more hours.

For 29

percent of the company's employees, the work week was seven days
long with no extra compensation for Sunday work.

When the other 71

percent of the work force, those who had a six-day week, came in on
Sunday, their labor was considered overtime, but, nevertheless, they
received only the regular wage for their work. In January of 1910,
··12
43.5 percent of the company's employees did Sunday work.
Work in a steel mill was dangerous, and long hours did nothing
to ensure safety.

During 1909, 10 percent of all the men employed

by the company met with some kind of accident, with as many as 2
percent o£ the workers in two different departments being injured.
13
Twenty-one men lost their lives while at work.
One resident of
South Bethlehem noted that "we see the ambulance go three or four or
five times a day, and sometimes six or eight, to and from the
14
hospital; it passes by my office."
12

Report on Strike, pp. 9-16.
13
Ibid., p. 121. For a general discussion of the hazards inVOiVed for men working in steel mills see Brody; ·staelworkers
in America, pp. 100-101, 159-161.
14
"Testimony of Mr. Harry A. Cyphers", in United States
Commission on Industrial Relations; 'Firtal·Report·and·Testimony,
Vol. XI, Washington, 1916, p. 10614.
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For long hours of dangerous work, compensation was small.

Pay-

roll figures for January of 1910 show that of 9,184 men, 2,640 or 28
percent earned 12 to 14 cents an hour.
16 cents an hour.

Another 1,528 received 14 to

Of all the employees, 61.2 percent made less than

18 cents an hour or $2.10 for a day's work.
individuals made more than 60 cents an hour.

Only 21 highly skilled
15

Late in January of 1910, a skilled employee in the No. 4
Machine Shop was dismissed for refusing to work overtime.

Shortly

thereafter, a committee of three approached their superintendent
with requests that the discharged machinist be reinstated, that
Sunday work be eliminated, and overtime work in the shop be reduced
to a minimum.

These requests were refused, and a few days later

the three delegates were themselves discharged for refusing overtime
work.

To their fellow machinists, these dismissals seemed to be a

reprisal for the three men's earlier action, and in protest, the men
in the No. 4 Machine Shop decided to strike.

They were joined by men

from Machine Shops No. 3 and No. 6, raising their number to about 800.
At this point the company's plant police forced the striking
machinists to leave the plant.

The strikers repaired to a nearby

open field, where they established a committee to call on Schwab to
discuss their grievances.

Meeting with Schwab in his office, the

delegates asked for the riinstatement of the dismissed men and for
abolition of overtime work, or, if this could not be done, to pay

15Report·on Strike, P• 19.
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time and a half for such labor.

Schwab gave the committee several

reasons why overtime had to continue, and why the company could not
pay time and a half for it.
a

gene~al

When pressed by the committee to attend

meeting of the striking machinists that afternoon to explain

his position, Schwab declined.

Later, Schwab did attend the meeting

but, by then, news of his earlier refusal had inflamed the strikers.
They hooted and

·1-~ered

his statement that if the men came back their

grievances would be attended to on an individual basis, but that the
company would not negotiate through the strikers representatives.
On Sunday, February 6, a committee approached the superintendent
of the plant, C.A. Buck.

The members came from a meeting in which

the striking machinists decided to drop their demands regarding overtime work.

They would return to work if everyone, including the

three machinists previously dismissed, were reinstated.

The strike

might have ended then and there, but Buck, fearing this would appear
as capitulation, and set a precedent in future demands for collective
bargaining, refused.

The men could all return to work, he said, but

the company would decide whom it would emplO)'.

"In other words,"

Buck stated, "the company wants it understood that the Bethlehem
Steel Company is running that plant."

16

Stunned by news of the rebuff,

the strikers voted unanimously to stay out.

17

To observers, the most significant aspect of the strike was its

1611 Statement submitted by the Executive Committee of the
Strikers,"

17

in~.,

p. 38.

South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 7, 1910, p. 1.
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spontaneity and unorganized character.

18

No unions existed in the

plant, and in South Bethlehem itself there were only a few organized
bartenders and a small carpenter's union.

Well aware of Schwab's

dislike of unions, the strike's leaders deliberately avoided the
subject of organization for several days in the hope that the dispute
could be settled quickly.

Only after Buck's refusal to reinstate all

of the striking machinists did their executive committee permit union
organizers to work among the men.

In fact, the executive committee

had not requested the assistance of organizers from the American
Federation of Labor.

The organizers a·rrived 1n South Bethlehe'ill only

after being informed of the strike by the pres:f.dent of the local
19
bartender's union.
Upon their arrival, the labor organizers were dismayed by the
informal character of the strike, and especially by the absence of
any preparations for a long struggle.

Indeed, their first advice

was for the machinists to call off the strike and return to work.
strike

~o1as

A

a long-term affair, and, in their present state, the men

could not support one.

The only alternative was to organize, a

suggestion offered not only by the A.F.L. representatives but by a
20
few South Bethlehem residents as well.

18

"The Struggle for Industrial Democracy," The Outlook, Vol. 95,
July 16, 1910, pp. 306•308. Report on Strike, p. 17, Brody,
Steelworkers in America, p. 161.

19

Report on Strike, p. 17, see also "Executive Committee Statement," ibid., p. 38, and "Statement submitted by the Company,"
~.,

20

P• 23.

SoutP Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 7, 1910, p. 3, Feb. 8, 1910, p. 1.
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From the start, an executive committee of thirty machinists
controlled the strike.

The organizers from the national unions worked

with the committee and gave advice, but were regarded as distinctly
subordinate to it.

For the most part, the union representatives

confined themselves to organizing the various trades and helping to
formulate demands.

The committee maintained its authority by holding

daily mass meetings, presenting speakers, giving suggestions, planning
fund-raising activities, and, above all, keeping the strike peaceful.
The strike began over a question of working conditions, and could
have been settled easily.

The machinists' original demand of time

and a half for overtime work was made in the hope that such a pay scale
would be so prohibitive as to result in the total abolition of Sunday
21
and other overtime work.
Since the machinists enjoyed the highest
wages an? shortest hours in the plant, th~J had to include the demands
of men from other departments before new strikers would join their
ranks.

The organizers assumed the task of drafting proposed wage

and hour scales for each department in the works,

In most cases they

suggested both increased wages and reduced hours.

Drafting such proposals

took time, and it was not until the strike was more than a month old,
that specific requests for wage increases were presented to the
22
company.
Although the machinists made their decision to strike without
21
22

. .
Report·on·strike, p. 17.

..........

See !bid., PP• 26-32 •
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reference to other workmen in the plant• they soon gained allies,
Within a few days, they were joined by 500 unskilled immigrant
laborers who left the plant en masse,

They were followed by 150

molders and 200 riggers.

These recruits joined the strikers ranks
23
even before any wage demands were formulated,
For the strike to succeed, public support was a vital necessity,
and the strike leaders made the greatest effort to avoid violence.
The executive committee advised the men against gathering on street
corners or in saloons to discuss their grievances,
also warned against fighting or even

th~

The strikers were

mere discussion of violence.

The committee chairman, David Williams, announced that he, personally,
would report to the Chief Burgess the name of any striker carrying a
weapon.

The company, he counselled, desired an excuse to bring the

State Constabulary to Bethlehem to break the strike.

Those who

advocated violence 't-7ere sure to be in the pay of the company, he said,
24
and should therefore be avoided.
The striker's self-policing
activities were successful, and for several weeks, the strike was free
from even minor incidents.

In fact, a newspaper in a neighboring

town characterized the strike as "one of the most orderly labor struggles
25
in the history of the country."
South Bethlehem was, in the words

23

south Bethlehem'Globe, Feb. 7, 1910, p. 1, Feb. 8, 1910, p. 1,
see also 11 Executive Committee Statement" in·Report·on·strike,
p. 38.

24 south·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 8, 1910, p. 3, Feb. 22, 1910, p. 1.
25 Allentown Democrat quoted in "Testimony of Mr. David Williams,"
in Final'Report·and·Testimony, Vol. XI, p. 10945.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of one resident, "About like an ordinary Sunday morning -

180.
26
quiet."

The arrival in South Bethlehem of organizers from the radical
Industrial Workers of the World nearly upset the executive committee's
plans to keep the strike peaceful.

The I.w.w. representatives were

given permission to address the strikers on the condition that they
not advocate violent action.

However, this was exactly what they

did advocate, much to the committee's

alal~.

As a result, the

committee requested the Chief of Police to refuse the Wobblies the
use of the Municipal Hall where the strikers normally met.

Undaunted,

the men from the I.w.w. spoke to a meeting of the foreign-born
strikers the next night and again suggested that the men pursue a
course of violent action to obtain their rights.

fheir arguments

were diluted, however, when they were followed by the remarks of a
local Hungarian strike leader who reminded

h~s

audience that violence

would result in the "Cossacks", that is, the State Constabulary,
being brought to South Bethlehem.

Having made little headway, the

Wobbly organizers left town shortly thereafter, much to the committee's
relief. 27
The peaceful nature of the strike in part reflected the support
which residents of South Bethlehem, in general, gave to the striking

26
27

-

"Cyphers Testimony," in·ibid., p. 10612.
South·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 22, 1910, p •. l, Feb. 23, 1910, p.
1. 11Williams Testimony", in'Firtal·Report·an.d·Testimony, Vol.
XI, PP• 10946-10947. For the .r.w.w., see Melvyn Dubofsky;:we
Shall Be All: ·A·History·of·the·rndustrial·workers·of·the·wot1ld,
Chicago, 1969.
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steelworkers.

The borough council, one of whose members was himself

on strike, permitted the strikers use of the Municipal Hall for
meetings and headquarters space free of charge.

Moreover, the local

police sympathized with the strikers, and winked at minor infractions
of the law.

Indeed, the local police made only one strike-related

arrest, and it was of a strike-breaker for threatening people with
a revolver.

The open sympathy of the police for the strikers was,

of course, a source of exasperation for company officials.

28

That local authorities gave support and sympathy to the strikers
and not the company was not surprising.

As Herbert G. Gutman has

pointed out, this was often the case in small industrial communities
in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Inhabitants of small

towns did not share the hostility toward labor prevalent in large
metropolitan centers.

In the small town, social relationships were

still face to face; the town's middle-class, its businessmen, lawyers
and other professionals, had direct contact with the workers and
knew their problems,

Outside the large cities the impersonal ideology

of an industrial society did not take immediate hold, and the small
town's reaction to labor conflicts was based more on moral considerations than on economic ones,

Thus the inhabitants of the small

industrial community judged the situation in terms of a value system

28

"Statement of Mr.
Ort'Strike, p. 43,
ibid,, p. 21-for i'•
~erning police

Hugh Kelly, Ex-Chief of Police," in Report
"Company Statement," irt'ibid., p. 24, see also
the opinion of the Labor'BUreau investigators
sympathies.
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rapidly becoming outdated.

Believing in the sanctity of private

property and free enterprise, they also assumed that an employer
had a moral duty to treat his employees fairly.

They expressed little

or no sympathy for the concems of the industrialist seeking to
rationalize production by use of impersonal rules and sanctions.

29

The political structure of the small town likewise encouraged
local officials to side with strikers in an industrial conflict.
In a one or two industry town, workingmen had a great political influence because they made up a large part of the electorate.

More-

over, a system of ward representation required that a councilman
live in the ward he represented.

Since wards often had definite

socio-economic characteristics, a councilman from a working-class
ward, if he were not a workingman himself, would almost surely share
their values and aspirations.

Consequently, employers often had to

reach outside the local community for authority to impose their will
30
on striking employees.
Such conditions prevailed in South Bethlehem.

Local businessmen

encouraged the strikers to organize themselves into unions, and a
member of the strikers' executive committee also served as a member
31
of the borough council.
Moreover, Charles M. Schwab's status in
29

.
See Herbert G. Gutman, "The Workers' Search for Power," in H.
Wayne Morgan, Ed.; 'The'Gi1ded·Age, Revised Edition, Syracuse,
New York, c. 1970, pp. 31-53.

30

-

Ibid., PP• 33, 37.

31 see·south·Bethlehem Globe, Feb. B, 1910, p. 1.
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the local community was ambivalent.

Although he possessed great

wealth and economic power, he did not also possess the moral authority
which had formerly belonged to the Fountain Hill industrialists.

In

seeking to break the strike Schwab was not able to rely on the local
police, but would have to rely on the State Police; an organization
whose authority did not derive from the local community and whose
values were those of an impersonal society.
Ethnic diversity and hostilities might have been expected to
hinder a widespread community support of the strike but this was
the case.

The large numbers of immigrant

~-1orkmen

not

participating in

the strike from its start encouraged the feeling that the strike was
truly a community affair.

The native Americans welcomed the immigrant

strikers into their ranks, and treated them as equals; both groups
attended the same meetings where speakers addressed the audience in
both English and Hungarian.

Grateful for this recognition, the

immigrants responded enthusiastically, and South Bethlehem's ethnic
In~

communities, not just individual workmen, supported the strike.

deed, coming from village societies which encouraged a sense of group
solidarity, immigrants made better strikers than their more individualistic American fellows.

At a meeting of Hungarian women, for example,

single girls took a pledge that they would not marry "scabs".

Rather

than go to work as strikebreakers, many men either left town for
employment elsewhere or took the opportunity to return to Europe.
Of 121 individuals named as "scabs" in a circular handed out by strikers,
only 11 '\-7e:ce Eastern Europeans.

That their names were supplied by
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other immigrants can be seea in the phonetic spelling of the men's
addresses:
32
Alley.

Mekenek St. for Mechanic St. and Skuloli St. f.or School

Only the local clergy expressed disapproval of the strike.

Early

in the strike, David Williams had exhorted his followers to appeal to
their clergymen for support.

"Go to your pastors and priests," he

stated, "and tell them that it is in their interest to come to your
aid; that the conditions robbing you of the rest needed and the work
on Sundays have been fixed by one man -- C.M. Schwab."
appeals had little effect, however.
Council of Churches, "7hich sent

33

Such

In the opinion of the Federal

observe~s

to South Bethlehem, the

Protestant ministers were too far removed from the workers to under-.
stand their problems.

Most of them ministered to middle-class

congregations, while many of the men employed by the company were
Catholics:

there was little contact between the two.

Having spoken

with Schwab, the ministers were convinced that the strikers' charges
of excessive Sunday work were unfounded, and some expressed the
opinion that workmen, in any case, abused their Sundays and holidays

32

South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 8, 1910, p. 1, Feb. 28, 1910, p. 3,
Mar. 4, 1910, p. 1, Mar. 7, 1910, p. 1. "Notorious Scabs,"
South Bethlehem, Pa., March, 1910, circular in author's
possession. For discussions of the effectiveness of Eastern
European immigrants as strikers, see Brody, ·steelworkers in
America, PP• 138-140, Victor.R. Greene.;.The·slavic'Community
on·strike: ·rmmtsrant·Labor·in·Pertrtstlvartia'Artthracite, Notre
Dame, Ind., 1968, pp. 95-110, and John N. Ingham, 11 A Strike in
the Progressive Era, McKee's Rock, 1909,"'Pertrtstl~artia·Masazine
of History artd'Biography, Vol. xc, 1966, pp. 353-373.

33 south Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 11, 1910, p. 1.
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by drunkenness, ballgames and the like.

Although some ministers did

attend strike meetings, they did not go to offer aid; they went to
34
persuade the men to return to work.
The sympathies of the local
ministerial association were made clear in an open letter to the
strikers published in the South Bethlehem Globe:
Only the officials of the company can accomplish
the righting of existing wrongs •••• Is it
reasonable to expect that by attacking your
employer, you can persuade him to deal generously
and magnaimously with you?35
Similar questions were not addressed to the company.
The only clerical support the strikers received came from the
Catholic priests whose parishioners were unskilled immigrant
36
laborers.
They were of little standing outside their ethnic
communities, however, and of the two priests who did exert a communitywide influence, one was a personal friend of Schwab's while the other,
who originally encouraged the strikers, withdrew his support after
being persuaded by Schwab that the strike was being led by Socialists.

37

34

Graham Taylor, "The Rapprochment of the Church and the Working
World," The Survey, Vol. 24, July 2, 1910, p. 577, John A.
Fitch, "Bethlehem: the Church and the Steelworkers,'! The Survey,
Vol. 27, Dec. 2, 1911, p. 1296, "Will Bethlehem Follow Pittsburgh," Literary Digest, Vol. 41, July 16, 1910, p. 204.

35

~outh Bethlehem Globe, Apr. 20, 1910, p. 4.

36 Fitch, "Bethlehem: The Church and the Steelworkers,"·The Survey,
p. 1296. South·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 7, 1910, p. 3, ~b. 8,
1910, P• 1. Feb. 14, 1910, p. 1.
37 "Williams Testimony, " .. Final'Report ·and ·Testimony, Vol. XI, p.
10958; ·south·Bethlehem'Globe, Feb. 15, 1910, p. 1, Mar. 1, 1910,
p. 1. Apr. 8, 1910, p. 1. For a discussion of the attitude of
the Catholic Church toward Socialism, see Ma~c Karson; American
Labor Unions and Politics, 1900•1918, (Beacon Press Edition)
Boston, 1965, PP• 212-284.
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As a whole, .the response of the clergy was disappointing to the
strikers.

As an A.F. of L. Organizer declared, "We had expected

that the ministers of the Gospel would remain at least neutral
38
instead of coming to the rescue of this greedy corporation."
For the strike to succeed, the plant had to be closed.

This,

however, required organization which the strikers initially did not
have.

For the next three

~-7eeks,

therefore, departmental committees,

created by the A.F. of L. organizers, worked feverishly to unite the
men still at work.

When the men were sufficiently organized, those

still within the works were to come out in a body, and the plant
shut down.

On Feoruary 24, the strikers felt strong enough to display both
their organization and their numbers by holding a parade in South
Bethlehem.

The parade, led by a Hungarian band, stretched for four

blocks, and the marchers were orderly in spite of their numbers.
Only two minor incidents marred the

ev~nt:

a worker had his dinner

pail taken from him, and a young boy threw a brick through superin39
tendent Buck's window.

38

Ibid., Feb. 14, 1910, p. 1, "The Struggle for Industrial
"i5eiii0cracy," The Outlook, pp. 306-308.
39
See "Kelly Statement" in Report on·strike, p. 40. "Company
Statement," in ibid., p. 23, "Cyphers Testimony" in Final
Report·and TestTtii'Oiiy, Vol, XI, p. 10615, and "Williams Testimony,"'ibid., p. 10947. Williams quotes from the South
·Bethleh~lobe of Feb. 25, 1910, to indicate the orderly
nature of the parade, copies of which are unavailable.
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The parade marked the climax of a successful organizing campaign,
and the next day the strikers moved to close the works.

Crowds of

striking workmen gathered at the plant entrances to prevent anyone
from entering or leaving.

Threats

wer~

made, stones thrown, and

workers had their dinner pails taken away.

To enable men to leave

the plant, the company had to put them in box-cars and take them out
by rail.

The attitude of the local police was particularly irritating

to company officials.

Although the Police Chief and most of his force

were present, not one striker was arrested.

Aided by this polif!e

inaction, the strikers succeeded in closing the plant.

40

Company officials reacted quickly to the strikers' action.

The

first step was to inform the borough government that it would be held
41
responsible for any damage done to company property.
Shortly thereafter, the burgess and chief of police met with company officials.
When pressed to defend the inaction of his meu, Hugh Kelly, the
police chief, replied that his small police force could not handle
large crowds.

This was an admission the company had been waiting for,
42
and they demanded outside protection.
The borough council then
43
requested the assistance of the Northampton County Sheriff.
Upon his arrival in South Bethlehem, Sheriff Robert Person went

40

"Company Statement," in·Report·on·strike, p •. 24, "Kelly Statement," in·~·, p. 40, ·south ·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 26, 1910,
P• 1.

41Eugene Grace to Burgess, Feb. 25, 1910, in·Report·on·strike,
p. 51.
42 "Kelly Statement," in·ibid., pp. 40-41, see also "Company
Statement, '' in ~·• p. 4
2 •
43
Minutes of Special Council Meeting, Feb. 25, 1910, in ~·•
P• 51.
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to the offices of the Bethlehem Steel Company where company executives,
not borough officials, described the situation to him.

As a result

of this meeting, Person sent a telegram to the governor in which he
declared his fear of an outbreak of violence that evening, and re44
quested the State Constabulary to assist him.
The governor replied
that the situation did not warrant use of the State Police, and he
reprimanded Person for not even attempting to exercise his powers
45
as sheriff.
In answer to this, Person wired back that the whole
town was in a lawless state and he could not control the situation.
Serious rioting and bloodshed had already occurred, he said, and the
State Police were necessary to prevent its repetition.

46

Person's

description of conditions in South Bethlehem bore little relation to
the actual circumstances.

The crowd which closed down the plant

had been disorderly and annoying, but no rioting had taken place and
there had been no bloodshed.

Indeed, the sheriff later testified in

court that, at the time of his request for the State Police, the only
violence he knew about was of a stone being thrown through an office
47
window.
Nevertheless, Person's telegram convinced the governor of
the situation's urgency, and he dispatched a troop of the constabulary
to South Bethlehem.

44 sheriff Person to Governor Stuart, Feb. 25, 1910, in·~.,
p. 56.
45
46

Governor Stuart to Sheriff Person, Feb. 25, 1910,
p. 56.

in~.,

Sheriff Person to Governor Stuart, Feb. 25, 1910,
PP• 56-57.

in·~.,

47 south Bethlehem Globe, Apr. 15, 1910, p. 7, "Cyphers Testimony,"
Final Report·and·Testimony, Vol. XI, p. 10615, Report on Strike,
p. 21.
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Formed in 1905, the Pennsylvania State Police were notorious
48
among union organizers for their strike-breaking activities.
They
replaced the Coal and Iron Police, an organizat:f.on armed with police
powers but paid by corporations.

Called Cossacks by strikers, the

tax-supported State Police provided corporations with well-trained
strike-breakers~

Although the constabulary claimed to be impartial

in labor disputes, critics pointed out that, in every case, the State
Police operated out of corporation property, never from strike head49
quarters.
In a sense, the Pennsylvania State Police acted as
agents of the newly-emergent nrban-industrial society.

It was their

task to impose order in situations disruptive of the proper functioning
of that society.
had no local ties.

Highly trained and well-disciplined, the Constabulary
As a result, they partook of the same value system

as did the corporation, and so keeping the peace and breaking strikes
came to mean nearly the same thing.

The presence of the State Police

in South Bethlehem was more than just a challenge for the strikers; it
was also a challenge to the integrity of the local community and its
50
values.

48

See, "Testimony of Mr. James H. Maurer," in Final Report and
Tes-timony, Vol. XI, pp. 10931-10942, see also James H. Maurer,
·The American Cossack, Reading,Pa., 1914, for an unfavorable
account of the Pennsylvania State Police from labor's point of
view.
49
"Testimony of Major John c. Groome," in·Final Repore·and Tec;timony, Vol. XI, p. 10981.
5°For a discussion of the State Constabulary as a necessary part
of an industrial society, see Herbert Crolye ·The·Promise of
American Life, (Capricorn Books Edition), New York, 1964, pp.
144, see also Katharine Mayo, Justice to all: 'The·story of the
Pennsylvania State Police, 5th edition, New York, 1920, pp.
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A troop of State Constabulary reached South Bethlehem by train
on the morning of February 26, and to the townspeople they, not the
strikers, seemed to be the embodiment of lawlessness.

Upon their

arrival, the troopers -:-1ent to the offices of the Bethlehem Steel
Company where they were assigned quarters and received breakfast.
By this time, news of the Constabulary's presence had spread, and a
large crowd gathered to get a glimpse of them.

Acting on the

principle that "'There is no innocent bystander,' and when the order
came 'Get your man,' you pick anybody,'" the troopers rode their
51
horses into the crowd.
Unable to get out of the way quickly enough,
many members of the crowd were beaten, with women and children being
knocked down and trampled, among them the wife of the police chief,

52

Rather than dispersing the crowd by their actions, the troopers
only enraged it,

What had been a curious but peaceful group of

onlookers became a mob, and the non-existent rioting of the day before
now became a reality,

The mounted troopers were pelted with bricks,

stones, and chunks of ice, while they, in turn, rode down their
antagonista and clubbed them with truncheons.

The violence lasted

for most of the day and the single troop of police sent to the borough

188-195, for an account of the State Police's role in South
Bethlehem in just such terms.
51
The quotation is from an interview with a State Trooper reported in the Allentown.:Democrat.and included in "Williams
Testimony,"·Firtal'Repote·and·Testimony, .Vol •. XI, p. 10949,
see also, "Kelly.Statement 11 in·Report·on·serike," p. 42,
South·Bethlehem·Globe, Feb. 26, 1910, p. 1,
52

"Williams Testimony," Final Report and Testimony, Vol, XI,
p. 10949, South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 26, 1910, p. 1.
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could not handle the situation.

Reinforcements had to be sent

from Philadelphia and with their arrival the 91 troopers were able
to restore order by nightfall.

53

During the events of the 26th, a trooper shot and killed a man.
Because the dead man had done nothing to provoke the trooper, the
incident became something of a local cause celebre.

As the crowd

was being chased off the streets, one trooper rode his horse up
the steps of the Majestic Hotel, and fired several shots into the barroom.

Two of the patrons, neither of whom had taken part in the

events outside, were hit; one was wounded in the mouth and the other
killed.

The Chief of Police considered the shooting to be a deliberate

act of terrorism.

The Majestic Hotel, he noted, was the headquarters

of the A.F. of L. organizers, and he believed the shooting to have

.

been premeditated.

54

The trooper was arrested on manslaughter charges and held over
to the county court.
not identify him.

He was acquitted, however, when witnesses could

The number on the trooper:' s collar during the

trial was not the one witnesses said he had been wearing at the time
of the shooting.

Although the witnesses' descriptions matched the

defendant's features, the numbers did not, aud the man was set free.
Labor leaders were incensed by this action, and pointed out that

5311

Statement of Captain in charge of State Police," in·Report
on Strike, p. 44; ·south·Bethlehem·Globc, Feb. 26, 1910, p. 1,
Feb. 28, 1910, p. 1.

54

"The Killing of Joseph Szambo," in Report·on·strike, pp. 48-49,
"Kelly Statement," in~., pp. 41.. 42.
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inability to match numbers and descriptions often happened during
labor disputes in which members of the constabulary were charged
55
with criminal behavior.
The actions of the State Police had the immediate effect of
driving the community closer to the strikers.
troopers beat people without provocation.

It was well known that

On several occasions, it

was reported that the Constabulary themselves provoked incidents by
having troopers in plainclothes mingle with crowds and shout "scab".
The result would be beatings from the uniformed troopers and indiscriminate arrests.

Those individuals arrested were held in Steel

Company offices, sometimes for days without hearings.

When hearings

were arranged, they were held in Charles M. Schwab's office and were
closed to the public.

The strikers and their sympathizers claimed
56
that these hearings indicated frame-ups.
Nearly everyone in South Bethlehem resented the presence of the
Constabulary:

strikers, residents, businessmen, police, and most

borough officials.

In response to petitions drawn up by residents

55 South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 28, 1910, p. 2, Apr. 9, 1910, p. 1,
June 15, 1910, p. 1. The report of the officer in command at
South Bethlehem to his superintendent stated that the trooper
had been acquitted after the prosecution could not prove the
shooting had been unjustified. Captain Robinson to Superintendent, June 16, 1910 in·Final·Report·and·Testimony, Vol. XI, pp.
11004-11005, see also "Testimony of Mr. John G. Sebald," in
ibid., p. 10988.
5Rstatement of Michael Lynch, Chief of Police," in Report on
Strike, p. 43,"Kelly Statement,llin ~·• pp. 41-43 11 "williams
Testimony," Final·Report·and·Testimony, Vol. XI, pp. 1094810949, 10952, "Cyphers Testimony," in~., pp. 10612-10616.
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and businessmen, the borough council passed a resolution asking the
sheriff to have the constabulary withdrawn.
tl1eir request.

Sheriff Person refused

Shortly thereafter, Police Chief Hugh Kelly resigned

his position in protest over the lack of cooperation from the
Sheriff and the Constabulary.

Retail businessmen indicated their

dislike of the troopers by refusing to deal with them while at the
57
same time extending cred:f.t to strikers.
In spite of the Constabulary, the strikers remained unintimidated.
Although the State Police kept the plant open, some 3,800 men remained
on strike.

They were organized into t't-7elve unions.

Since all but

800 of the strikers were skilled workers, they knew themselves to be
indispensible to plant operations and were thus confident of ultimate
58
success.
As a result, the company resorted to more traditional
methods of breaking a strike.

They blacklisted strikers who left town

for work elsewhere, and threatened to annul the contracts of apprentices unless they returned to work.

At one point the Company attempted

to evict strikers who rented houses from it, but this expedient failed
because of a state law requiring landlords to give tenants 55 days
notice before eviction.

Local newspapers reported that troopers con-

57

South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 28, 1910, p. 1, Mar. 15, 1910, p.
1, Burgess to Sheriff, Mar •. 15, 1910 and Sheriff to Burgess,
Mar. 16, 1910, in·Re-port·on Strike, pp. 54-55, "Kelly Statement," in ~·, pp. 42-43, .captain .. Rob1.nson to Superintendent,
!-far. 10, 1910, in 'Firtal·Report artd ·Testimony, Vol. XI,
P• 11006.
58
Report on Strike, p. 19.
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confronted strikers in their homes with the option of returning to
59
work or being arrested.
The strike continued, regardless of harassment, and on March
5, the strikers presented their demands to the company.

Although

specific demands were made for each department, in general, they were
requests for increased wages and shorter hours.

Sunday and overtime

work were to be compensated for at a rate of time and half, and
holidays such as Christmas and Thanksgiving would merit double time.
Abaent from the striker's demands was any request for union
recognition.

All they desired, the strikers said, was an end to
60
Schwab's insistence that no employees be union men.
Schwab's answer to the striker's communication came the next
day.

The company had a special Sunday edition of the Bethlehem Times

printed at its expense which contained Schwab's reply.
and subject to no ambiguities.

It was short

It was a refusal:

We desire to notify the men who have left our
employ as well as the general public, that we can
give no consideration to the communication, since
it does not emanate from men working in our plant.
It must be understood that under no circumstances
will we deal with men on strike or a body of men
representing organized labor.

59

south Bethlehem Globe, Mar. 7, 1910, p. 1, Mar. 12, 1910,
p. 1, 11 Kelly Statement," in·Repott'on·strike, pp. 42-43,
"Lynch Statement," in'llbid., pp. 43-44.

-

60 "Executive Committee Statement," in·ReP~rt·on·sttike, p.
39, the strikers demands are given in·ibid., pp. 26-32.
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Having thus defined our position 'l:-7e shall
refrain from further statements ot acknowledgements of any sort whatever.61
Other statements in this issue of the paper urged the men to return
to work, but nothing was said about hours or wages.
After receiving Schwab's refusal to negotiate, the strikers
tried a new tactic:

they sent letters and petitions to President

William H. Taft, various Congressmen, and the Washington embassies
of foreign countries.

In these letters they stated that, because of

the strike by the company's skilled machinists, the work being done
at South Bethlehem in fulfillment of contracts was defective.

Unless

the strike were settled, these contracts should be cancelled, they
advised.

They also urged President Taft to launch a full-scale

investigation of the strike and conditions in the pla.nt:

the strikers

were sure that such an investigation would reveal the intolerable
62
working conditions to be found at South Bethlehem.
The strikers' petition met with a favorable response in Congress.
A. Mitchell Palmer, later to become Attorney General under Woodrow
Wilson, represented the area in Congress.

He expressed sympathy for

the strikers plight, and persuaded Taft to order an investigation
of the strike by the Bureau of Labor.

Schwab, claiming that the

company had nothing to hide, gave public assurances of cooperation with

61 south·Bethlehem Globe, Mar. 7, 1910, P• 3. See also Report on
Strike, pp. 25-26. Copies of the Bethlehem·Times have not
been preserved on microfilm or otherwise.
62
South·Bethlehem Globe, Mar. 10, 1910, p. 1. Mar. 11, 1910,
p. 1, Mar. 12, 1910, p. 2, Report on Strike, pp. 129-130.
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the federal investigation.

63

Shortly afterwards, however, he made

his greatest effort to date to crush the strike.
On the evening of March 30, a number of South Bethlehem's
leading businessmen were summoned to a meeting with Schwab.

He told

them he was incensed by the letters the strikers had sent to Congress
and various foreign governments

~rging

them to cancel contracts they

had made with Bethlehem Steel, and reminded the businessmen of the
company's importance to the town.

He was particularly indignant

that these letters had borne the return address of the Municipal Hall,
for this made it seem as if the community supported the strike.

Unless

some overt action were taken to remove the impression that the town
backed the strikers, he would close down the plant permanently.

As one

of the businessmen present later reported; "Mr. Schwab criticized the
municipal authorities for permitting the use of Municipal Hall by
socialist agitators who had no interest in the town ••• and who besides
64
were daily abusing and insulting Mr. Schwab."
Schwab's threat had the intended effect.

The Commercial League

met the next day and its members passed a number of resolutions
condeming the strike led by "socialist agitators", and suggesting
they be denied the continued use of the Municipal Hall.

More importantly,

they went on record supporting the company:

63 south ·Bethlehem '.Globe, Mar. 16, 1910, p. 1. Stanley Cohen,
A. 'Mitchell'Palmer~ ·politician, New York, 1963, p. 24.
64 south·Bethlehem'Globe, Mar. 31, 1910, p. 1, see also Hessen,
"schwab" p. 72.
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We bear testimony to the business honor and
integrity of the Bethlehem Steel Company •••
and point with pride to ••• the honest and
efficient work of our fellow townsmen and its
worldwide reputation for excellence of
material and workmanship and our entire confidence in the maintenance of its reputation
under Mr. Schwab's administration,65
A delegation of businessmen carried copies of the resolution with
them when they travelled to Washington the next day to meet with
66
congressmen an d Pres id ent Ta f t on t h e company ' s behalf.
Af ter
the meeting was over, Schwab who was in attendance, stated that he
had not sought to influence the businessmen to end the strike, and
thanked them for their kindly feelings toward him. 67
The day following the actions taken by the Commercial League,
the borough council held a special meeting.

By a vote of 9 to 6,

council instructed the strikers to vacate the Municipal Building.

68

The votes themselves reflected the degree to which Schwab's threat
split the community,

South Bethlehem had five wards which ran

consecutively from West to East.

The character of the borough's

population changed from old-stock and middle-class in the first and
second wards to recent immigrant and working class in the fourth and
fifth with the third ward being transitional in this respect.

Of the

nine councilmen favoring the ejection of the strikers, three each

65south Bethlehem Globe, Apr •.. 1, 1910, P• 1.
66.!1?.!2,., Apr. 1, 1910, P• 1, Apr. 2, 1910, P• 1.
67 tbid •• Apr. 1, 1910,
1.

-

68

.!E.!!!·'

P•

Apr. 4, 1910, P• 1 •
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came from the first and second wards, two from the third, and one
from the fourth.

Moreover, three of these men had signed the

Commercial League resolutions
strikers' charges.

def~nding

the company against the

The others were businessmen with much to lose

if Schwab closed the plant.

On the other hand, none of the council-

men supporting the continued use of the Hall by the strikers had
signed the resolutions and one of them, in fact, was himself a
striking machinist.
The withdrawal of business support weakened the striker's
effectiveness.

The strike dragged on inconclusively during the month

of April while both sides waited for the government to publish the
results of its investigation.

In the meantime, however, more and

more men returned to work, and by early May, only 540 men remained
69
out.
On May 4, the government published its report and the remaining

strikers were momentarily heartened by its vindication of their
claims of long hours and low wages.

Although the report resulted in

a storm of criticism being directed at Schwab, it did not improve
70
the strikers' position, which had become hopeless.
Schwab was, in
any case, eager to bring the strike to an end, and so enlisted the

69 tbid., May 10, 1910, P• 1.
70
F'or reactions to the report see,. IIInvestigations of the Strike
in the Bethlehem Steel Works,"·The·outlook, Vol. 95, July 16,
1910, pp. 544-545. "To Put an End to Seven Day Work?"· ·The
Survey, Vol. 24, June 18, 1910, pp. 475-478, seeLalso HeB'Se"n,
"Schwab," pp. 342-349.
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aid of J, Davis Brodhead, a former congressman from the district,
to act as an intermediary between him and the remaining strikers.
Brodhead was making a bid for a return to

C~ngr.ess,

and Schwab in-

dicated that Brodhead would achieve publicity and praise if he
achieved a settlement,

Schwab desired Br,odhead as an intermediary

because Brodhead's opponent in the Democratic primary would be the
incumbent A. Mitchell Palmer, and Palmer's advocacy of the strikers'
cause had annoyed Schwab.

Brodhead met with the executive committee

while its chairman, and driving force, David Williams, was in
71
Washington, and on May 18, the strike was declared ended.
The terms of the settlement indicated a total victory for the
company.

The men were permitted to return to their jobs, but not

those who had damaged either the company's property or its integrity,
There was to be no union recognition but workmen would be allowed to
approach company officials as individuals if they had any grievances,
There were no increases in wages,

The situation thus remained the

same as it had before the strike,

The only concession made by the

company was that Sunday and overtime work would be optionalu

Howeve;,

since wages had not increased, those who did not work overtime or
Sundays would face a loss in income.

72

The 104 day strike was a failure,

The men went back with the

promise that overtime work was optional, but a year and a half later,

71 south Bethlehem Globe, }~y 18, 1910, p, 1, Coben, Palmer,

PP• 24-28,
72

South Bethlehem

Glob~i

May 18, 1910, p. 1.
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the situation was the same as it had always been.
overtime work, he risked dismissal.
in wages.

If a man refused

There had been some impro·vement

Men who received 12 1/2 cents an hour in January of 1910

earned 13 cents an hour in November of 1911, and those who had
made 13 1/2 cents were now paid 15 cents.

On the other hand, men

paid by the ton had actually suffered a reduction in wages during
73
the interval. The strike had accomplished little.
The strike had consequences of more than local significance.

It

received national publicity, which, in turn, focused attention on
the conditions of labor in the American steel industry.

The t'\'7elve-

hour day and the seven-day week was called a disgrace to civilization,
and a campaign to establish an eight-hour day on government contract
work gained support.

The Senate passed a resolution calling for a

full-scale investigation of the steel industry and the House instructed the Attorney General to begin an investigation of the u.s.
Steel Corporation -- an investigation which eventually led to an
74
anti-trust suit.
For labor leaders, the South Bethlehem strike was a revelation.
It indicated that immigrants from Eastern Europe could be unionized,
and that, in fact, immigrants had a greater capaci.ty to carry on a
prolonged strike than most native Americans.

Prior to the strike most

73

John A. Fitch, "Bethlehem: The Church and. the. Steelworkers,"
The·survey, p. 1297, Brody; ·steelworkers·in·America 1 p. 164.
74
.. .
. ..
"Will Bethlehem Follow Pittsburgh?"'Liter~try'Digest, p. 204 11
Brody, ·steel~orks·in·America, pp. 161-162.
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labor leaders had believed the "Runkies" too docile to be effective
union members.

The lessons learned from the South Bethlehem strike

led to a drive to organize all steel workers, skilled or unskilled,
native or immigrant under a single jurisdiction.

15

For South Bethlehem, the strike was a rude shock.

Before the

strike, the community's residents assumed that Charles M. Schwab was
the heir to the Fountain Rill industrialists of the recent past.

It

was believed that Bethlehem Steel was a local operation with roots
in the community; a company whose officials would always take local
values and local needs into account.
was not the case.

The strike revealed that this

Schwab and his subordinates had no loyalties to

South Bethlehem as such:

to them, South Bethlehem represented little

more than a labor pool.

It was only by chance that Schwab had located

there; the company was in, but not of, the community.

If Schwab and

his associates were, in the future, to interest themselves in local
social and political affairs, it was for the purpose of ensuring
that a similar strike never reoccurred.

Thus, the defeat of the

strikers meant the defeat of a value-system based on a belief in the
community's ability to manage affairs within its own boundaries.

Al-

though South Bethlehem had been an industrial community from the
beginning of its existence, and thus part of an emerging national
economy, its inhabitants had not fully adopted their values to the new
system.

The company's victory marked the overthrow of the older set

of values by one more attuned to the needs of a complex, urbanindustrial society.

75

Ibid., PP• 139-142.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION

In 1917, Bethlehem and South Bethlehem abandoned their identities
as separate communities and united to form the city of Bethlehem.

Al-

thoagh local boosters had long sought consolidation, it became a
reality only after Charles M. Schwab added his support to the movement.
City status meant the adoption of commission government, and Schwab
knew that such a government tended to institutionalize the values of
corporate industrialism in local affairs.

Schwab thus led the drive

to provide the community with a municipal administration responsive
to the needs of business and industry.

The success of the consolida-

tion movement therefore guaranteed that the Bethlehem Steel Company
would possess unquestioned influence over municipal affairs in the

"
future.
In purely local terms the consolidation of the Bethlehems was
a result ·of the strike of 1910.

The strikers had experienced an

initial success because they had the support of the community and
controlled the borough government as well.

The strike failed when

Charles M. Schwab refused to accept the standards and values of the
local community as a guide in his dealings with the strikers.

His

actions were a shock to local residents for it made them realize just
102.
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how much their lives were dependent upon forces beyond their control.
Local businessmen were especially impressed with the degree to which
their fortunes were tied to the actions of the Bethlehem Steel Company,
for they recognized that another such confrontation between company
and community would result in their ruin.

Their own self-interest thus

demanded that they act to remove political power from the hands of
those hostile to Bethlehem Steel and the values it represented.
Bethlehem Steel, for its part, came to a similar conclusion.
saw

~hat

future conflicts could be avoided

o~ce

Schwab

local residents be-

came convinced that the community's interests and those of the
company were identical.

Like the business community, he recognized

that a municipal government, sensitive to the company's needs, was
essential to the preservation of labor stability on the local scene.

1

Thus, when Schwab and local businessmen joined forces in a consolidation
campaign, they were acting to bring to the Bethlehems a system of
municipal administration which incorporated the bureaucratic values
of an industrial society in its approach to governmental affairs.
If consolidation of the Bethlehems had its immediate, local causes,
it also took place in the context of a wave of reform movements which
swept the country in the early years of the twentieth century, and which
has helped to give the period from 1900 to 1920 the title of "The

1

Sidney B. Whipple, "Notes on Mr. Schwab's Life," Unpublished
typescript, 2 vola., 1935, on deposit in the Charles M. Schwab
Memorial Library, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa.,
P• 220.
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Progressive Era."

Although the terms "Progressivism" and "Progressive

.

Movement" have been used to cover a multitude of changes and reforms

in American life during these years, there was never a unified movement responsible for all these activities.

The various reforms were

the products of a wide variety of distinct groups each with its own
goals, and membership in one reform group did not necessarily mean
membership in, or even sympathy for, another.

2

What many different

reform groups did share was the application of similar techniques to
their different problems.

Almost all reformers saw the tasks con-

fronting them in terms of administration and organization, and bureaucratic principles came to dominate most aspects of reform.

3

Seeking to

apply to society what they believed were the natural laws of organization, many reformers adopted the values and techniques of scientific
management for use in their programs.

Efficiency became the standard

of judgement, and method, not morality, united reformers in their
efforts to establishi'their visions of the good society.

4

2samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism: 1885-1914, Chicago,
1957, pp. 140-162. Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A
Study of the Progressive Movementp Cambridge, Mass., 1962, pp.
10-15.
3

Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920, (American Century Series Edition), New York, 1968, pp. 154, 169-208. Samuel
Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era: '1890•1920, Chicago, 1964, pp. 75-116.

4

Wiebe, ~ch for Order, p. 168, Haber, Scientific Management, pp.
xi, xii, 8, 9, 19, 59, James Weinstein, The·corporate'Ideal'in
the Liberal State: 1900•1918, Boston, c. 1968, pp. ix, xiv, 339, Barry Dean Karl, ·~xecutive Reorganization and Reform in the
New Deal: The Genesis of Admanistrative Management, 1900-1939 1
Cambridge, Mass., 1963, pp. 17-19, 50-53.
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Municipal reform movements fit into this pattern.

Originating

in almost every case with local businessmen who pictured the ideal
city as an extension of their commercial values, reform campaigns
sought to xestructure local governments and make them conform to
the standards of efficient business enterprise.

Thus, reform aimed

at the centralization of authority and the application of impersonal
managerial techniques to the problems of local government.

Planning,

efficiency, cm1tinuity, and economy, came to be the desired goals of
government, and, as these were the values expressly espoused by the
business community, a reformed government identified the needs of
business as its own.

The organizational procedures of the factory

were now being applied to society, for, as Samuel P. Hays has observed, the new system of municipal administration was but "the
elaboration of the processes of rationalization and systematization
inherent in modern science and technology." 5
The commission plan met the requirements of most reformers for
a municipal government sensitive to the needs of business and industry.
It was devised in Galveston, Texas in 19Cl after a great tidal wave
left the city in ruins.

Proposed by a committee of businessmen, the

commission plan proved capable of quick and efficient action in rebuilding the devastated city.

Significantly, the plan was based on

~

·samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government
in the Pr~gressive Era," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. LV,
October 1964, pp. 157-169, the quotation is from p. 168.
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the most efficient organization known to its developers, the
business corporation.

6

The Galveston plan called for a five-man commission vested with
the powers of a mayor and a board of aldermen with each member heading a city department.

Performing both the legislative and adminis-

trative functions of government, the commission could act promptly
on matters affecting the city.

With the later addition of the office

of city manager and the introduction of non-partisan elections, the
plan's original weaknesses were remedied, and it became the perfect
vehicle of reform for businessmen seeking greater influence in
municipal affairs.

7

Commission government appealed to businessmen and industrialists
because it gave them political power while removing power from the
hands of the community's working class citizens.

The Galveston

system abolished parochial ward politics and made the entire city a
political forum.

At-large elections for positions on the new councils

almost always assured the business element of success because a citywide campaign demanded more economic resources than the ward politician
could obtain.

Moreover, the business or professional man would be

better-known on a community-wide scale, and could therefore present
himself as concerned with the welfare of the
one ward.

entir~

community, not just

Such candidates could also argue that a business-like

6 George K. Turner, "Galveston: A Business Corporation," McClure's,
Vol. 27, October 1906, p. 612.
7This and the next paragraph are based on Hays "Municipal Reform,"
pp. 157-169, Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, pp. 92-116, and Wiebe,
Search for Order, pp. 177-178.
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government would provide the city with mor.e and better services at
a lower cost than the old-style ward politicians could.

Such argu-

mente were effective, and by the First World War, some 600 cities
had adopted commission governments.
Although the consolidation of Bethlehem and South Bethlehem
which introduced the commission plan into local government took place
in 1917, proposals to unite the boroughs were nothing new.
tion had been brought up at

~arious

Consolida-

times since the early 1890's.

To

local boosters, Bethlehem, South Bethlehem, and West Bethlehem, incorporated in 1886, seemed to comprise on large community, with the
fortunes of one borough tied to those of the others.

8

By the first

years of the century, two more local boroughs had been incorporated,
Fountain Hill in 1894 and Northampton Heights in 1901.

The former

adjoined South Bethlehem on the west and the latter on the east.
To local businessmen, the consolidation of all these

~ommunities,

or, at the very least, of Bethlehem and South Bethlehf:m, would be
very desirable and beneficial for all.

A consolidated community

would attract nel-7 industry and new people; real estate vall\e would
increase; businessmen living in a manufacturing city would be able
to secure better credit which, in turn, meant a larger variety and
quantity of goods.
of its advocates.

Consolidation equalled propP.erity in the arguments
Seeking to gain the support of South Bethlehem

residents, proponents of consolidation pointed out that local pros-

8

~etblehem

Daily Times, Sesqui-Centennial Industrial Edition,
June, 1892, p. 28.
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perity resulted from the Bethlehem Steel Company's location in that
borough, but Bethlehem was given the credit.
remedy this inequity.

Consolidation would

Above all, consolidation meant progress.

9

Bethlehem supported consolidation; it was South Bethlehem which
presented the stumbling block.
favored the move.

Only the borough's businessmen

For most of South Bethlehem's residents, Bethlehem's

advocacy of consolidation was cause for suspicion.

They believed

that the middle-class, residential borough on the north side of the
Lehigh River sought only to take advantage of South Bethlehem's
prosperity.

It was the residents of Bethlehem who first called South

Bethlehem "Shanty Hill" a councilman opposed to consolidation pointed
out.

"They look upon us as the great unwashed," he continued, "and I
10
think we should wash ourselves of them."
To proponents of consolidation, such remarks

motives on the part of local politicians.

iudic~ted

selfish

In thH event thm: the

boroughs achieved consolidation, such men would be deprived of power. 11
To a degree, this accusation contained some truth.

Yet, if the local

politicians were deprived of political power, they would not be the
only ones to suffer.

Their

worki~g-class

constituents, with whom

they identified• would likewise become powerless.

9

Where businessmen

South Bethlehem Globe, Feb. 5, 1902, p. 2, Mar. 12, 1903, p. 4,
June 13, 1903, p. 5, Dec. 4, 1905, p. 1, Dec. 8, 1905, p. 1.

10 Bethlehem Times, Jan. 19, 1892, p. 1, South Bethlehem Globe,
Oct. 1, 1893, P• 4, Apr. 3, 1902, P• 5.
11Bethlehem Times, Jan. 19, 1892, p. 4. South Bethlehem Globe,
Aug. 4, 1904, p. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

209.
saw only advantages in consolidation, their opponents saw only the
opposite.

As a councilman from South Bethlehem's strongly working-

class and immigrant fifth ward noted in 1905, he opposed consolidation "because it would increase the taxes and rents of the
poor and would afford no compensating increase of wages fol.' the
workingman.

Adam Brinker [a pro-consolidation politician and

businessman] and others would be benefitted by consolidation, for
they could increase the rents of their buildings and tenements.

It

is all right for the rich and all wrong for the poor." 12
The first serious attempt to consolidate "the Bethlehems" was
launched by local business leaders in 1903 when they persuaded the
boroughs of Bethlehem, South Bethlehem and West Bethlehem to create
13
consolidation ccmmittee~ to discuss the feasibility of a merger.
The main thrust, the unification of Bethlehem and South Bethlehem,
proved abortive.

The opposition forces in South Bethlehem were too

great to overcome, but the meetings were not totally without results.
In 1904, after an energetic campaign supported by local businessmen,
West Bethlehem's population of nearly 3,500 was added to Bethlehem's
14
7,300.
Bethlehem now had the distinction of being the only borough
in Pennsylvania to be located in two counties:

Lehigh and

Northampton.
In contrast to South Bethlehem, West Bethlehem's population was

l~Ibid.,
13
14

Apr. 21, 1905, P• 1.

Ibid., Sept. 8, 1903, p. 1, Nov. 3, p. 1, Nov. 15, P• 4, Nov.
26, P• 1.
Ibid., July 28, 1904, p. 1, Aug. 4, p. 1, Aug. 5, p. 1, also

~fth Census of the United States, Vol. 1, Washington, 1901,

PP• 632-641.
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similar in character to Bethlehem's.

It had grown up largely as a

suburb of Bethlehem, and its people were predominantly nativeAmerican.

Only 210 foreign-born individuals lived there in 1900.

There was little opposition to consolidation in West Bethlehemo
With 85 percent of the borough's voters going to the polls, West
15
Bethlehem favored the merger 690 to 157.
In South Bethlehem, the leaders of the move to enlarge the
borough's boundaries and population remained undaunted.

Thwarted in

their efforts to merge with Bethlehem, they sought union with the
boroughs of Fountain Hill and Northampton Heights.
Bethlehem Commercial League, composed of

~etail

The South

merchants from

the three boroughs, began agitation for unification in November of

1905.

The only question in their minds was whether the new community

should be a borough or a city.

By December. the League had convinced

the three borough councils and school boards to send representatives
16
to a meeting where the issues would be discussed.
The efforts of the Commercial League to combine the three boroughs
on the south bank of the river failed.

Consolidation advocates

attempted to make their proposal as appealing as possible.

They

argued that the merger would attract new industry and the added employment would minimize the adverse effects of a depression in the steel
industry upon the community.

15

Moreover, consolidatio11 meant increased

South Bethlehem Globe, Aug. 10, 1904, p. 1.

16~., Nov. 14, 1905, p. 4, Dec.

8~

p. 1.
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retail trade and improved real estate values.

It would also

facilitate municipal ownership of the new community·'s water and
electric power supplies,

However, these arguments did not convince

the proposed merger's opponents, and on December 18, the Fountain
Hill council voted against consolidation.

The benefits which the

proponents of consolidation had said would result did not appear to

.

u

be enough to offset the borough's loss of independence,
Events outside the immediate area altered the conditions under
which all future attempts at changing the nature of local government
would take place,

In 1910, Pennsylvania business elements launched

a campaign to introduce the commission form of government into the
state,

Three years later, their efforts bore fruit,

On June 27,

1913 the governor signed into law a bill requiring all third-class
cities, those with populations between 10,000 and 100,000 to adopt
18
commission charters,
The new state law provided the opportunity for which local
businessmen had been seeking,

Ever since the failure of the con-

solidation efforts of the previous decade, proposals had been made
19
that South Bethlehem itself incorporate as a city.
On August 4,

17

Ibid,, Dec, 14 , 1905 , P• 1 , Dec, 19 , p. 1 •

18
Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, p. 94, Laws of the General Assembly
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Passed at the Session of
1913, Harrisburg, Pa., 1913, pp. 586-631, for the definition
of a third class city see General Laws Passed by the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania During the Session
of 1874, Harrisburg, Pa., 1874, P• 230,
19
South Bethlehem Globe, Apr. 22, 1907, p. 6.
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1913, less than five weeks after the new state law took effect,
135 South Bethlehem community leaders signed and presented a
petition to the borough council calling for n special election
20
to determine if the borough should become a third-class city.
The next day, the

Sou~h Be~hleh~m

Globe ran an editorial

giving enthusiastic support to a third-class city movement as "expressive of a progressive spirit.';

South Bethlehem had outgrown

borough status, and the change would be the first step in the
establishment of commission government, "the success of which is
acknowledged in several cities, prominent among which are Memphis
and Denver."

Of particular benefit to the community, the editorial

continued, would be the abolition of ward representatj.on which was
21
inefficient, uneconomical, and time-consuming.
When no election date had been set by August 13, another
editorial appeared in the Globe, this time reprimanding the borough
council for its tardiness.

Action was taken the vexy next day at a

special council meeting where the borough solicitor gave an opinion
on the incorporation laws.

Act No. 367, approved by the Governor on

June 27, 1913, required a vote on city status to be taken at a general
election with notification being made in local newspapers four weeks
before the event.

However, Act No. 391, approved on July 7, seemed

to permit voting at a special election with announcements in the news-

20

The petition and the names of the signers are reprinted in
Aug, S, 1913, P• 1, 16.
21
Ibid., Aug. 6 , 1913 , P• 6 •
~.,
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papers one week before the election.

Since South Bethlehem was

seeking city status under the second act, which the borough attorney
felt took precedence over that of June 27, a special election was
22
set for August 22.
The Globe published a notice of the city charter in its next
edition.

It also ran an editorial commending the council for acting

to correct "its late dilatoriness," and pointed out that South
Bethlehem had double the population necessary to become a thirdclass city.

The borough had been operating under a system made
23
inefficient by the municipality's gro.wth.
During the following

weeks, the Globe published a number of articles and editorials
favoring the change in government.
The proposed

re~orm

Bethlehem's inhabitants.

did not arouse the enthusiasm of South
Only 42 percent of the eligible voters

bothered to appear at the polls on August 22.
favored the change.

Of these 59 percent

The returns by wards, as certified on August

23, and published in the Globe, showed that middle-class residential
dist~icts

favored commission government, but working-class areas

did not.

Wards One and Two supported the proposal by votes of 312

to 68 and 240 to 98.

The Third Ward which was closely balanced

between middle-class and working-class elements favored the change by
147 to 117.

22

Wards Four and Five, strongly working-class and immigrant

Laws of the General Assembly, 1913, pp. 568-631, 649-696, South
Bethlehem Globe, Aug. 15, 1913, p. 1.

23 Ibid., Aug. 15, 1913, P• 6.
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did not approve.
24
to 58.

They voted against city status 158 to 71 and 146

The ultimate goal of the reformers was to achieve consolidation.
By eliminating ward representation, the new system would produce an
efficient government, and this, it was believed, would induce
Bethlehem and Fountain Hill to seek a merger.

The new city would

thus not long remsin a third-class city, but as its population
passed the 100,000 mark it would become a city of the second class.

25

In the opinion of one South Bethlehem citizen, the elimination of
the ward system would overcome the obstacles to consolidation.
"~-7ith

the

prospt~ct

of a city council under the old method divided

by politics and ward representation, property owners and plain folks
generally preferred to endure the known :tlls they borep" he stated.
Hm-1ever, with "businesslike" methods of government in existence,
26
consolidation was inevitable.
The prospects of ultimate consolidation appeared good, at least
for a while.

Six days after the South Bethlehem council received

the petition requesting city status for the borough, a similar
petition was presented to the Bethlehem council.

Unfortunately for

the advocates of reform, Bethlehem, as a result of its 1904 merger
with West Bethlehem, was located in two counties, and the state laws

24~•• Aug. 23, 1913, P• 1, Sept. 3, p. 1.
25
Ibid., Aug. 22, 1913, P• 6, Aug. 23, P• 6, Sept. 11, P• 8.
26
Ibid., Aug. 25, 1913, P• 6.

-
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governing the incorporations of cities required that a community
27
seeking city status be located in one county.
In South Bethlehem, preparations for the establishment of the
new city government got off to a good start.

A city charter was

obtainedD primary elections held, and on November 5, tl1e date of the
election, a mayor and four councilmen were chosen as the new

gener~l

city's commissioners.

They were all business or professional men.

The mayc·;: was. a physician and the council was comprised of an
architect, a banker, a chemist, and a department store owner.

This

was the kind of leadership the reformers had been seeking,and
28
were sworn into office on the first of December.

they

The establishment of a commission government in South Bethlehem
did not go unchallenged.

When the Chief Burgess applied for the city

charter in Harrisburg in September, he was informed that a telegram
had been received from Peter J. Sheehan, a South Bethlehem saloon
keeper and politician, declaring that the August 22 election had not
been in accordance with the law.

Although opponents of the election

claimed that it was unconstitutional, state officials, nevertheless,
granted the charter. 29

27

~·•

Aug. 26, 1913, p. 1, Sept. 9, p. 1, Laws 6f the
General Assembly 1913, PP• 568-631.

28 south Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 1, 1913, p. 1. Semi-Centennial:
The Borough of South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: ·souvenir·History,
South Bethlehem, Pa., 1915, p. 17.
29
South Bethlehem Glo~, Apr. 6, 1914, p. 1.
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On January 12, 1914 proceedings contesting the validity of the

August 22 election were begun in the Northampton County Court.

The

petitioner, Thomas Scott, was a former borough councilman who had
had two years to serve when the charter was granted.

He was also

the proprietor of a small hotel in the Fourth Ward, and had been a
keen supporter of the strikers while serving on the council in 1910.
Scott's petition was vehement in tone, and he denounced the new city
30
officials as "usurpers".
The case was hearli on September 15, 1914.

The judge's decision

set aside the charter, and removed the city officials on the grounds
that the August electio1l was unconstitutional.

The vote, he said,

should have been taken at a general election, and Act. No. 391,
which permitted voting on city status in a special election, was in
direct contravention of Article 15, Section 1, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.

The verdict was appealed to the State Supreme Court.

On March 22, 1915, the Court upheld the lower court's verdict; it
ordered South Bethlehem returned to borough status, and the former
31
borough officials to resume their positions.
Several weeks of
confusion ensued as city officials refused to give up their posts
until officially notified.

Meanwhile, the borough officials con-

tinued to claim that they represented the only legitimate local
30

~.,

Feb. 2, 1914, p. 9, Mar. 2, p. 9.

31 Ibid., Sept. 16, 1914, p. 1, Mar. 22, 1915, p. 1. "Commonwealth v. City of South Bethlehem", in Pennsylvania State
Reports Containing Cases DP;cided by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania January Term 1915, Vol. 248, Phila., 1915,
pp. 581-584.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217.
government.

32

The movement for a business government had suffered a set-back,
but its advocates remained undaunted.

In 1915 they tried again.

In

both Bethlehem and South Bethlehem, petitions were presented to the
borough council.

The South Bethlehem petition was once again

primarily a middle-class document.

Thomas Scott, who had brought

the suit against the cit' charter and had since returned as councilman, pointed out that the petition was not representative of the
whole town.

Of 272 signers, only one lived in the part of the

borough east of Elm Street in the middle of the Third Ward.

Scott,

representing the old ward system clearly did not approve, but in
November of 1915, the voters in both boroughs decided to seek city
33
status.
Nothing was done for the next year and a half, however.
Other, more effective paths toward a new municipal government were
being followed.
In 1912, a joint recreation committee of the boroughs suggested
inter-borough cooperation in order to improve local playground
facilitie~.

When the committee was reorganized two years later, it

did a complete survey of the boroughs' recreational facilities, and,
again, recommended collaboration.

In 1916, Dr. Cyrus L. Stimson,

field secretary of the Playground and Recreation Association of
America, was asked to do a study of the Bethlehems.

32
33

At this point,

South Bethlehem Globe, Mar. 29, 1915, p. 1, Mar. 31, p. 1,
Apr. 13, P• 1.
Ibid., Sept. 5, 1915, p. 1, Nov. 3, p. lw
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the newly organized Rotary picked up the theme, and suggested
consolidation.

Stimson's report and the Rotary Club suggestions

were presented to Charles M. Schwab in June of 1916.

After

examining these reports, Schwab met in October with Stimson,

s.

Robert

Taylor, and A.c. Dodson, two prominent Bethlehem residents,

at which time he voiced agreement with the recommendation, and
34
promised to support a consolidation movement.
The playground report

~o1as

not Schwab's first involvement in

activities tending toward consolidation.

He had, in fact, spoken

out in favor of consolidation on a number of occasions.

In 1913,

during the campaign to make South Bethlehem a city, Schwab had
stated that "the interest of the community soon will see the ultimate
necessity of consolidation into a second class city."

Only con-

solidation would promote industrial and commercial progress and
35
ensure civic unity, he said.
Ultimately, it was Schwab's
participation in the inter-borough campaign to build a "Hill-to-Hill"
bridge that made consolidation a reality.
The hostility of many South Bethlehem residents to merger with
Bethlehem had not been the only factor keeping the two boroughs
~part.

Geography was also important.

To the advocates of consolida-

tion, the Lehigh River seemed to be, both literally and figuratively,
the greatest obstacle to be overcome.

Only two bridges crossed the

34 Ibid., June 22, 1916p p. 6, Nov. 28, p. 1.
35

rbid., Sept. 5, 1913, P• 8.
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river between the two communities.

One, the New Street bridge, a

steel structure built in 1867, was a toll bridge.

The only free

bridge was a covered wooden structure in poor shape, subject to
periodic damage by the Lehigh's spring floods.

Besides its poor

conditionp the free bridge also had the disadvantage of a bad
location.

There were railroad grade crossings at each end of the

bridge.

This was dangerous, and people sometimes met with fatal
36
accident&.
To those seeking merger of the two boroughs, the need for a

more adequate link across the river was obvious.

A free bridge,

by improving communication between the boroughs would increase
understanding and lessen hostilities.
37
be consolidation.

The hoped-for result would

Although proposals for replacement of the wooden bridge by a
more modern structure were put forward as early as the 1890's,
38
progress was slow.
The situation changed, in 1911, with the
creation of a Joint Bridge Commission composed of leading business
39
and political figures from the two boroughs.
The committee studied

36 Ibid., Feb. 26, 1898, P• lp Apr. 18, 1902, P• 5.
37w.J. Donald, "Bethlehem Builds Two Bridges," National Municipal
Review, Vol. 7, Sept. 1918, p. 484.
38
Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce, Hill-to-Hill Bridge: Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, Bethlehem, Pa., n.d., p. 6.
39
Rollin R. Keim, Hill-to-Hill Bridge, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania:
Historical and Pictoral, Bethlehem, Pa., 1924, pp. 12-13.
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a number of bridge designs, and finally came up with a plan for a
concrete structure to span the Lehigh, and eliminate the various
railroad grade crossings.

Having acquired an adequate replacement

for the wooden structure, the committee next turned to the problem
of financing construction.
achieved its goal.

By

1916~

the committee had almost

Both Lehigh and Northampton

count~es,

the two

boroughs, and the railroads concerned, all agreed to donate various
sums.

40

In the eyes of the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission,

however, the amm!ut was insufficient.

An

additional $200,000 had

to be raised with.tn 30 days or the conunission would not give its
approval.

In respot:se, the two boroughs launched an intensive fund-

raising drive which not only produced the needed amount, but also
41
made consolidation a reality.
The Hill-to-Hill Bridge campaign became a major community effort.
In over-all charge of the campaign was Archibald Johnston, formerly
president of the Bethlehem Steel Company and now a vice-president of
the parent corporation.

A "Major" headed up the drive in each borough.

Each in turn appointed "Captains" to direct teams of 15 to 20 members.
The boroughs were divided into districts with a team to each district,
and the team workers were given lists of the people they were to
approach for donations.

No amount was too small.

dren were encouraged to donate their small sums.

40

41
42

Even school chil-

42

Chamber of Commerce, Hill-to-Hill, pp. 13-14.
Keirn, Bridge, p. 17.
A. George Schaffner, "Bethlehem's Hill-to-Hill Bridge,"
American City, Vol. 29, Oct. 1923, p. 412.
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The results were gratifying to the project's supporters,

The

campaign brought in $450,000 -- more than twice the required amount,
The Bethlehem Steel Company alone pledged $100,000, and Charles M.
Schwab, a member of the Joint Bridge Commission, pledged an
43
additional $50,000 of his own.
Indeed, Schwab's participation
in the bridge campaign was of crucial importance in making the longsought consolidation of the Bethlehems a reality,

In a speech

delivered at the conclusion of the fund-raising drive, Schwab made it
clear that he did not view the bridge as an end in itself, but as a
step toward consolidation.

He urged the committee which had raised

the money to begin the task of consolidating the two boroughs.

'~e

have," he said, "reached a new era of civic P,ride, and the Bethlehem
Steel Co. [sic] will help with money, influence and anything possible
44
to aid the city,"
Schwab did not limit his support of consolidation to mere
encouragement,

On November 27, 1916 he gave a banquet in the

Colosseum, a large South Bethlehem Hall.
local business and political leaders.

In attendance were 800

They all belonged to

organizations with an interest in consolidation: the South Bethlehem
Chamber of Commerce, the Industrial Commission of Bethlehem, the
Joint Bridge Commission, the members of the bridge campaign, and the
two borough councils,

Aided by two of his top executives, Archibald

43Keim, Bridge, PP• 18-19,
44 south Bethlehem Globe. Oct, 9, 1916, p, 1,
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Johnston and Eugene Grace,
consolidation campaign.

Sch~ab

used the occasion to launch a

In an after-dinner speech he suggested

that those present lead a consolidation drive.

Schwab's remarks

were followed by those of Grace and Johnston, as well as by D.F.
Stimson, Field Secretary of the Playground and Recreation Association, and Roy
of New York.

s.

Smith, Vice-President of the American City Bureau
45
Each speaker in turn urged consolidation.

The banquet guests were not a hostile audience.
with enthusiasm to Schwab's suggestions.

They responded

One member of the audience

went so far as to propose Schwab for the consolidated city's first
mayor.

The audience gave its approval to Schwab's proposal that a

committee of three prominent citizens be chosen

~hich

would, in turn,

appoint a committee of fifty to later meet with Schwab and discuss
consolidation.
groups.

The committee of fifty was to be divided into two

A Legal Consolidation Committee, chaired by Archibald

Johnston would initiate plans for merger.

With Charles M. Schwab at

its head, the Committee for Civic Improvements was to establish an
46
amalgamated Chamber of Commerce.
Consolidation became a legal possibility on May 25, 1917, when
the governor of Pennsylvania signed two bills relating to the political
status of boroughs.

Act No. 143 allowed boroughs to hold special

elections for the purpose of deciding on city status.

Act. No. 159

45 Ibid., Nov. 28, 1916, P• 1, P• 9.
46
tbid., Nov. 28, 19lo, p. 1, Nov. 30, p. 1.
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permitted two or more contiguous boroughs to form a third-class city
47
without regard to county boundary lines.
The change in state regulations signaled the beginning of an
all-out campaign to consolidate the boroughs.

On May 20, a petition

signed by 400 voters calling for a consolidation election as soon
as possible had been presented to the South Bethlehem Council.
Bethlehem Council received a similar petition on May 28.

The

Each council

appointed delegates to serve on a joint consolidation committee which
would work out the final details.

48

Meeting on June 1, the committee set July 10, 1917, as the date
for a special election.

The committee also decided that tax rates

would be uniform, and that the new city would retain the existing
ward boundaries of the two boroughs as well as assume their bonded
49
:1i.~~ fl<"'ilting debts.
The borough councils approved the committee
report:

South Bethlehem on June 4, and Bethlehem on June 11.

The

next step was to convince the voters to accept the proposed change.
Coming when it did, the consolidation campaign benefited from
the outpouring of patriotic sentiment engendered by the entry of the
United States into World War One.

The consolidation movement was

presented to the people of the two boroughs in such a way as to

47

Laws of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Passed at the Session of 1917, Harrisburg, Pa., 1917, pp.
262-265, 296-297.

48

South Bethlehem Globe, May 20, 1917, p. 1, May 29, p. 1.

~., June 2, 1917, p. 1.

49
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identify it with the American war effort and thus with patriotism.
A week long Red Crosa fund-raising drive, begun on June 15, and
organized in the same fashion as the Hill-to-Hill Bridge campaign,
became linked with the merger movement,

The personnel and

organizational structure of both drives were idetltical, and people
were informed th&t by supporting the Red Cross and consolidation
campaigns, they were doing their part to make the nation stronger
and more united in its battle against Germany.

50

The official consolidation drive began on July 3 with a banquet
at the Colosseum.

The Lese of the week was taken up with meetings,

speeches, and, on July 7, a huge parade,

The local newspaper printed

articles and editorials supporting the merger.

A straw vote taken

by the South Bethlehem Globe, favorable to consolidation, served as
51
a major propaganda device,
The proponents of consolidation sought as much support for
their program as possible.

To gain it, they appealed to the leaders

of various social groups and classes in the community by granting
them status as representatives of their constituents in return for
their support of the merger.

Thus, the prestigious consolidation

committee included not only steel executives, businessmen, and
professionals, but also the clergymen and other recognized leaders of
the various immigrant communities -- men who had received little

50

Ibid,, June 28, 1917, p. 1, July 3, p. 1, July 9, p. 1, see
also Raymond Walters, The Bethlehem Bach Choir, Boston, 1923,

P• 78,
51

South Bethlehem Globe, July 3, 1917, p, 1, July 7, p. 1.
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previous acknowledgement from the community at large,

52

South

Bethlehem's ethnic communities became the subject of a great deal
of attention,

Men such as Archibald Johnston, who as a vice-

president of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, normally had few dealings with immigrants, addressed them at meetings called for the
purpose of gaining their support,

Over 2,500 members of the various

ethnic groups participated in a consolidation parade held on July 7.
In almost every case, advocates of consolidation identified their
cause with loyalty to the American flag, and support of the war
53
effort,
The campaign was an overwhelming success,

On July 10, the

citizens of the two boroughs voted in favor of consolidation
to 169,

.~,988

17, the Governor of Pennsylvania granted a charter
54
for the new city of Bethlehem,
On July

The achievement of city status did not mean the end of efforts
to change the local political structure.

To be

Rttre:

the newly

instituted commission government pleased the reformers,

At the same

time, if the wrong people came to power, the whole point of consolidation, the placing of political authority in the hands of the
community's major economic interests, would be nullified,

52

Selection

For examples of this see the biographical sketches of the
consolidation committee leaders in Fred L, Shankweiler, ~
of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1918.

53 south Bethlehem Globe, J 1 3 1917
u y '
' P• 1 ' J u 1y 9 ' P• 1 ' P•
6.

54

Ibid,, July 11, 1917, Po 1, July 18, P•

1~
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of officers for the new government could not be left to chance.
The problem of staffing a new government had arisen in other
municipalities when the business community introduced the commission
plan.

It had been found necessary to circumvent the existing

political processes and prevent candidates supported by the regular
political parties from entering office.

As representatives of the

"old politics" such men would be hostile to the values of those
responsible for the new system, and defeat the purpose of reform.
55
The solution appeared in the form of the non-partisan election.
The non-partisan ballot, coupled with the at-lat'ge

~lP.r..t:l.on

of

city officials, made it unlikely that any but well-known individuals-usually business or professional men--could be elected.
~ithout

Moreover,

the financial resources of a political party behind them,

few candidates who did not have the support of the business
community had much chance of success.

Short of funds, a candidate

lacking support from the business community was, in turn. unlikely to
obtain the publicity or press coverage needed to win a city-wide
campaign.
Bethlehem's first municipal election followed this pattern.

No

sooner was the consolidation campaign over, t:han a follow-up campaign
to elact city commissioners began.

At a July 30 banquet given for

consolidation campaign workers, Archibald Johnston was proposed as
mayor of the new city.

55

In the primary election of September 19, he ran

This and the following paragraph are based on Hays, "Mun:f.cipal
Reform," P• 160• Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, ·pp. 110-111. Karl,
Executive Reorganization, pp. 92-97.
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unopposed.

The four remaining members of the council chosen in the

regular November election were James E. Mathews, Manager of
Ordnance of the Bethlehem Steel Company, August W. Schmich, retired
superintendent of the steel plant, Alexander

c.

Graham, prominent

real estate dealer and hosiery mill owner, and Thomas F. Rowan, a
56
hotel proprietor.
Although consolidation had long been sought by local businessmen,
it had been realized only wlth the backing of the Bethlehem Steel
Company.

The company saw the advantages of a commission form of

government.

A centralized municipal government, staffed by men

aware that the local community was but a small part of a larger industrial society, would be responsive to the company's needs.

No

longer would the political power of working class voters force the
local government to oppose the company as it had in 1910.

Sharing

the same vision of the proper functioninr, of society in an industrial
nation, company and city officials could now

coo~erate

in attempting

to give concrete form to that vision on the local level.
For the city government and the Bethlehem Steel Company to be
effective allies, both had to deny the existence of any undue influence
by the company on city affairs.

Thus Archibald Johnston found it

necessary to repudiate charges that the company would dominate the new
city administration.

"As to the interest of the Steel Company," he

56 south Bethlehem Globe, July 31, 1917, p. 1, Nov. 7, p. 1, for
biographical information see Shankweiler, Men of Bethlehem, pp.
6, 18, 20, 28, 29.
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stated, "my only complaint is that they have never shown enough
interest.

Past evidence shows that the interests of the Steel Com-

pany have always been in behalf of its employees, and I have failed
to see any selfish motive in any of its dealings with the community.
Mr. Schwab and the officers of the Steel Company have Bethlehem's
interest at heart and are constantly planning to improve con57
ditions."
Schwab concurred in Johnston's assessment. "The thought
is furthest from my mind that the so-called steel interests shall in
any way be dictators in our conununity," he announced.

"We are happy

to be plain citizens, lending our efforts to the advancement of
58
Bethlehem."
Schwab was undoubtedly sincere in his desire to improve
life in Bethlehem, but his assertion that the company's role in local
affairs was minimal lacked conviction.

In a brief description which

he made of the consolidation campaign some years later, Schwab admitted ·as much:
boroughs,

t~

"We were interested in combining Bethlehem's •••

make a unified city and to stimulate a community pride.

Arch Johnston was made, by main strength, its first mayor."

59

Historically, l-7hen large corporations have become involved in
public affairs, they have generally preferred to remain in the
background.

57

South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 20, 1917, p. 5.

58
59

To do this and still retain their influence over events,

Quoted in Walters, Bach Choir, p. 194.

Whipple, "Notes," p. 220.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

229.
they often created front organ:l.zations.

60

In Bethlehem, the Steel

Company worked through the Chamber of Commerce.

This presented

little difficulty for the company since those most likely to join
were businessmen, aware of the company's importance to the community
and in sympathy with its values.

Indeed, the consolidation campaign

was linked from the start with a drive to create an Amalgamated
Chamber of Commerce whose members would come from both sides of the
Lehigh River.
Two committees had been formed at the banquet given by Schwab
on November 27, 1916, which launched the consold.dation drive.

One

of these committees, headed by Schwab, had as its task the establishment of a Chamber of Commerce, but the consolidation campaign, being
the most important, received priority.
after consolidation had
to organize a Chamber

becom~

~f

Only in December of 1917,

an established fact, did the effort

Commerce get underway.

Originally designated the Greater Bethlehem Association, the
proposed Chamber of Commerce was presented to the public as a
"citizen organization to bridge over the gap between the official
61
governing body and the citizens at large."
As such, the new organization would be more than a mere businessmen's associationo
as an unofficial

~artner

Functioning

of the new city administration, the Chamber

60 see ~dward c. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, Citv Politics,
(Vintage Books Edition), New York, 1963, pp. 29-30.
61nonald, "Two Bridges," p. 486.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

230.
of Commerce would aid in solving the problems confronting the city.
Its goal was the betterment of the whole community.
The Civic Improvement Committee met in Schwab's office on
December 14, 1916 to sketch a preliminary design for the organization of the Greater Bethlehem Association.

Its first act was to

hire experts from the American City Bureau, which specialized in
creating civic organizations such as Chambers of Commerce, to conduct a

m~mbership

association.

62

drive and outline a program of work for the

However, the membership drive did not begin until

the following December.

The campaign was launched on December 5,

1917 when Schwab addressed what the local newspaper described as
"the greatest mass meeting of Bethlehem's Progressive men and
women•" 63

During the next week the campaign became the center of

public attention.

Each day the newspaper published a listing of the

number of members signed.

The stated goal was an organization of

800 members paying annual dues of $25, and having a budget of $20,000.
A week's campaigning produced a membership of 2,200 and an income of
64
$60,000.
On the evening of Dec.ember 22, 1917, the Greater Bethlehem

62

Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce,
Vol. I, Dec, 22, 1916, Jan, 5, 1917, for the American City
Bureau see, "New Factor in the Vitalizing of Commercial and
Civic Organizations," American City, Vol. 8, May 1913, pp.
465-466.

63 south Bethlehem Globe, Dec, 6, 1917, p. 1,
64
Donald, "Two Bridges," p. 486,
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Association was officially dissolved and replaced with the Chamber
of Commerce.

Officers and a board of directors were chosen.

Three

of the board's 15 members, including Schwab himself, were connected
with the Bethlehem Steel Company.

Moreover, the only woman member

of the board, Alma Tobias, was married to a company executive.
Acting through the chamber's officers, the board had the power to
appoint all committee chairmanships.

The chairman of the

v~rious

committees, in turn, had the right to select.the men with whom they
desired to work.

65

The Chamber of Commerce had close ties with both the city
administration and the Bethlehem Steel Company.

Members of the

organization held important posts in the city government.

They

included the Mayor, the City Solicitor, the City Treasurer, the
head of the Civil Service Board, as well as all five members of the
City Planning Commission among whom were Charles M. Schwab and
Eugene Gracec

Clearly, the Bethlehem Steel Company was now in a

position to exert whatever influence it chose ove·r the future development of the city.
Local businessmen had sought to unite the boroughs of Bethlehem
and South Bethlehem into a single city for decades and by the end
of 1917 consolidation became a reality.

Seen in the context of the

nation's development, consolidation was a local manifestation of a

65

Chamber Minutes, Feb. 23, 1918, South Bethlehem Globe, Dec.
11, 1917, P• 1.
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trend toward institutionalizing the values of an industrial society.
The advantages of the commission form of government, efficiency,
stability, economy, and centralized decision-making, were precisely
the values espoused by the advocates of scientific management in
the factory and the business corporation.

In many respects, however,

the new administrative forms were destructive of traditional American
66
concepts of political democracy.
Municipal reform tended to remove
~ffective

political power from the.hands of lower-middle and working-

class voters with their narrow parochial interests and place it in
the hands of business and professional men whose perspective was that
of the entire city.

The reformers' claim that commission government

would be mcr.-e responsive to the needs of "the people" was true, but
only if one defined "the people" as those aware of the needs of an
industrial society.

Officials of the Bethlehem Steel Company were

cognizant of the possibilities inherent in the new system and threw
their weight behind the consolidation effort.

The new government

would be responsive to the Company's needs, not because of any
sinister collusion, but because the men who staffed both organizationa partook of the same values and shared the same vision of the
good society.

66Hays, "Municipal Reform" pp. 167-169, Weinstein, Corporate
Ideal, pp. 108-110, Karl, Executive Reorganization, pp. 9197, Melvin s. Rolli, Reform in Detroit: Hazen s. Pingree
and Urban Politics, Nel-7 York, 1969, pp. 171-181. See also
Lawrence J.R. Henderson, "1'he Lost World of Municipal Government," American Political Science Review, Vol. LI, June
1957, pp. 330-345.
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CHAPTER NINE
WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS

Stability and

o~der

were requisite elements in the continued

functioning of an industrial society both inside the factory and
outside its gates.

To prevent a repetition of the disruptive

events of 1910, officials of the Bethlehem Steel Company, aided by
the city government they had helped to create, worked to convince
local residents that their interests were identical to those of
the company.

Since most of its employees were local residents,

the company's efforts to improve working conditions in the plant,
combined with an active involvement in civic and cultural affairs,
did much to eliminate many of the antagonisms remaining as a
result of the strike.

Moreover, the company took advantage of

the Americanization drives of the First World War to gain the
loyalty of its many foreign-born employees -- the very men who had
been its most steadfast opponents in 1910.

The company's efforts

proved their worth in 1919 when neither the

~ommunity

nor the

majority of employees aided those strikers who sought to close the
plant as part of the nation-wide steel strike of that year.

In

other words, Bethlehem Steel had become an integral part of the local
community, and in the process, the residents of Bethlehem had accepted
the values of an industrial society.
233.
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Even before consolidation gave the Bethlehem Steel Company
undisputed influence in local affairs, Charles M. Schwab endeavored to convince local residents of his concern for their
welfare.

Between 1904 and 1910, Schwab had shown little interest

in matters of local concern, but after the strike the reverse was
true.

His involvement in community musical activities illustrates

this.
In 1900, J. Fred Wolle, a local resident, organized the
Bethlehem Bach Choir to present public performances of the choral
works of Johann Sebastian Bach.
The Bach Choir ceased to exist in 1905 when Wolle departed to
accept a position as chairman of the Music Department of the
University of California at Berkeley.

In 1911, during a business

trip to San Francisco, Schwab stopped in Berkeley to speak with
Wolle, and persuaded him to return to B·etfileheni.'"anct·resume direction
of the Bach Choir.

1

Schwab's action in bringing Wolle back to Bethlehem endeared
him to community leaders, because the Choir was more than just a
musical organization.

It was also a favorite institution of the

local community's upper-class, as its lists:-.of officers and
executive committee members indicated.

Moreover, Schwab displayed

a continuing interest in the Bach Choir by becoming its chief

1Raymond Walters, The Bethlehem Bach Choir, Boston, 1923,
pp. 90-91, 214-215.
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financial backer.

He made up half the Choir's annual deficit.

He

would not assume the entire liability, Schwab explained, because
then the Choir would be a private, rather than a community activity,
and people would lose interest in its annual Festival.
upon the retirement of the Choir's president, Henry
2
members of the Choir elected Schwab to the post,

s.

In 1919,
Drinker, the

Besides the Bach Choir, Schwab also aided other musical
organizations,

He gave financial support to the Lehigh Valley

Symphony Orchestra which was located in Bethlehem,

He also started

the Bethlehem Steel Company Band in September of 1910,

Led by a full-

time director, the Band was composed of company employees.
provided the Band with all the necessities:
and a rehearsal hall,

Schwab

instruments, uniforms,

At the Company's expense, the Band performed

on civic occasions and even provided free public concerts during
the summer months,

3

Although Schwab's involvement in the musical life of the
community gained him the thanks of the middle and upper-classes, a
large segment of the local population cared little for such
cultu~al

activities,

Of far more interest to these people was the

Bethlehem Steel Company's sponsorship of a professional soccer team

2

Ibid., PP• 40-46, 230-238,

3

South Bethlehem Globe, June 22, 1918, p. 1, William J, Heller,
History of Northampton County, 3 Vola., New York, 1920, Vol.
III, pp. 396-397, Raymond Walters, Bethlehem Long Ago and Today,
Bethlehem, Pa., 1923, pp. 115-116, Walters, Bach Choir, pp.
32-33.
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in 1914.

To gain players, Schwab raided many of the crack soccer

teams in the country for stars.

The team was successful, even to

the point of going on European tours, and local sport fans followed
its fortunes with avid interest.

For the use of the team and

company employees, Schwab also built an athletic field and gymnasium
costing $50,000.

In addition, Schwab earned the gratitude of local

sports fans by his contribution of $50,000 toward the completion of
4
an athletic stadium at Lehigh University.
Of greater importance to the community were Schwab's efforts to
further the health and safety of both company employees and local
residents.

The Bethlehem Steel Company emerged from the 1910 strike

with a bad reputation for the dangerous conditions under which many
of its employees were forced to work, and for the many accidents
~esulting

,

from those conditions.

5

In response to the adverse

publicity it received, Bethlehem Steel joined the growing number of
corporations instituting industrial safety programs in their plants.

6

4New York Times, Aug. 2, 1914, III, P• 4, May 22, 1916, P• 12,

South Bethlehem Globe, Oct. 1, 1919, p. 8, Bethlehem Fabricators
Inc., Bethlehem the City of Steel and Memories, n.p., n.d., p.
24, Catherine Drinker Bowen, ~istory of Lehigh University,
Bethlehem, Pa., 1924, p. 78.
5

United States Bureau of Labor, Report on the Strike at the
Bethlehem Works, Washington, 1910, p. 121, 11 Will Bethlehem
Follow Pittsburgh?"P Literary Digest, Vol. 41, July 16, 1910,
p. 204, David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era,
Cambridge, Mass., p. 161.

6

For a discussion of the industrial safety movement, see Gerd
Korman, Industrialization, Immigrants and Americartizers: The
View from Milwaukee, 1866-19ll, Madison, Wise., 1967, p·p. 110135, see also Brody, Steelworkers, pp. 165-168.
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In October of 1913, Bethlehem Steel announced the creation of
a Safety and Welfare Department.

Under its auspices each department

in the plant was to have a safety committee of four men.

A foreman

would serve as the committee's permanent chairman, while its other
three members would come from the rank and file.

The latter would

change at regular intervals, giving all members of a department
opportunity to serve.

Recommendations would be submitted to a plant

safety committee which would in turn inform the appropriate company
7
agencies of needed feforms.
The establishment of a Safety Department was followed the next
year by the building of a $75,000 dispensary.

Staffed by full-time

physicians and nurses, the dispensary could treat all but the most
serious cases.

Before this time, the plant had possessed no medical

facilities of its own, and it was necessary to take injured employees to St. Luke's Hospital.

"This new method is designed to

keep the company in touch with injured employees," a company official
announced.

When an injured worker's condition improved he would be

given light employment at full pay, and upon full recovery, assigned
to his former position.

8

Under the direction of the Safety and Welfare Department, employees were given first-aid training, and each department had its

7south Bethlehem Globe, Oct. 15, 1913, p. 12.
Bwilliam L. Estes, Jr. Ed., l~illiam L. Estes, 1855-1940; The
First Superintendent, Director and Chief Surgeon·of·st. Luke's
Hospital: An Autobiographx 1 Bethlehem, Pa., 1967, p. 80,
South Bethlehem Globe, July 20, 1914, p. 1.
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own first-aid team.

Moreover, to generate interest in the program,

as well as to sharpen its team members' skills, the company
sponsored annual first aid meets.

At first, competition was

limited to teams from the various departments, but later, as the
company expanded operations, teams from plants in other locations
took part as well.

9

The concern of the Bethlehem Steel Company for its employees'
health did not limit itself to the confines of the plant.

During

World War I, the Bethlehem Steel Company donated the cost of an
entire ward to St. Luke's Hospjtal, and Schwab paid one half the
10
cost of another.
Also, South Bethlehem's large immigrant population
benefitted from Schwab's financial support of a Raby Health Center.
The initiative for establishment of the Health Center came from
Ernesta Drinker, daughter of the president of Lehigh University.
Appalled to learn that the infant mortality rate in South Bethlehem
was the highest in the entire state of Pennsylvania, she resolved to
do something about it.

Supported by the director of the local

hospital, she approached Schwab with the idea for a baby health center.
Schwab recognized the project's humanitarian value as well as its
public relations potential and agreed to have the Bethlehem Steel

9"A Worker's Army of First-Aid Experts," Literat"7 Digest, Vol.
68, Jan. 1, 1921, PP•· 54-57, "Safety in Industryf First Aid and
Accident Prevention in a Great Manufacturing Plant," Scientific
American, Vol 84, Dec. 22, 1917, pp. 392-393, South Bethlehem
Globe, Sept. 26, 1916, p. 1.
lOEstes, Autobiography, pp. 90-92, South Bethlehem Globe, Aug.
23, 1917, p. 1, Archibald Johnston, ·Message·of Archibald
Johnston, Mayor of the City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1920,
p. 320.
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Company support it financially.

11

The Baby Health Center opened its doors in the summer of 1915,
and began dispensing pasteurized milk for infants at a low cost.
Within a short time, the center had developed into a child care
clinic where the services of physicians and nurses were available
free of chargee

In 1920, the Health Center had three branches on

Bethlehem's south side.

In that year, physicians treated 12,959

cases and 59,879 quarts of milk were sterilized and dispensed.
In 1921, the Health Center's services were expanded to include a
pre-natal clinic.

The operation's principal financial support

carne from the Bethlehem Steel Company which also provided the
12
buildings free of charge.
The chief beneficiaries of the clinics were the children of
South Bethlehem's
immigrants.
,..

The project's chief function,

according to Archibald Johnston,
...... .....
~

~·1as

to educate "those in our midst

who do not know as well how, and where to secure assistance in maintaining the health of the babies of those of longer residence among
.. 13
us.
In keeping with the educational function, a local physician

11catherine Drinker Bowen, Family Portrait, Boston, c. 1970,
p. 131, South Bethlehem Globe, May 23, 1917, p. 1.
12 Archibald Johnston, Message of Archibald Johnston, Mayor of
the City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1919, p. 53~ Message
of Archibald Johnston, Mayor of the City of Bethlehem,
Bethlehem, Pa., 1921, pp. 21-23; Message of·Archibald
Johnston, Mayor of the City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Pa., 1922,
p. 53, South Bethlehem Globe, Jan. 26, 1915, p. 1, Oct. 5,
1917, p. 9.
13Johnston, Hessage, 1921, p. 24, South Bethlehem Globe, Hay 17,
1916, P• 1.
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gave bimonthly instructions, in their own languages, to immigrant
midwives.

The success of the station's medical staff in gaining

entry "into many homes in the poorer quarters of the city," resulted in improved public health conditions among the immigrants.

14

In his annual message of January 1921, Mayor Archibald Johnston
pointed with pride to the fact that the infant mortality rate among
the immigrant populE don was lower than that of "the districts
inhabited by our prosperous citizens," not served by the clinic.
1be existence of the clinic was of great public relations
to the Bethlehem Steel Company.

15

val~e

Mention of the Center was always

accompanied by references to the company's support of it.

}wreover,

the company urged that the families of its employees take advantage
of the clinic's services. 16

In this fashion, the Baby Health Center

forestalled the company's critics from claiming that it cared little
for the welfare of the community, and it also served to ensure worker
loyalty.

Few parents who had obtained free care for their children

at the clinic were likely to consider their employer totally unconcerned about their well-being.
Although the Baby Health Center received most of its support from
the Bethlehem Steel Company, it was technically a service of the city
government.

14
15

Such cooperation between the two was not an isolated

Ibid., Oct. 3, 1917, P• 9.
Johnston, Message, 1921, p. 23.

16 Bethlehem Steel Company, Bethlehem Booste~, No. 8, AuguSt
15 ' 1918, p. 16 •
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incident.

Indeed, the prospect of such close relations between the

city administration and the company had been the reason for the
company's support of consolidation in the first place.
Archibald Johnston assumed his post as Bethlehem's first Mayor
in January, 1918.

He brought to the office a set of values shared

by many other municipal reformers of the period.

In his mind, the

role of the mayor was that of an administrator, and he considered
it his task to introduce the business methods of the contemporary
corporation into local government.

A new bookkeeping system, a

civil service system to abolish political patronage, the hiring of
a professional city managP.r and a city planner, as well as the
creation of a city planning commission were part of an approach to
17
municipal government sl~ ·~~by many of his contemporaries.
Thus,
in a public message delivered after his first full year in office,
Johnston stated that his most important accomplishment was
18
duce a modern bookkeeping system in the city government.

t~

intro-

Three

years later, he announced that he was "more than ever convinced of
the necessity of conducting civic affairs along modern business
19
lines."
City government, he continued, should be placed in the

17 Archibald Johnston, Message of Archibald Johnston, Mayor of
the City of Bethlehem, Bethlehem, Fa., 1918, p. 3, Message,
1922, p. 4. South Bethlehem Globe, Jan. 7, 1918, p. 1, Jan.
8, P• 1, July 6, P• 1, July 24, P• 1, Sept. 10, P• 1. For
a general discussion of this attitude see, Melvin G. Rolli,
Reform in Detroit: Hazen s. Pingree and Urban Politics, New
York 1969, PP• 161-181.
18
Johnston, Message, 1919, p. 14.
19
Message, 1922, p. 4. Italics in the original.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

242.
hands of "citizens of business ability," and removed from those of
professional politicians.

Strong party affiliations resulted in

election promises and patronage obligations, and these were fulfilled
only at "the expense of successful, efficient and economical conduct
20
of the city's affairs."
Within the limits imposed on him by the values he brought to
government, Archibald Johnston was an effective l·1ayor.

If the

introduction of new bookkeeping methods reflected an approach to
city administration conditioned by a desire to make government more
businesslike, such a reform was Gorely needed.

An

audit of the books

of the boroughs of Bethlehem and South Bethlehem revealed bookkeeping
systems which were, at best, haphazard.

For example, the South

Bethlehem Borough Sinking Fund was found to be $100,000 in arrears
because funds had not been put aside to pay off municipal bonds.
Thus, one of the new adti\inistration' s first tasks was to pay South
21
Bethlehem's creditors.
Other projects had to be delayed until a
sounder financial footing could be established for the city.
In his inaugural message, Johnston indicated his awareness of
the problems arising out of urban conditions.

High on his list of

priorities was providing the city with an adequate supply of pure
water, for part of Bethlehem's water supply came from an unhealthy
source:

thP. Lehigh River.

The river water was contaminated with

human and industrial wastes dumped into it from the towns, mines, and

20
21

tbid., PP• 4-5.
South Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 4, 1917, p. 1.

Johnston, Message,

1919' p. 11.
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factories up-stream.

Although the borough of Bethlehem possessed

a municipally-owned water supply dependent on wells outside the
town limits, South Bethlehem was serviced by the Bethlehem City
Water Company which drew its water from the Lehigh.

As a result,

South Bethlehem was periodically swept by typhoid epidemics in
spite of the ctJmpauy's attempts to filter the water.

At Johnston's

urging, the city purchased the water company's frqnchise for 1.7
22
million dollars in September of 1918.
Johnston's four years in office saw the beginning of an extensive program of street paving and an expansion of sewerage
facilities.

In March of 1919, Bethlehem had 147.6 miles of streets

of which only 15.9 were paved.

In addition, the city had only 12.7

miles of sanitary sewers, and 4.2 miles of storm sewers under those
streets.

Baci streets and the lack of sewerage facilities had been

the subject of chronic complaints for years, but prior to consolidation, the local governments had done little to improve conditions.

Johnston's administration replaced the cesspools and

privies so dangerous to public health with a city-wide network of
sanitary

sewers~

Shortly thereafter, macadamized streets were

22 Johnston, Message, 1918, pp. 5-6, 11, "Report on the Water
Supply of Bethl~hem," in United States Housing Corporation,
Project Book, Bethlehem, Pa., Record Group 3, Records
of the United States Housing Corporation, National Archives,
~Jth Bethlehem Globe, Hay 3, 1898, p. 2, Mar. 10, 1903,
P• 1, Aug. 6, 1913, P• 22, l1ay 17, 1918, P• 11, Sept.
4, P• 1.
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introduced on a wide scale.

23

The creation of a municipal park system was a matter of
particular pride to Johnston.

In the teeming immigrant quarter of

the city, only saloons existed as recreational centers, and there
were no municipally owned and supervised playgrounds for children.
Such facilities were not totally absent, however, for during the
summer months, the Bethlehem Steel Company provided supervised
24
playgrounds on lots which it owned in South Bethlehem.
This was
clearly inadequate, and Johnston took advantage of his close ties
with the Steel Company to secure the establishment of a 92 acre
park along Saucon Creek in the sparsely settled southeastern section
of the city,

When a public fund raising campaign raised the money

to purchase 46 acres of land, the company announced the donation of
an equal amount of land,

In addition, the Company provided the park

with a bandstand seating 1,200 people, extensive flower beds, the
materials and labor for a suspension bridge across the creek, and
25
$13,500 for the first year of the park's upkeep.
Acting as an unofficial liaison between the city and the company, the Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce also functioned as an agency

23

"Bethlehem Water Supply," u.s .H.C,, Pro.1ect Book, Johnston,
Message, 1919, p. 9. South Bethlehem Globe, Jan. 14, 1895, p.
2, June 2, 1906, Frank Koester, City Planning Report for the
City Planning Commission; Bethlehem, Pa., (mimeograph), New
Yor.k, 1919, PPo 18, 78, City Ordinances of Bethlehem, Pa. 1 Nos.
1-258 1 Jan. 14 1 1918 to May 16, 1921, Bethlehem, Pa., 1921,
PP• 406-467,

24 south Bethlehem. Globe, Oct. 3, 1918, p. 1, B.S. Co., Booster,
No. 10, Sept, 16, 1918, P• 1,
25
South Bethlehem Globe, Nov. 7, 1918, pp. 1, 15, Johnston,
Message, 1920, pp. 10-11, 14.
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educating local citizens about the realities of life in an industrial society, and in the process weaning them from their adherence
to an older, small-town, value system.

The Chamber's task was both

helped and hindered by the nation's participation in World War I.
To fulfill the $150,000,000 in wartime contracts which it had
obtained, the company increased its local work force from 10,000
26
to 30,000.
This increase in population, however temporary, put
a severe strain on the physical and psychological resources of the
community.

Moreover, this took place just at the time that

Bethlehem's social and political leaders were seeking to transform
Bethlehem into a model industrial city.

27

In the midst of all this,

the Chamber of Commerce sought to convince the city's permanent
residents of the benefits to be derived from the Bethlehem Steel
Company's presence in the community, for ultimately the company's
activities affected almost every aspect of life in the new city.
In Bethlehem, public transportation was provided by the trol&eys
of the Lehigh Valley Transit Company.

Because Bethlehem was part of

a large interurban network covering the entire Lehigh Valley, the
transit company considered Bethlehem's local traffic of minor importance and ignored the pleas of residents for improved service.

26

The

Koester, City Planning Report, pp. 34, 67. United States Department of Labor, Report of the United States Housing Corporation, 2 Vola. Washington, 1919, Vol. II, p. 111. South
Bethlehem Globe, June 23, 1915, p. 1, Robert A. Hessen, "A
Biography of Charles M. Schwab, Steel Industrialist," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Columbia University, 1969, pp.
352-388.

27

Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce,
Vol. I, Feb. 23, 1918.
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increased demands of wartime, resulting from an expanded labor
force at the steel mill, did not produce an increase in service.

On the contrary, during the winter of 1917 and 1913, the Lehigh
Valley Transit Company actually discriminated against the Bethlehem
28
service in the distribution of its available car facilities.
The result was a series of daily incidents, some of which achieved
near-riot proportions.

At the end of their shifts, steel workers

mobbed the few available trolleys, and fist-fights among those
seeking seats were common.

Moreover, steelworkers from areas to

the north of Bethlehem often waited in vain for streetcars to take
them home, and when none appeared walked to the north side of town
to obtain transportation.

To add insult to injury, when they

finally boarded a streetcar, the conductors would not accept their
29
pass books, and made them pay regular fares.
These seemingly
minor episodes became a major problem as service deteriorated.
Complaints directed

tm~ard

the police department were passed on to

the City Council with appeals that it take the matter in hand.

How-

ever, the Public Safety Committee of the Council merely recommended
that fares be kept at five cents.

30

In the absence of action by the City Council, the Chamber of
Commerce stepped in.

28

It obtained the services of Delos Wilcox, the

Delos F. Wilcox, Report on·the Transit Problem·of·Bethlehem,
Pa., and Vicinity, (mimeograph), Bethlehem, Pa., 1918, p. 7.

29 Bethlehem City Council Minutes, Vol. 1, Feb. 4, 1918.
Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 31, 1917, p. 1.
30

Council Minutes, Vol. I, Jan. 29, 1918.
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country's foremost public transportation expert, and asked him to
report on Bethlehem's needs.

The result was a sober document

describing the failures of the Lehigh Valley Transit Company, and
recommending public ownersh1.p of transportation facilities as well
31
as the immediate inauguration of bus service.
Although the City
Council expressed an interest in Wilcox's report, it did not adopt
his proposals.

Instead, the Council used the report to goad the

Lehigh Valley Transit Company into improving its local service.
Anxious to have its franchise extended into the recently annexed
East Bethlehem area of the city, the Transit Company agreed to meet
32
the Council's demands.
The Chamber of Commerce came into existence at the height of
World War I, and, from the start, most of its activities involved
the war effort.

The Chamber involved itself in raising money for

the local War Relief Fund, promoting war gardens, publicizing the use
of substitute foods, and assisting in Liberty Loan campaigns. 33 Many
of its wartime activities were carriud out in cooperation with the
Bethlehem Steel Company.

In two areas, especially, housing and

Americanization, the efforts of the two organizations were so closely
allied as to make it difficult to discover where the activities of
one ended and those of the other began.

31
Wilcox, Transit, pp. 7-8, 22.
32
Council Minutes, Vol. I, Jan. 29, 1918.
33
Chamber Minutes, Vol. I, Feb. 23, 1918.
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Housing was a matter of important local concern during the war.
The number of additional workers the company could employ to meet
wartime demands depended largely on the housing available.
fortunately~

Un-

Bethlehem suffered from a chronic housing shortage,

and even in the best of times there were employees who had to commute
to work from nearby communities.

34

To help alleviate the situation,

the Chamber staged rallies to acquaint residents with the problem,
and convince them that patriotic duty required renting spare rooms
to war workers.

In addition the Cha1nber undertook a house-to-house

survey to determine the available facilities in the town.

In all

this the Chamber of Commerce acted as the Steel Company's junior
partner.

In fact, when the United States Housing Board requested

the Chamber to act as its agent in determining housing needs, the
Chamber refused and directed the Housing Board to the Company which
35
already had charge of such matters.
The Bethlehem Steel Company, recognizing the existence of a
housing shortage, planned an ambitious home building program.
Through its subsidiary, the Saucon Land and Improvement Company,
Bethlehem Steel purchased 480 acres of land east of Bethlehem where
36
it proposed to build 1,500 houses for its workers.
However, in

34Koester, City Planning, p. 41.
35 south Bethlehem Globe, Oct. 27, 1917, p. 1, Nov. 10, 1917, p. 1.
3611 Conference of Representatives of Housing Committee and
Bethlehem Steel Co., Jan. 10, 1918, in Report on the Abandon~ent of the Bethlehem Project, Feb. 10, 1919.
Typescript in
Record Group 3, Records of the United States Housing
Corporation, National Archives.
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1917, passage of the War Revenue Act, an excess-profits bill, convinced company officials that such an undertaking was financially
impossible.

As a result, Bethlehem Steel, which normally resented

government interference in business, appealed to the Federal Govern37
ment for aid.
The Bethlehem Steel Company sold the properties it had acquired
for a housing project to the United States Housing Corporation for
$367,000.

The government planned the construction of some 2,000 brick

dwellings on the site along with such public facilities ae schools,
churches, stores, and a movie theatre.

38

The war ended before this

ambitious project could be completed, and only 277 houses had been
built when the program was terminated in 1919. 39
Although the housing project was undertaken to provide housing
for war workers, the results were not intended to be temporary, but
rather permanent additions to the community.

In consequence, Housing

Corporation agents were instructed to act in cooperation with both city
and Steel Company officials.

It soon became obvious that the govern-

ment was dealing primarily with the company.

In a report on a

conference with the Bethlehem City Solicitor about the cost to the
37

Minutes of the War Industries Board from August 1 1 1917 to
December 19 1 1918, WaRbington, 1919, pp. 59-60.
38
Dept. of Labor, u.s.H.c. Report, Vol. II, p. 111, also J.D.
Lippincott, ~ed States Housing Corporation, Bethlehem
Project Closing Report, Feb. 8, 1919, (typescript), P• 18,
in Record Group 3, Records of the United States Housing
Corporation, National Archives.
39
U.S.H.C., Abandonment Repo~, p. 50.
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city of laying water mains at the project site, a government official
stated that the Solicitor "pointed out that the majority of the City
Council is composed of officers of the Bethlehem Steel Company, which
has direct interest in facilitating the work of this Bureau."

The

cost of the mains, the lawyer stated, would be met by an upward
reassessment of local properties from $22,000,000 to $71,000,000.
The city could thus increase its bonded indebtedness without having
to submit the proposal to a referendum as required by state
"This submission he [the cit'}7 solicitor] desired to avoid."

law~

40

Another

government agent reported in apparent amazement that "This company is,
41
in fact, the entire city practically,"
The Bethlehem Steel Company's involvement with the government
housing

pro~ect

indicated its concern with more than the housing of

temporary wartime

employees~

From the start, the company intended

the houses for use by its machinists and other skilled employees.
By providing such workers with permanent housing, the company sought
42
to reduce labor turnover, and ensure labor stability.
Since homeowning employees would be unlikely to jeopardize their jobs by
engaging in union acti•lity, the company put into effect a prop,ram
designed to aid its workers"in the purchase of their own homes.

4011Kerr Report, Sept. 10, 1918," in U.S.R.C., ,EEo,1ect Book.
41c.s. St. John to Dr. James Ford, Nov. 13, 1918, in ~·
42 "Conference of Representatives of Rousing Committee and
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Apr. 13, 1918," in U,S .. H.C.,
Project Book, see alae "Conference" Jan. 10, 1918, in ib:f.d_.
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1917, for example, the Company loaned its employees $1,100,000 to
purchase homes.

In addition, the company loaned another $1,600,000

to employees seeking to build homes.

A total of 77 houses were sold

to employees without any down payments in lease purchase agreements. 43
Skilled workers were not the only subjects of the Company-a
efforts to insure worker loyalty.

Taking advantage of the patriotic

fervor sweeping the country, the Company strove to convince employees
of the importance of their work to the war effort.

Patriotic rallies,

flag-raising ceremonies and Liberty Loan campaigns were used to reinforce patriotic loyalty to the nation, and, more importantly, to
the company. 44 Even though many of the company's employees were
immigrants from Eastern Europe, appeals to their patriotic loyalty
were not without sense.

Although Poles, Slovaks, and Magyars were

technically citizens of Germany and Austria, they were often hostile
to their governments, and, in fact, local Poles and Slovaks contributed men and money to Polish and Slovak contingents fighting with
the Allies. 45

Moreover, when the United States declared war on

Austria-Hungary in December, 1917, it decided not to classify such
immigrants as enemy aliens, an action which gratified local
43

Lippincott, Closing Report, p. 7, B.s. Co., Booster, No.1,
May 1, 1918, p. 16.
44
Brody, Steelworkers, pp. 190-197, South Bethlehem Globe, Apr.
7, 1917, P• 1, BoS. Co., Booster, No.4, June 15, 1918, p •. 3,
No, 7, Aug. 11, 1918, p. 23, No. 13, Nov. 1, 1918, p. 1.
45
South Bethlehetn Globe, Apr. 24, 1918, p. 1, May 22, 1918, p. 1.
See also John Higham, Stran era in the Land Patterns of
American Nativism 1860•1920 Atheneum Edition , New York,
1965, P• 217.
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foreigners.

46

Thus, the company's foreign-born employees needed

little encouragement to form "Loyalty Leagues" declaring their
adherence to the American cause, or to participate actively in
47
Liberty Loan campdigng,
If loyalty to the United States became
identified with loyalty to the Bethlehem Steel Company, it was not
by accident.

Such loyalty would hinder immigrant participation in

activities which the company designated as unpatriotic, namely,
union membership.

The company was aideu in this by the Americanize-

tion drives of the wartime period.
Americanization programs grew out of a realization that a large
proportion of the residents of American industrial centers were
aliens.

Given the emotional atmosphere created by the United States'

entrance into World War I, this caused a certain amount of apprehension among native Americans.

As a result, Americanization efforts,

supervised by the United States Bureau of Naturalization, soon made
48
their appearance in communities with large immigrant populations.
Bethlehem, where 12,000 of the 18,000 local registrants for the draft
49
were aliens, was no exception.
46

South Bethlehem Globe, Dec. 13, 1917, p. 6.

'•7 Ibid.,

Apr. 2, 1917, P• 6, May 22, P• 1, Dec. 31, P• 1, Apr.

~1918, p. 2, June 15, p. 6, B.s. Co., Booster, No. 1, May

1, 1918, p. 6, No. 4, June 15, 1918, pp. 15-16, No. 19 0
3, 1919, P• 7.
.
48
49

Feb~

Higham, Strangers, pp. 215-217, 243-250.
Jacob c. Schaeffer, The Record of Service·l917•1927 1 Edward F.
Ackerman Post No. 397; The American·tegion; ·Hellertown, Pa.,
Allentown, Pa., 1927, pp. 13-14; south Bethlehem Globe, Dec.
6, 1917, p. 20.
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In large measure, the Americanization movement represented a
desire to accommodate the immigrant to an industrial society.

It

was designed to break down the immigrant's strong group loyalties
and thus eradicate his ethnic identity.

By teaching the immigrant

the fundamentals of English and Civics, the proponents of
Americanization assumed that the foreigner would acquire the values
and aspirations of native Americans.

As such, then, Americanization

grew out of the same desire to create a homogeneous, disciplined
society required by an industrialized nation that had produced the
municipal reform movement.

50

Recognizing the applicability of

Americanization to local conditions, Bethlehem Steel encouraged such
efforts among its workmen.
Americanization activities began in Bethlehem in the fall of
1915, under the direction of J. Mark Frey, head of the Young Men's
Christian Association of Lehigh University.

The Y.M.C.A. had begun

a program of English language instruction for immigrants on a
national scale in 1907.

The Robert's method of instruction, used

by the Y.M.C.A., was designed specifically for use among the immigrants employed in American industry.

Stressing the familiar and

concrete, the lessons related to the men's industrial environment
and emphasized such things as good work habits, discipline, and

50

Edward F. Hartman, The Movement to'Americartize·the·Immigrant,
New York, 1948, pp. 24, 56-63, 91-97, Higham, Strangers, pp.
238-242, Maurice R. Stein, The Eclipse of Community: An
Interpretation of American Studies, (Harper Torchbooka
Edition) New York, 1964, p. 54, Korman, Industrialization,
pp. 136~166.
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safety.

51

When Frey found himself unable to interest local school

authorities in such a program, he turned to the Bethlehem Steel
Company for help.

Convinced of the program's utility, Company

officials obtained the use of public school facilities for night
school classep by promising to meet all the expenses involved.
Supervised by Frey, seventeen Lehiglt University students, paid by
the company, began giving instructions in English in November, 1916.
Classes were open to all aliens in the community whether or not
52
they were employed by Bethlehem Steel.
On the whole, the response to the English language teaching

program was favorable.
some

2~000

In the 1916-1917 series of instructions,

studunts representing 64 nationalities attended classes.

Another 1,200 students enrolled in the 1917-1918 session.

Although

the program became coupled with the Americanization movement sponsored
by the Bureau of Naturalization, company officials limited its
activities to English language instruction, and declined to hold
classes preparing aliens for citizenship.

Although willing to place

the school under the nominal supervision of local school authorities
in order to obtain government assistance and teaching materials, the
company refused to participate in a wartime naturalization drive.

51Bowen, Lehis~,p. 27, Korman, Industrialization, pp. 141-146,
Glazier to Chief Examiner, Naturalization Service, Phila.,
Jan. 6, 1916 in Record Group 85, Records of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, File E-520, National Archives.
52
Glazier to Chief Exaruinet:, Jan. 6, 1916 in ibid,

-
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An Americanization drive sponsored by the Bethlehem Chamber of

Commerce had almost destroyed the English language night school,
company officials explained, for many of its immigrant employees
feared that filing a declaration of intent to become a citizen
made them liable to conscription.

In the face of wartime labor

shortage,, the company feared that a naturalization drive would
cause many aliens to seek work elsewhere.

53

With the coming of peace,- the company's attitude toward
naturalization drives changed.

Continuing its English language

classes, the company expanded its program to include classes
preparing aliens to pase naturalization examinations.

Bethlehem

Steel officials were aware of the value of company sponsored
citizenship drives in helping their workmen to confuse loyalty to
the company with loyalty to the nation.

When the war ended, and

labor shortages were no longer a problem, the company launched a
54
naturalization campaign.
For several weeks before the start of a new series of English
language classes in December, 1918, great stress was placed on the
desirability of the attendance of aliens at citizenship classes.
Company representatives approached all the unnaturalized foreigners
53

South Bethlehem Globe, Oct. 9, 1917, p. 1, J.M. Gurnett to
Commissioner of Naturalization, Washington, D.Co, Nov. 4,
1918, Naturs.lization Records File E-520, for the seriousness
of Bethlehem Steel's wartime labor shortage see William Hard,
"Cannon, Whose Fault?" New Republic, Vol. 14, Apr. 1918, pp.
377-379.
54
H. Wilson to Chief Naturalization Examiner, Jan. 28, 1919,
Naturalization Records, File £-520. See also Brody, Steelwor~, p. 189.
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in the plant, and encouraged them to seek citizenship.

Employees

who attended the school would receive pay raises and promotions,
but those who did not would be dismissed when work slacked off
55
with the completion of war contracts.
To make things as easy as
possible for prospective citizens, papers for filing a Declaration
56
of Intent could be obtained in the company offices.
As a result
of the campaign, some 5 1 500 men enrolled in the English and
citizenship classes in the December, 1918 series of instructions.

57

If the company made use of the patriotic fervor of wartime to
gain the loyalty of its employees, unions likewise used the opportunity to step up their recruitment activities in the American steel
industry.

Because military needs demanded uninterrupted production,

the federal government needed the cooperation of organized labor in
its efforts uo win the war.

In return for their support, labor

unions obtained government recognition of their right to organize.
The reault was a spurt in unionizing activities because organizers
58
could claim that joining a union was a patriotic act,
At
Bethlehem Steel, a drive to organize the company's machinists met
with enough success to produce a walkout in April, 1918.
55

J.M. Gurnett to Commissioner of Naturalization, Jan. 5, 1919 1
Naturalization Records, File E-520,

56

See "Free Night School for Non-English Speaking Men," a

fl~er

in~.

57

J.M. Gurnett to Director of Citizenship, Dec. 1, 1919,

in~·

58 David Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919, Phila.,
c. 1965. PP• 50-53, 72-74.
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The grievances voiced by the striking machinists in 1918 were
similar to those which had led to the strike in 1910.

They com-

plained of an unfair bonus system, substandard wages, and inadequate
overtime pay.

In addition, the machinists stated thnt the company

manipulated draft deferments to eliminate union men from the ranks
of its employees.

Because of Bethlehem Steel's important role

in the production of war material, the National War Labor Board
h~ard

the case.

After listening to the witnesses, the N.W.L.B.

announced its decision on July 31, 1918.

It ordered the bonus system

to be eliminated, and replaced by pay scales conforming with the
minimum hourly rates of the War and Navy Departments which included
time and a half for work over eight hours and double time for
holidays and Sundays.

In addition, the company was ordered to meet

with shop committees elected by the employees to discuss all future
59
grievances.
The Bethlehem Steel Company was unhappy with the decision and
did nothing to implement it.

On November 17, Eugene Grace, president

of Bethlehem Steel, informed a War Labor Board examiner that, since
the war was over, the company was no longer bound by the board's
decision.

59

The company would not pay higher wage rates, and if the

"Democracy in Bethlehem," New Republic, Vol. 16, Aug. 1918,
pp. 36-38, United States Senate Committe on Labor and Education, Investigation of Strike in the Steel Industry, 66 Cong.
1st Session, Washington, 1919, p. 1008, "Hearing: the
Bethlehem Steel Company Controversy, June 18, 1918," "Award
of the National War Labor Board Aug. 1, 1918" in Bethlehem
case, docket 22, Record Group 2, Records of the National War
Labor Board, National Archives.
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N.W.L.B. wanted the machinists to have the back pay it said was
m~ed

them, the board could find the money itself.

The shop

committees elected under N.W.L.B. supervision were ignored, and
60
their members discharged during postwar production cutbacks.
After a public rebuke by ex-president William H. Taft, cochairman of the N.w.L.B., Grace backed down and agreed to
negotiate a new bargaining plan with the remaining committeemen.
On

April 3, 1919, a new plan was adopted which, on paper, gave

the employees' representatives unusual independence.

However, the

men had little reason to believe in the company's good faith and
in this they were justified.

The compc.·rty refused to adhere to the

back pay provisions of the N.W.L.B. award and the intransigence
of company officials made the collective bargaining plan useless.

61

When the National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel
Workers called an industry-wide walkout for September 22, 1919,
Bethlehem was not included.

Indeed, the National Committee desired

to keep Bethlehem in operation.

By applying competitive pressure

on the struck companies, Bethlehem Steel would act as a de facto
62
ally of the unions.

60

'E.B. Woods "Memorandum on Bethlehem Situation," Nov. 17, 1918,
E.B. Woods "Report" Nov. 19, Dec. 21, 1918, Eugene Grace to
William H. Taft, Dec. 12, 1918, "Hearing Jan. 15, 1919,"
R.G. Gregg to E.L. Mandel, Mar. 5v 1919, Bethlehem Case,
Docket 22, National War Labor Beard Records; New York Times,
January 16, 1919, p. 18, Jan. 19, Po 14, Feb. 5, p. 18.
61
~ke Investigation, pp. 1010, David Williams to W.L. Lauck,
Mar. 3, 1919, Bethlehem Cases, Docket 22, National War Labor
Board Records.
62
Brody, Crisis, pp. 180-182.
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The local union leaders at Bethlehem were willing to abide by
the National Committee's order not to strike, but the men were not.
Frustrated by the company's refusal to give them the back pay awarded
by the N.W.L.B., as well as by the failure of the collective bargaining
systemD the men wanted to strike.

They were encouraged by the initial

success of walkouts in other areas, and wanted the American Federation
of Labor to represent them as a bargaining agent.

It seemed parti-

cularly galling to them that the company recognized unions and paid
standard wages in its ship yards, but would not do so in its steel
mills.

63

In the face of rank and file discontent, and fearful of losing
members if they failed to actw local union leaders decided to call a
strike.

On September 21, they asked the National Committee to re-

quest a conference with company officials for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement to abolish company unions, recognize the
A.F. of L. as

~

bargaining agent, establish standard rates of pay,

and discuss outstanding grievances such as the back pay award.

If

the company did not reply by 4 P.M., September 25, the National
Committee was to issue an order for a strike on the twenty-ninth.

64

The call fot a conference was a tactic to gain public support,
for the company's anti-union stance was well known.

Acting on the

63

R.B. Gregg to E.B. Woods, Dec. 9, 1918, Bethlehem Case,
Docket 22, National War Labor Board Records, Strike Investigation, p. 1010.

64

South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 18, 1919, p. 18, New York Times,
Sept. 22, 1919, p. 2.
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assumption that no reply would be forthcoming, union leaders set
about making preparations for a strike, and printed cards asking
the men to stage a walkout.

This was a tactical mistake, for it

gave Grace the opportunity to accuse the union of a lack of good
faith.

In a public letter to the National Cnmmittee, Grace refu1;ed

to confer with A.F. of L. representatives because, he saidp the
company already had a collect:l.ve bargaining system, and were it
defective, employees would certainly have informed the management.
Since he had never received any complaints about the system, Grace
stated that he therefo,:e saw no need for a conference.
The walkout came on September 29, 1919 at 6 A.M.

65

By all

accounts, it was a great deal less than hoped for.

Out of a work

force of some 13,500, only about 2,500 men struck.

Most of the

strikers were machinists and there were few unskilled workers in
their ranks.
machinists.

Unioni2ing activities had been concentrated on the
It was assumed that a strike by machinists would

paralyze the company, and when the unskilled men saw that the com66
pany had been hurt, they would soon follow.
This was not to
happen.

65

See "Williams Statement" in ibid., Sept. 22, 1919, p. 2,
also Sept. 30, 1919, p. 2. -----

66william z. Foster, The Great Steel Strike ·and 'Its l.eseons,
New York, 1920, pp. 104, 181; ·~rike·Investigation, p. 1011,
South Bethlehem·Globe, Sept. 22, 1919, p. 1; ·New·York Times,
Sept. 30, 1919, p. 1, Easton Express, Oct. 1, 1919, p. 5.
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In spite of the machinists claim to have crippled the company,
their absence was not immediately apparent to observers.

Although

the company was more handicapped than offic1.als admitted, the noisy,
.:nnol<~e-pronw:·ing

continued.

activities in departments other than machine shops

The continued activity within the plant had an adverse

psychological effect on the determination of strikers to remain out,
as well as on potential strikers still at work.

67

Company officials were aware of the machinists' strategic importance, and kne·w that it would not be long before their absence
would noticeably affect production.

Thus, despite claims that all

was well, officials made a concerted effort to persuade the men to
return.

Supervisors visited the homes of striking machinists and

offered them bonuses ranging from $25 to $100 to return.

For those

men fearing violence if they came back the company announced it 't-Tould
send automobiles to bring them to work.

In the meantime, the com-

pany voluntarily raised the wages of men still at work.

68

The Company's efforts to end the strike were successful.

Al-

though many men stayed out longer, the strike was effectively over
in little more than a week.

The ranks of the strikers were thinned

't-Then the steam engineers returned to work in a

67
68

body~

The next blow

South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 30, 1919, p. 1, Easton Express,
Oct. 1, 1919, P• 1.
South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 30, 1919, p. 1, Oct. 4, p. 14,
Easton Express, Oct. 1, 1919, p. 1.
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came when the railroad men on the plant system voted not to strike.
This, added to the failure of the unskilled men to come out, meant
the end of the strike.

After this, the resolve of the strikers was

broken, and in spite of the efforts of their leaders, there was a
69
steady stream of deserters from the rank of the union men.
Perhaps the major reason for the strike's lack of success was
the failure to include the unskilled immigrant workers, for without
their staying power the strike had little chance of success.

The

absence of immigrant participation marks the major difference between this strike and the one which occurred in 1910.

The

individualistic native American strikers were subject to pressures
which immigrants, receiving the support of their ethnic communities
were not.

..

In 1910, the strike went on for months, as it did else-

where in 1919.

In Bethlehem, the strike of 1919 was shortlived in

the extreme.
If it appears obvious that immigrants should have been ineluded in the strike for it to succeed, it remains to be asked why
they were not.

The answer seems to lie in the absence of dis70
crimination by the company against immigrants.
War time propaganda
about "enemy aliens" coupled with the normal prejudice against
immigrants appears to have affected the skilled American workers

69 Foster, Strike, p. 182, South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 30, 1919,
P• 1, Oct. 1, P• 1.
70
Strike Investigation, PP• 1021.
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greatly.

At any rate, statements made by the striking machinists

indicated a resentment of the fact that "alien enemies and other
71
noncitizens," received the same wages they did.
The union did
not want such men in their ranks, and therefore made no effort to
organize them.

Even during the strike no effort was made to welcome

foreign-speaking workmen.

The leader of the union forces in

Bethlehem was, in factt prQud to declare that "tl.dre was no foreign
strike in Bethlehem; it was an American strike."
In addition to the

ma(~hinists'

72

hostility, other factors contri-

buted to the failure of the immigrants to strike.

Quite obviously

the wartime emphasis on patriotism and the Americanizstion program
had borne fruit.

The immigrants had assimilated the idea that loyalty

to the United States meant loyalty to the company.

Moreover, the

preparations made by the local police department for the strike reinforced this belief.
as special police.

The city hired 35 recently returned veterans

These men wore their army uniforms with only a

small button to indicate that they were police.

This, it was said,

was a deliberate attempt to intimidate foreigners by making them
believe that regular soldiers were on guard, and that the national
73
government opposed the strike.
In 1910, the strikers had the support of the entire community,

71 Ibid., PP• 1011, 1021.
72
.ill!·' p. 1015.
73
New York Times, Sept. 30, 1919, p. 2.
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but this was not the case in 1919.

By 1919, the company had

succeeded in its goal of integrating itself into the midst of
community life.

Moreover, since consolidation, the company, not

strikers, had a large influence in the local government, and on
September 28, the Mayor, Archibald Johnston, prohibited picketing
and public, that is union, meetings.

74

Since the strikers were

thereafter forced to meet in neighboring Allentown, the company
took the opportunity to arottse connnunity spirit on its behalf.
The company denounced the strikers as non-residents and outsiders,
and labelled the walkout an "Allentown strike."
telling argument and it struck horne.

75

This was a

There was little, if any,

overt support for the strikers in Bethlehem, and no need to denounce
strikers as

Bolsheviks and radicals or to resort to the repressive
76
violence which took place elsewhere in 1919.
The company's policy of good community relations had proved
its worth,

It had made a point of doing things for the·community

which were both l':onspicuous and pleasing.

In the space of a month,

during the same period as the strike, the local newspaper carried
notices concerning company activities.

On September 29, for

example, the city council publicly thanked the Bethlehem Steel Company
Band for providing free Sunday .concerts during the sunnner and for

74

15

76

Council Minutes, Vol. I, Sept. 28, 1919; South·Bethlehem Globe,
Sept~ 29, 1919, P• 1.
New York Times, Sept. 27, 1919, p. 3, Sept. 30, 1919, p. 2,
Brody, Crisis, pp. 119-159,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

playing gratis at street dances. 77

Articles on the sports pages

noted the activities of the Bethlehem Steel Soccer Team and spoke
78
of local boxers who were in training at the company's gymnasium.
Yet another article noted that the Bethlehem Steel was providing
the furnishings and would pay the rent for a chess and checkers
79
club in the city.
Events had come to such a point that, on
October 28, 1919, a candidate for city council was forced to defend
himself in print by

~o;~riting

a letter to the newspaper in which he

angrily denied that he had even been hostile to the Bethlehem Steel
Company or that he had ever said "Charles Schwab and his lieutenants
80
~Y'ere a positive detriment to this connnunity."
Bethlehem's reaction to the steel strike of 1919 indicated the
degree to which its residents had accepted the values of an industrial
society as their own.
with the often

Because the local citizens were in

exp~essed

symp~thy

desire of the Bethlehem Steel Company for

a stable and orderly local society, little support for the striking
machinists was forthcoming.

Whereas local residents had judged the

strike of 1910 from the standpoint of a value system hostile to
industrialism, their views were now determined by the benefits they
derived from living in an industrialized community.

In large measure,

this change in attitude was the direct result of the concerted efforts

77

.

South Bethlehem Globe, Sept. 30' 1919 ' p. 1.

78

Ibid., Oct. 1, 1919, P• 8.

79~•• Oct. 25, 1919, p. 8.
80

~··

Oct. 28, 1919, p. 10.
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of the Bethlehem Steel Company to transform the potentially volatile
local community into a stable, labor pool.

In the process of con-

vincing local citizens that the Bethlehem Steel Company had the
community's best interest at heart, the company also brought
Bethlehem to full acceptance of the values of an industrialized
society.

By 1920, it had become a modern industrial city, integrated

into the life of an industrial nation.
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CONCLUSION

In the years between 1741 and 1920, Bethlehem changed from a
religious commune into an industrial city.

In the process, the

standards by which the inhabitants lived also changed.

The values

and imperatives of an industrial society replaced those of a
Moravian village, and the Bethlehem Steel Company, not the Moravian
Church, was the community's dominant social institution.

In the

course of nearly two centuries, Gesellschaf.t had supplanted
Gemeinschaft,
In the eighteenth century, the religious values of the
Moravians influenced every aspect of life in Bethlehem.

The

village's social and economic institutions reflected the Moravian
emphasis on the importance of communal piety for salvation,

The

choirs carried out the social functions usually associated with· the
family, and also provided their members with food, clothing, shelter,
and employment.

Individual economic activity was forbidden, and,

in accord with the tenets of a Christian communalism, production
and consumption were shared by all,

Moreover, seeking to keep the

distracti.ng influences of the outside world at arm's length, the
Church aut.horities permitted none but Horavians to settle within the
limits of the town,
267.
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The attempt to insulate Bethlehem from the rest of the world
ended in failure.

Eighteenth century Pennsylvania proved to be

neither the time nor the place to establish a medieval, Christian.
utopia.

Western society was becoming increasingly secular and

individualistic, and its values gradually penetrated into
Bethlehem, altering the lives of its inhabitants.

By the middle

of the nineteenth century, there was little about Bethlehem to
distinguish it from any other American community of similar size.
To be sure, most of Bethlehem's inhabitants gave their allegiance
to the religious beliefs of their predecessors, but their lives
were governed by a spirit of secular individualism rather than by
the standards of communal pietism.
The spirit of secular individualism which brought an end to
Bethlehem's exclusively Moravian existence, also gave birth to
South Bethlehem as an industrial community.

Social cohesion was

at a minimum in South Bethlehem, for the members of the town's
heterogeneous population had little in common except for a desire
to achieve a measure of economic success.

Motivated more by

competition than cooperation, the inhabitants of South Bethlehem
were divided into a variety of social and ethnic groups each
possessing its own traditions and standards.

Only the local elite's

involvement in community affairs brought a sense of cohesion and
continuity to the town.
By 1920, the local community had once again undergone a transformation in values.

This time t.he shift was from an unrestrained
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individualism to a sense of membership in a corporate whole.

The

need for order and stability in a complex, urban-industrial society
led to the emergence of a value system based on bureaucratic
principles of organization, and cooperation replaced competition
as the ideal form of social behavior.

As Bethlehem's dominant

social institution, the Bethlehem Steel Company most fully embodied
these standards, and it

~~as

through the comp&ny'q involvement in

community affairs that such a value system
of the town's residents.

be~ame

part of the lives

The acceptance of this bureaucratic ethic

marked Bethlehem's absorption by an integrated national society.
It was the culmination of a process which had begun in the eighteenth
century when Bethlehem was founded as a religious commune.
To the degree that the specific events which comprise
Bethlehem's history are not repeated in the history of any community,
its story is unique.

Yet, seen in a broader context, Bethlehem's

history is in many ways representative of the national experience.
Bethlehem's transformation from a Moravian commune to a secular industrial city did not take place in a vacuum, for the forces which
influenced Bethlehem's development were general forces affecting
the nation as a whole.

In this sense, then, an understanding of

how one particular community became an industrial city can also help
us to better understand how the United States became an industrial
nation.
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